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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the inner connection between politics and morality and the 
analytical challenges it has posed and still poses for political philosophy.  In part one, I 
explore the problematic relationship between politics and morality as it has been 
conceived and analyzed by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Weber.  This exploration is 
a historical reconstruction, a ‘genealogy’, of four major philosophical accounts 
concerning the tension between the moral demands of politics and the moral demands of 
‘ordinary’ life.  The historical reconstruction aims at revealing the philosophical 
complexity of the problems that characterize the relationship between politics and 
morality.  It is set to show that those problems have some basic perennial features which 
remain unresolved until nowadays.   
In part two, following the conclusions of the historical reconstruction, I make 
the central contention that the insoluble fragmentation of moral values that characterizes 
our world is central to the understanding of the inner connection between politics and 
morality.  For this reason I analyze this connection from the perspective of moral 
pluralism, the philosophical tradition that conceives moral conflicts as the very essence 
of moral activity.  My claim is that politics appears to be structurally opposed to 
specific types of moral values, because political moral values themselves are part of the 
fragmentation of morality.  I support this claim with a further analysis of the moral 
divisions between the private, public and political spheres of conduct.  My argument is 
that each of those spheres is permeated by a dominant type of moral values which is in 
permanent tension with the dominant types of values in the other two spheres of 
conduct.  Finally, I make the case, that the usual aphorisms against the immorality of 
politicians and the famous concept of ‘dirty hands’ can be better understood when 
viewed as the inevitable result of the insoluble fragmentation of morality.  I conclude, 
however, that the perennial attempts to achieve some sense of moral unity through 
politics indicate the special moral status we should attribute to political action.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
It is not always obvious why someone interested in politics, or political discourse, needs 
to be concerned with questions of morality.  Yet, it is the main argument of this thesis, 
politics should always be studied along with moral matters, since political action is at 
any given time an ethically formative affair.  Conversely, politics is determined by 
moral concerns and moral behaviours.  This may seem paradoxical because the 
relationship between politics and morality has been usually considered as, to say the 
least, problematic, contradictory and irrelevant to political action.  Although political 
and moral discourses appear to be distinct in many respects, my intention is to offer a 
philosophical account of their interrelation after examining some key authors in the 
history of political philosophy who have devoted their attention to the relationship 
between politics and morality.  The parallel study of politics and morality is necessary if 
we are to avoid both conceptual and practical misunderstandings regarding political 
action and the way it is morally judged.  Hanna Pitkin speaks of moral discourse as 
‘characteristically dialogue, personal conversation about an action that has gone wrong 
or done damage’, whereas, she argues, ‘political questions strike one as being of larger 
scope and scale, addressed to a larger audience, cast in a more general and impersonal 
mode.’1  Although, as we are going to see in the rest of the thesis, this argument is 
generally correct, it does not follow from it that moral concerns are or should be 
irrelevant or contradictory to political concerns.  On the contrary, politics pertains to 
human actions and problems which, even if not always clearly existential, are most of 
the time, directly or indirectly, related to a general ontological exegesis or moral 
purpose.  Thus, since politics concerns human affairs, it will inevitably be grounded on 
moral predilections and it will inevitably have moral consequences.  When we discuss 
about political problems we expect to find difficulties in identifying the right actions, in 
predicting their results and, at the end of the day, in resolving them, because there is 
always one or more related moral concerns to those problems.  If there were none, then 
we would not find it difficult to conduct politics and also make moral judgments about 
                                                 
1
 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social 
and Political Thought, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, and London (1993), 204. 
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politics.  In a few words, political problems are problems because they have moral 
implications and, at the same time, are constituted upon moral arguments. 
 As a consequence, the general argument to be identified and analyzed in detail 
concerns the variety of parameters that have defined the relationship between politics 
and morality in the course of time and the importance that these parameters may have 
for a better understanding of this relationship in contemporary political philosophy.  The 
question is why a better understanding of politics and political action needs a parallel 
understanding of morality and moral action and why the interaction of these two very 
generic concepts sometimes creates philosophical confusion and practical difficulties.  
Already, the identification of this relationship as a problem raises a number of questions 
regarding the ‘object’ and ‘approach’ of the thesis.  One obvious question is why one 
would choose to study the problem both historically and analytically.  One preliminary 
answer is that most attempts in political philosophy are either focused on its history or 
on its contemporary normative concepts, but never on both.  My claim is that a 
comprehensive approach to problems that derive from the relationship between politics 
and morality should be based, first, upon a genealogy of all the relevant major 
arguments in the history of political philosophy; and second upon the contemporary 
analytical efforts which should be viewed as the conclusion of this genealogy.  In other 
words, if we are to pursue a fuller understanding of a problematic concept we need to 
ascertain if and how it has been problematic for previous thinkers and authors.   
This brings us to more specifically methodological issues.  We can narrow down 
the methodological questions by assuming two possible objections.  The first refers to 
the relation between philosophy and the study of political theory and whether it is valid 
to conflate those two disciplines, which are essentially focused on different subjects of 
analysis, in order to answer moral questions of political nature.  This is what Pitkin 
thinks is the essence of philosophy according to Wittgenstein: ‘philosophizing is the 
attempt to get clear about the most significant and fundamental and inescapable features 
of the world and ourselves, not by gathering new facts but by reinvestigating the facts 
we already have.  But that necessarily means getting clear about our concepts, their 
limits, and their implications.’2  Thus philosophy is the study of the concepts that reflect 
the human condition and the central forms of human life.  But where philosophy is 
concerned with those fundamental concepts, their discrepancies and their order, political 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 294. 
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theory is concerned with the discrepancy and order in the relationship between our 
concepts and our institutional practices.
3
   
 Hence, it is my claim here, that the study of the relationship between politics and 
morality requires an approach that combines both ‘philosophizing’ about the human 
condition and theorizing about politics.  This is political philosophy in its classical 
sense; that is, discourse regarding existential matters such as questions about the moral 
purposes of the human species along with questions of how it is better to organize 
human society in order to meet those purposes.  Therefore, it is not merely, as Pitkin 
argues, that political philosophy is, presumably, occupied with central political 
concepts,
4
 but more importantly that it is concerned with ontological and moral 
concepts which interact in complicated ways with political concepts.  For example we 
can conceive institutions, political organizations and political conduct in general, as 
ethical ideas: established in order to fulfil some ‘public or quasi-public moral purpose’;5 
or we can think of moral habits as a fundamentally motivational force for specific kinds 
of political action.  The relationship between politics and morality is, in either case, the 
epitome of what we should call political philosophy.  This is a necessary 
methodological clarification because, as we shall examine at a later stage, some 
problems of political action and moral judgment –such as the famous ‘dirty hands’ 
case– are often conceptually confused, either because they are not established upon 
correct philosophical assumptions, or because they are not considered to be 
philosophically significant.  In this sense, one could say that one of the purposes of this 
thesis is to point out the significance of moral philosophy in studying and understanding 
political theory and vice versa.  On the same note, this thesis might contribute to the call 
for a return to political philosophy in its classical meaning, where progress is not 
identified with the fragmentation of disciplines within philosophy, but is based upon the 
ability to unify different spheres of knowledge in favour of a fuller understanding of the 
human condition.   
 
The second and more essentially methodological objection which needs to be addressed, 
even if only briefly, refers to the approach of the relationship between politics and 
morality as a problem that has been perennially troubling for political philosophers in 
different times and in different societies.  One of the basic aims of the thesis is to show 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 298-299. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, Bibliolife (original edition: MacMillan and 
Co., New York 1899), 297. 
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that the relationship between politics and morality constitutes a problem which can be 
traced back to the origins of political philosophy.  Indeed, the problem itself lies at the 
beginning of political philosophy.  The argument is that this relationship has taken 
different forms through time but it is essentially deriving from similar philosophical 
difficulties which persist until nowadays.  These philosophical difficulties can be briefly 
identified as the conflict between different moral values and their equivalent spheres of 
action, and the supposedly distinguished role of politics in attempting to resolve this 
conflict and achieve some sense of unity.  The closest approach to this discussion in the 
relevant bibliography on politics and morality is John Parrish’s argument on ‘dirty 
hands’ as a philosophical, political and historical problem which has been thought and 
analyzed in different versions, but as fundamentally the same, in the course of time.
6
  
However, Parrish mainly focuses on an account of the ‘real history of the problem’7 and 
he does not delve into the detailed philosophical conclusions which can be drawn from 
such a history.   
 The leap from a historical exposition of the problem of politics and morality to a 
contemporary philosophical solution of it, must necessarily address the methodological 
objections made by the school of historical contextualism.  This is because any such 
leap from history to analysis is in danger of losing focus of the problem in several ways.  
Quentin Skinner argues that studying past works of philosophy in order to discover 
‘timeless elements’ is not only impossible, but also pointless.8  In other words, 
concentrating on what the classic writers have said about ‘fundamental concepts’ and 
‘abiding questions’ has nothing to offer to our contemporary understanding of a given 
philosophical or political problem.
9
  The main problem in such approaches is that of 
‘sheer anachronism’.  ‘A given writer’, Skinner argues, ‘may be “discovered” to have 
held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity of terminology, on some subject 
to which he cannot in principle have meant to contribute.’10  This sheer anachronism 
usually results into two types of ‘mythologies’ which, according to Skinner, make 
studies in political philosophy sometimes irrelevant and sometimes misguiding.  The 
first type is the ‘mythology of doctrines’ which consists of ‘supplying the classic 
theorists with doctrines which are agreed to be proper to their subject, but which they 
have unaccountably failed to discuss’.  Thus there is ‘the question of whether any of 
                                                 
6
 John Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007). 
7
 Ibid., 18. 
8 Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, History and Theory, Vol. 8, No. 1 
(1969), 4. 
9
 Ibid., 5. 
10
 Ibid., 8. 
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these writers ever intended, or even could have intended, to do what they are thus 
castigated for not having done.’11 
 I believe that Skinner’s objection to careless extrapolations when one studies the 
history of political philosophy is reasonable, but not essential in denying the existence 
of perennial problems.  To use Mark Bevir’s argument, such danger can be avoided 
when scholars pay the proper attention to philosophical problems and do not get carried 
away by their strong interest in them.
12
  However, the second type of ‘mythology’ 
Skinner outlines in his seminal article on the Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas is crucial for the validity of any study and argument made in relation to 
political philosophy and its history.  This is the ‘mythology of coherence’ according to 
which it may become ‘dangerously easy for the historian to conceive it as his task to 
supply or find in each of these texts the coherence which they may appear to lack.  Such 
danger is exacerbated […] by the consequent temptation to find a “message” which can 
be abstracted from it and more readily communicated.’ And Skinner concludes, ‘[t]he 
writing of history of ethical and political philosophy is pervaded by this mythology.’13   
Bevir’s answer to this objection is that scholars who find that an author 
expressed beliefs relevant to a contemporary problem can avoid this danger if they 
frame the problem in a sufficiently abstract manner.
14
  Obviously, the ‘mythology of 
coherence’ will always be a danger for every work in the genealogy of political and 
philosophical concepts.  This is because defining the problems in ‘sufficiently abstract 
terms’ is a relative thing where the limits of abstraction are unclear.  The outcome of 
such studies lies thus on our ability to reconstruct the views of past authors on problems 
which they might not have addressed directly.  This reconstruction must be sufficiently 
but not overly abstract.  However, the main objection posed by Skinner remains: are 
there any real perennial problems in political philosophy?  Following Bevir’s response, 
perennial problems do exist for three reasons: first because when we translate a past 
work into our vocabulary it follows that we share some relevant beliefs with the past 
author.  The possibility for translation entails that we can ponder a problem, which a 
past author addressed.
15
  Second, because past authors might have addressed a problem 
which authors who wrote on these authors also addressed and which we too can 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., 13, 16. 
12
 Mark Bevir, ‘Are There Perennial Problems in Political Theory?’, Political Studies, XLII, (1994), 674. 
13
 Skinner, Meaning and Understanding, 16. 
14
 Bevir, ‘Are There Perennial Problems’, 670, 674. 
15
 Ibid., 664. 
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ponder.
16
  Finally, ‘provided that we are willing to frame problems in a suitably abstract 
fashion, we can find perennial problems, that is problems numerous authors have 
expressed beliefs about at least indirectly and we too can ponder.’17   
The common logic that permeates those reasons for the acceptance of perennial 
problems is that, given the appropriate reconstruction, we can see the recurrence of a 
philosophical problem which has yet to be given a definite solution.  This is why we call 
some works classic and some others not; because they express or set the context for 
perennial problems.  It lies with us to reconstruct carefully the views of those classic 
authors and identify their beliefs and ideas as relevant to the problem we recognize as 
perennial.
18
  Furthermore, Skinner’s argument that ‘any argument is inevitably local or 
particular and because of this is unable to reach the level of abstraction necessary for it 
to be of trans-historical import’19 can be set aside considering the distinction between 
what is perennial and what is eternal, as explained in Rob Lamb’s critical article on 
Skinner’s revised historical contextualism.  Lamb’s argument is that when Skinner 
invokes Collinwood’s claim about eternal problems he fails to see the division between 
eternal as meaning something ‘without beginning or end’ and perennial as meaning 
something that lasts for a very long time.  To say that there are no eternal problems, as 
Collinwood has said, is to make an a priori ontological claim, whereas to say that there 
are no perennial problems, i.e. there cannot be philosophical arguments which last for a 
long time, is an empirical claim, which is deeply controversial.
20
     
In concluding the considerations of the possible methodological objections to 
such an approach in political philosophy, I want to argue that it is sufficient to keep in 
mind two basic conditions as summarized by Lamb: first, ‘Any claim that a particular 
problem is perennial or that a particular argument is intended for comprehension beyond 
its immediate temporal horizons requires substantiation with relevant evidence or 
argument’; and second, ‘whether or not past political thinkers are thought to have 
something to say will always be a matter of some contingency.  Nevertheless, it seems 
inevitable that encounters and critical engagements with the concepts and intellectual 
traditions that have bequeathed to us, as well as those alien to us both temporally and 
culturally, have an obvious utility.’21  This means that the study of the relationship 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 669. 
17
 Ibid., 671. 
18
 Ibid., 670-671. 
19
 Robert Lamb, ‘Quentin Skinner’s revised historical contextualism: a critique’, History of the Human 
Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2009), 60. 
20
 Ibid., 60-61. 
21
 Ibid., 70. 
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between politics and morality, with all the contextual variables and parameters 
considered, could be justifiably characterized as a perennial problem with no definite 
solution so far.  The uncertain limits of abstraction in writing the intellectual history of 
the problem do not entail that it is not possible to identify past beliefs as relevant to the 
given problem, provided we fulfill the above basic conditions.
22
 
 
Hence, the thesis is divided into two parts: the first, as already mentioned, is a 
genealogy of the arguments made in relation to the problematic nature of the 
relationship between politics and morality.  The genealogy is not written purely as 
history of political thought.  Instead, it is a reconstruction of arguments made by major 
figures in political philosophy in order to trace the roots of our problem and set the 
frame for its contemporary understanding.  This reconstruction has been based upon the 
indispensable guides of Janet Coleman’s History of Political Thought23 and Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s Short History of Ethics;24 Stuart Hampshire’s Innocence and Experience,25 
where he analyses the perennial features of the intersection between politics and 
morality as these have been exposed by Plato, Aristotle and, most importantly, 
Machiavelli; and Wilhelm Hennis’s Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction,26 for the 
final chapter of the genealogy on Weber’s political philosophy.   
Thus, the reconstruction starts with Plato’s political philosophy as the first 
attempt to reconcile the contradictory demands between what ancient Greeks called 
dikaiosune (mainly understood as an individual virtue) and the affairs of the polis.  This 
is the distinction that we nowadays roughly translate as the conflict between private and 
political virtue.  The moral man, Plato argued in the Apology,
27
 cannot fulfill his 
political purposes unless he is ready to risk his individual virtue.  For Plato, the 
discovery that shook the foundations of philosophy was the realization that the virtuous 
man, i.e. Socrates the philosopher, cannot and would not survive in this world because 
politics structurally poses and will always pose impossible demands on private virtue.  
However, Plato then developed the exact opposite argument.  In the Crito,
28
 we find 
                                                 
22
 Bevir, ‘Are There Perennial Problems’, 670. 
23
 Janet Coleman, A History of Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity Vol. 1 & 2, 
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, Malden and Victoria (2000). 
24
 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge, London and New York (1998). 
25
 Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, Penguin Books, London (1989). 
26
 Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction, Allen & Unwin, London (1988). 
27
 Plato, ‘Apology’, in Thomas G. West (ed.), Four Texts On Socrates, Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and 
Crito, and Aristophanes’ Clouds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London (1998).  Henceforth all 
four works will be quoted in abbreviated form with lines in brackets within the text.   
28
 Plato, ‘Crito’, in Thomas G. West (ed.), Four Texts On Socrates. 
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Plato arguing against private virtue as a corrosive element to the political morals and the 
good of the polis.  Thus, the problem of politics and morality, and in consequence the 
‘discipline’ of political philosophy, came to life because Plato recognized this 
fundamental contradiction.  His attempt to resolve this conflict between private and 
political virtue in the Republic
29
 is still nowadays every scholar’s starting point for a 
study of such matters.  Plato, by discovering the true meaning of dikaiosune (or what we 
badly translate as morality or justice) and offering an account of politics which would 
make possible their integration in a unified concept, wished to eradicate the conflict and 
thus the existential threat to the philosopher’s way of life. 
 However, although Plato’s insights in the nature of knowledge and its relation to 
morality and politics are indispensable, his tentative epistemological assumptions and 
his extreme political conclusions are necessarily the limited outcome of ancient Athens’ 
social context.  Aristotle is the next stop in this genealogy of politics and morality not 
only because he offered a stringent criticism of Plato’s misconceptions (and all the more 
impressive that he did so through the same social and pedagogical spectacles), but also, 
and more importantly, because he developed an equally powerful argument regarding 
the interrelation between moral and political virtue, by adding the intellectual element 
as a separate factor.  Thus, if it was Plato who first set the problem and defined its 
features, it was Aristotle who systematically tried to explain and resolve the causes of 
the tension between political and moral virtue without resorting to epistemological leaps 
of metaphysical shortcuts, like Plato’s theory of the ‘Forms’.  Aristotle’s most important 
works on political philosophy
30
 constitute an attempt to understand the nature of both 
morality and politics based on statistical data about political constitutions and biological 
observations about the human nature.  What Aristotle contributed was the idea that, 
although in his thought there is an objective moral end for men, in reality social 
structures and ethical ideals are so variable that they can hardly be subsumed under a 
common ontological aim.  However, instead of trying to eradicate the variety of views 
                                                 
29
 Plato, Republic, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).  Henceforth will be quoted in abbreviated 
form with lines in brackets within the text. 
30
 The two major works that constitute the main body of Aristotle’s political philosophy are not 
individually written as political philosophy.  However, the Nicomachean Ethics which is Aristotle’s 
moral theory and the Politics which is Aristotle’s political theory were intended by him to be read as 
works necessarily complementary to each other.  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (2000), and Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996).  Henceforth both works will be quoted in abbreviated 
form with lines in brackets within the text. 
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in favour of a utopian moral and political unity, as Plato did even though in an ideal 
sense, Aristotle chose to develop a political philosophy where politics is not structurally 
in conflict with morality.  For him, politics and morality are in tension because we have 
not attributed the proper significance to the political nature of human beings.  Thus in 
Aristotle’s account there is no need to transform human beings and their political 
organization so as to make them fit with an arbitrary account of morality (contra Plato).  
Instead, we only need to cultivate in them a sense of moral purpose, which naturally 
means nothing else than being political.  The reconciliation between politics and 
morality is therefore achieved smoothly without negating the nature of either politics 
and morality, or man. 
 The eradication of contradictions, the attempts to restore the moral unity of the 
political and the private, and the proposals of comprehensive political solutions to the 
existential questions of philosophy, are the features that characterize the classical school 
of political philosophy as represented by the fathers of this tradition, Plato and Aristotle.  
In order to find a break with the classical school, we must turn to Machiavelli, several 
centuries later, and his political agenda full of implicit assumptions about the 
relationship between politics and morality.  Machiavelli expressed a period when 
political philosophy was rife with conceptual shifts regarding the essence of politics and 
morality.  The moral ambiguity of Machiavelli’s works, character and political purposes 
is the proof of his differentiation from thinkers and writers of the classical tradition who 
have always set a moral goal and attempted to reach it by offering accounts of political 
organization based on philosophically sound moral reasoning.  At first glance, there is 
no ontology to be found in Machiavelli’s political works or a statement which clearly 
indicates to an underlying moral philosophy in his thought.  For the first time, it seems, 
a political work of great importance for its contemporary and future generations did not 
aim at offering an account of politics and morality in unity.  Nevertheless, Machiavelli 
can and has been considered as a fundamental writer in the history of political 
philosophy.  This is because, despite all the ambiguity and confusion that he created, 
Machiavelli speaks of the same problem to which Plato and Aristotle spoke.  With 
regard to Machiavelli, the focus of this thesis is not on the correctness of this or that 
interpretation, or the confusion created by the dichotomy between the Prince
31
 and the 
Discourses,
32
 but on the essential resources we can draw from his works regarding a 
fuller understanding of our problem.    
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For example, Quentin Skinner and David Wooton endorse the traditional 
‘Machiavellian’ interpretation according to which Machiavelli was the primary thinker 
who openly doubted that morality is a necessary thing for good politics.
33
  Political 
virtue was for the first time so clearly disconnected and irrelevant to moral virtue.  
Whether or not Machiavelli intended to put forward such a view is irrelevant for our 
present concerns.  What is relevant is that intentionally or not Machiavelli’s works 
initiated the recognition of political ethics as a different, or better, opposite thing to 
‘moral ethics’.  Equally indicative for Machiavelli’s contribution to the discourse of 
political philosophy is Isaiah Berlin’s34 interpretation of Machiavelli’s works as fully 
philosophical but proposing a radical division between two different and furiously 
conflicting moral worlds: the pagan-republican and the Christian-apolitical world.  
Finally, it is even possible to reconstruct Machiavelli, like Erica Benner does in her 
unconventional interpretation,
35
 as a deeply philosophical thinker who in reality aimed 
at finding a universal moral principle as a stable guide for good and effective politics. 
Thus, the philosophical ambiguity of Machiavelli’s writing is all the more suitable for a 
number of interpretations on the meaning he attributed to the relationship between 
politics and morality.  For political philosophers, and possibly not for historical 
contextualists, Machiavelli’s political works constitute not only the ideal transitional 
point from the classical authors to modernity, but also a fountain of ideas and concepts 
regarding the possible ways that the relationship between politics and morality can be 
studied. 
 A comprehensive genealogy of the relationship between politics and morality 
should include several more major thinkers of politics and moral philosophy before and 
after Machiavelli.  Hence it may seem strange that for such a study the final 
philosophical reconstruction takes place along the lines of the work of sociologist Max 
Weber.  Weber’s political writings are not extensive and, like Machiavelli’s, are not rich 
with points and observations about moral philosophy.  Nevertheless, if we assume that 
Machiavelli was the transitional point from classical to modern political philosophy 
because of all the different perspectives he made available for future thinkers, then we 
can assume that Weber was the transitional point from modern to contemporary 
political philosophy.  The criterion for such categorization of Weber amongst political 
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philosophers is once again his conception of the relationship between politics and 
morality and its philosophical consequences, as best summarized in his works Politics 
as a Vocation
36
 and The Nation and Economic Policy.
37
  Machiavelli’s cynical, though 
ambiguous, divisions between the spheres of politics and morality, virtue and practical 
effectiveness and thus the good man and the good ruler are clarified and explained by 
Weber through the spectacles of utilitarian and deontological moral theories.  These 
theories constitute philosophical traditions that dominated modernity and are still very 
strong nowadays.  For Weber, the tension between politics and morality derives from 
the idea that the consequences of an action (as derived from utilitarian philosophies) and 
its intrinsic value (as derived from deontic theories) cannot always be reconciled.  
History and political philosophy have taught us that this dichotomy is somewhat 
simplistic.  They have also taught us that the complex fragmentation of moral values 
makes such reconciliation impossible.   
Politics, for Weber, is still man’s attempt to give meaning to collective existence 
but it achieves this through struggle and compromise; not through concepts of moral 
unity.  Thus, although the tentative nature of the relationship between politics and 
morality has remained the same in the course of time, we can discern a progressive 
movement: from Plato’s unity of private and political virtue under the auspices of a 
dominating philosophy; to Aristotle’s more realistic account of the inter-determination 
between the moral and political spheres of life; to Machiavelli’s ambiguous argument  
that this unity or interrelation might not be what it seems to be at first glance; and 
finally, to Weber’s conclusion that our moral universe is so fragmented that we can only 
compromise and try our best to remain political beings as our best chance to preserve 
the moral importance of our existence.  The acceptance of moral pluralism, as the 
penultimate obstacle for the unity to which politics aspires, signifies the end of the 
genealogy of the problem and the –final– transition to our contemporary understanding 
of this relationship.   
 
With this argument in mind we must turn to the second part of the thesis which draws 
upon the concepts and observations of the philosophical reconstructions of past authors 
in order to improve our understanding of the problematic nature of politics and 
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morality.  First, we need to consider the fundamental irreconcilable dualisms in Plato 
and Aristotle’s political philosophies.  Then, we have the variety of interpretations of 
Machiavelli’s works as the outcome of his own moral ambiguity.  Finally, we have 
Weber’s conception of the conflict between one’s being responsible for political actions 
that might seem immoral and one’s moral integrity based on moral fragmentation.  
These arguments should indicate that the problematic features of the relationship 
between politics and morality are determined by our inability to create unitary accounts 
of morality.  Contemporary political philosophy struggles with the concept of ‘moral 
dilemmas’ because if there are indeed real insoluble moral conflicts then the 
understanding of our problem takes a crucial turn.  The problem of moral dilemmas 
continues from Weber’s conclusion about the fragmentation of moral values and it 
explores the limits of moral judgment in politics.  Christopher Gowans’ anthology of 
several articles from major contemporary thinkers on Moral Dilemmas
38
 is a 
comprehensive guide for the argument made here.  Its basic structure is that if on the 
one hand the fragmentation of moral values is not only apparent but real, then moral 
dilemmas are an unavoidable feature of our lives and the tension between politics and 
morality takes the form of such a dilemma.  If on the other hand moral pluralism is a 
misconception –as the dominant unitary moral theories of modernity dictate– then the 
tension between politics and morality is due to our inadequacies in applying or 
following the right moral guides and principles.  The argument pursued in this thesis is 
that not only are there moral conflicts due to the irreducible moral pluralism in the 
human universe, but also that the acceptance of moral pluralism is the only sufficient 
basis upon which we can achieve a better understanding of political action and its moral 
judgment.    
 Obviously, a pluralistic account of the relationship between politics and morality 
requires the clarification of several factors, against a monistic explanation of morality 
which does not recognize the distinction between the private and the political at all, and 
thus it rejects the problematic nature of the relationship between politics and morality.  
The most important clarification, and a pivotal point in this thesis, is with regard to the 
differentiation of the concepts of the private, the public and the political, in terms of 
their moral value and its practical connotations.  As it is going to be evident, the 
genealogy of the relationship between politics and morality has proved very useful in 
identifying that the major factor which divides classical and modern times is the 
difference between the concepts of the public and the political.  In this sense, the 
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perennial problem of moral pluralism for politics has in contemporary times been 
exacerbated.  This extra division is something which is not always evident in the 
contemporary literature.  Thus, contemporary accounts on the tension between politics 
and morality are based on the distinction, most prominently made by Thomas Nagel, 
between the personal and impersonal moral standpoints.  And although thinkers of 
moral pluralism recognize that there are several types of moral value which are 
irreducible to each other, when it comes to politics and morality this pluralism is often 
reduced to a basic dichotomy between utility and principle.
39
  However, there is not a 
comprehensive account of the fundamental distinction and the antagonistic relationship 
between the public and the political and, naturally, it is not always possible to 
comprehend fully how these are interrelated with private ethical considerations.  Susan 
Mendus,
40
 Lynne McFall,
41
 Martin Hollis
42
 and Thomas Nagel
43
 are here the key 
thinkers who have to offer significant insights on the problem but sometimes without 
any conclusive philosophical argument and sometimes without and conclusive political 
propositions.    
Thus, while moving from the ancient authors to Weber’s definitions regarding 
politics and morality, we should notice that the understanding of the problem changes 
significantly because the concept of the public is now added to the tension between the 
private and the political.  This addition is not a trivial one, merely relating to 
contemporary contextual understandings of the political.  Instead it is the result of deep 
structural changes that took place in modernity and transformed morally our world.  
Politics has always had a special status in regard to resolving problems of moral 
disunity despite being part of the problem itself.  However, nowadays the special moral 
status of politics is conflated with the moral importance of the public in resolving 
conflicts.  Thus, in addition to the usual distinctions between the intrinsic value of 
private morality and political utility, we now have public moral rules of impartiality, 
which sometimes significantly overlap with our personal moral considerations and 
sometimes are an indispensable element of good politics.  Our inability to clarify the 
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overlap and set the limits between each sphere of action and its moral implications 
aggravates the fragmentation of moral values and thus the conflict between politics and 
morality.   
Moral fragmentation is therefore depicted nowadays in the conflict between 
private moral integrity, which is constituted by general personal ethical considerations; 
political virtue, or what is commonly called the political ethic which gives priority to 
the utility and consequences of political action; and public morality which is 
particularly related to the public official’s virtues of impartiality.  How do we set the 
priorities in order to achieve some sense of unity of moral purpose in contemporary life 
and politics?  Each of these moral spheres and the equivalent social roles have acquired 
over time an autonomous and irreducible value, despite the fact that in reality they all 
overlap with each other and are fundamentally inter-determined.  This is what makes the 
transition from a concept of politics and morality based on the classical dualism 
between private and political virtue –that so much permeates the works of Plato, 
Aristotle and Machiavelli– to the contemporary (mis)understanding about political 
action and moral judgment.  
 Indicative of this contemporary misunderstanding and philosophical confusion is 
the concept of ‘dirty hands’, the analysis of which constitutes the conclusion of this 
thesis, in favour of a more philosophical and thus moral understanding of contemporary 
politics.  Often, the expression ‘dirty hands’ is related to conceptions of politics and 
politicians as generally morally corrupted and ‘worse than ordinary citizens.’44  Michael 
Walzer is the seminal figure in the debate about the meaning of ‘dirty hands’ and he was 
the first to set the problem on a basis of moral pluralism.
45
  Taking Walzer’s argument 
as the starting point, my purpose is to point out that the concept of ‘dirty hands’ is the 
contemporary political expression of the classical philosophical problem, as it has been 
traced through the genealogy of politics and morality.
46
  Stephen de Wijze speaks of the 
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‘strong ambivalence [that] pervades our attitudes towards politicians.’  ‘We want them’, 
he says, ‘to be morally upstanding men and women, honourable persons who we can 
trust to look after our well being and even our lives.  Yet we also recognise that for 
politicians to do their jobs well, they may engage in deception, compromise, betrayal 
and even murder.’47  I want to argue that this ambivalence is the result of the 
philosophical confusion about the fragmentation of value and the relationship between 
politics and morality.  This is so, because in cases of morally complex political 
situations we try to apply our personal ethical considerations and naturally fail to come 
up with consistent moral judgments or a reasonable understanding of political action.  
Thus, ‘[w]e end up inappropriately, sometimes dangerously, judging politicians far too 
harshly and sometimes not harshly enough.’48  My aim is therefore similar in exploring 
‘the boundaries of a moral politics’.   
Nevertheless, my intention is philosophically to extend the field of this study 
and argue that contemporary concepts such as the ‘fragmentation of moral value’ and 
the ‘dirty hands’ problem are interrelated in a deeper degree than it is often thought.  
Thus, when we aim at a conception of moral politics it is not always sufficient to state 
the obvious, i.e. there is a contradiction, a conflict which cannot be resolved unless we 
are ready to make sacrifices.  Despite the self-evident argument that states, politicians, 
public officials and so on cannot always be treated in a similar manner we treat the 
actors of private immoralities, we need to be in a position where we can –whether we 
are politicians, public officials or simple citizens– make moral judgments appropriate to 
our roles in social life.  In other words, a better understanding of our moral universe in 
relation to political action, justification and punishment is not only necessary as a ‘set of 
principles which can work as a guide for the politician’,49 but it is necessary as an 
indispensable element for the improvement of the human condition in its classical 
Weberian meaning.  
 
Thus, to begin with the first part of the thesis, the first chapter is devoted to exploring 
the origins of the philosophical problem that is treated herein.  These origins are to be 
found in Plato’s three main works in relation to the conflict between private and 
political virtue (Apology and Crito) and the resolution of this conflict according to 
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Plato’s radical propositions (Republic).  Plato’s political philosophy purports to explain 
the relationship between politics, morality and knowledge and offers solutions to the 
problems of this relationship within the context of the ancient Greek polis.  These 
solutions are essentially based on a unified conception of morality and politics.  
The second chapter examines the second major classical account on the tension 
between the contemplative, individual life and political activity, as developed by 
Aristotle (second in chronological order, but not in terms of philosophical significance).  
Aristotle provides a thorough analysis of the way in which moral characters and 
collective practices determined each other, as the latter are realized in the sphere of 
politics.  At the same time, he insists that there are insurmountable obstacles that 
everyday practical reason encounters in dealing with human nature and the complexity 
of human life. 
Chapter three makes the leap to Machiavelli and investigates three contrasting 
interpretative traditions of his works.  The juxtaposition of these interpretations (and 
their variations) aims at revealing that Machiavelli’s importance as a political thinker 
lies exactly in his ambiguity and/or cynicism in relation to the place morality has in 
conducting politics.  In this thesis, I offer no solution as to which interpretation really 
captures the essence of Machiavelli’s works and, accordingly, his own intentions as a 
political figure and as a writer.  Instead, the importance here lies in the depth and variety 
of the analytical tools that the exploration of Machiavelli’s political advice (or 
philosophy, depending on the interpretation) offers us, in the quest for a better 
understanding of the relationship between politics and morality.   
In chapter four, the final chapter of the first part of the thesis, we make the 
transition from classical and Renaissance understandings of politics and morality to a 
more contemporary one.  Weber is the transitional and maybe the key figure in this 
progressive movement from attempts to offer either coherent accounts of morality and 
politics or accounts where morality is irrelevant to politics, to accounts where morality 
and politics are strongly interrelated, but at the same time always conflicting.  Weber 
contemplates the existential predicament of the public figure and the political leader in 
such permanent conditions of moral fragmentation.  
Chapter five of Part two introduces the central concept of ‘moral dilemmas’.  In 
line with the conclusions we have drawn from the genealogy of the problematic 
relationship between politics and morality, we analyse the possibility that such a 
relationship is part of an irreducible moral pluralism, which entails an inevitable conflict 
between moral values.  This view contrasts with traditional and dominant explanations 
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of morality, which are based on some particular comprehensive principles, and deny the 
possibility that morality can have a conflicting nature, and thus that there can be a 
conflicting relationship between politics and morality.  Instead, in this thesis the basic 
claim that politics and morality constitute a problematic field of analysis is based on the 
acceptance that their tension is strongly related to the concept of ‘moral dilemmas’.  
Thus, one of the conclusions here is that monistic philosophical traditions cannot 
capture the essence of this relationship. 
After having rejected such monistic explanations of morality, and consequently 
of the possibility for political conduct to be faultless, in chapter six we explore the core 
argument of this thesis, that moral pluralism in politics is represented by the distinction 
between three fundamental spheres of moral agency: the private, the public and the 
political.  Each sphere is permeated by a different set of dominant moral values which 
are by nature conflicting but also very often overlapping, contributing thus further to the 
confusion regarding the relationship between politics and morality. 
Finally, in chapter seven we examine the concept of ‘dirty hands’ in political 
action as a way of evaluating our arguments thus far.  Several interpretations of ‘dirty 
hands’ have been developed in contemporary political theory based on different 
understandings of the main elements that characterize the relationship between politics 
and morality.  This is the particular contribution that this thesis aims to offer: an 
understanding of political decisions and moral judgment based on a philosophical 
account that takes on board the conflicting nature of morality, while at the same time 
accepting both the possibility of moral action in politics and the importance of morality 
for political action.   
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1. The Genesis of Political Philosophy:                                                                  
Plato’s Attempt to Treat Politics and Morality as One 
 
 
A) Crito and the Apology: The origin of the debate between politics and morality 
Politics in classical Greece was not always related to philosophy.  It did not always 
engage in ontological and ethical arguments and it was mainly occupied with the 
practical organization of the community, whereas philosophy was related to natural 
science.  Socrates was the first thinker who attempted to offer a conception of politics as 
a matter of science, in order to fight against the political and moral conventionalism of 
his time.  The Platonic figure of Socrates offers the best introduction to the combination 
of both worlds; i.e. political philosophy.  The Socratic dialogues illustrate not only the 
conflict between politics and philosophy but also the manner in which they are or 
should be connected when one recognizes that it is meaningless to develop political 
arguments without any moral basis; that is, the aim of politics should in one way or 
another be the ‘good life’.  Plato, thus, attempted to demonstrate the fact that political 
philosophy is concerned with political organization and institutions based on practical 
social necessities and pure philosophy is concerned with a freedom of mind which is in 
principle contrary to these necessities.  Then he tried to show whether this contradiction 
can be resolved, at least at a theoretical level.  Socrates’ practical predicament and 
teachings are therefore organized by Plato in order to identify the fundamental concepts 
within the problem of incompatibility between morality, or justice, in its most abstract 
sense, and real politics.  Plato’s conclusion, in the Republic, is in simple words that the 
problem basically lies within politics and therefore we only need to transform the 
structure of political organization in order to realize universal and unchanging justice.  
Nevertheless, in his latest work, he abandoned this very ambitious project in favour of a 
more conservative political philosophy.  In the Laws
50
 his interest in absolute justice 
and perfect collective virtue is substituted for stability and a political construction which 
is more legally fortified than morally excellent. 
The different approach regarding the relationship between politics and morality 
in the Republic and the Laws may indicate that Plato eventually realized that politics 
and philosophy are indeed incompatible.  One may say that he already suspected that, 
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considering the contrast of positions in the Apology and Crito.
51
  Nevertheless, it may 
have been his incurably inquisitive nature that pressed him to test in practice, and 
repeatedly fail in Syracuse, the theoretical experiment developed in the Republic.  The 
conclusion of the Republic, that it is politics we need to change and not philosophy, 
depends on the epistemological assumption according to which we have already 
discovered what true morality or justice is.  In other words, philosophy has already 
achieved its final aim and it lies with politics to realize this aim, now collectively.  
Whether Plato took this assumption seriously is a contested issue; even though this is 
not a matter of great importance.  The important thing is that he recognized and 
developed the contradictions between politics and philosophy, virtue and political 
activity, reason and practice, and so on.  Thus, he brought moral considerations into 
politics, and he did so in a philosophical manner,
52
 i.e. philosophy, which was until then 
only occupied with the explanation of natural phenomena, was now used in order to 
reveal the purpose of human societies.   
 Before Plato’s final conclusions in the Republic and the Laws, Plato had made 
sure to expose the main elements which constituted the tension between political 
activity and the contemplative or philosophic life.  In the Apology Plato presents the 
philosopher’s case against the city.  He wishes to show how true knowledge –which is 
in his theory de facto related to true justice following the fundamental Socratic 
teaching– will always be fatally threatened by a community of people who has learnt to 
engage in sophistry and quibbles when arguing about public matters.  Morality is thus 
linked with a private pursue of happiness or the good life, whereas politics is only 
concerned with public matters, with its own moral norms which are usually nothing 
more than what the most powerful arguments of the day counsel.  In Plato’s eyes, 
Socrates’ project was to make the Athenian citizens understand first that the human life 
should not depend on the will of mysterious beings, but on reasonable judgments;
53
 and 
second, that the good life might be possible at the collective level if self-assertion ceases 
to be the main characteristic of public life, and philosophy becomes its guiding force.  
His main point was thus in favour of reason and against arbitrary arguments.  Whenever 
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the latter prevailed, the good life, or justice, would be confined within the private sphere 
of human conduct and it would always be threatened by the polis.
54
   
This conclusion was obviously devastating considering the contextual 
characteristics of the ancient Greek community.  Up until then, it would have been 
inconceivable to think of a ‘good life’ outside the polis.  It was the first time that the 
community was not perceived as a universally accepted moral end in itself.  This 
ominous discovery required a radical approach so as to resolve the strongly paradoxical 
situation.  Socrates essentially proposed a re-education of the whole community.  His 
purpose was to explore the limits of reason not only within the individual soul, but now 
within the whole polis.  If everyone is able to conquer philosophy then the local 
community will once again acquire a universal moral qualification and the lives of its 
citizens will once again become worth living.  At the very start of the Apology, he 
seems to suggest that reason will be significantly more limited in public arguments.  
Nevertheless, he demands to overcome those limits and, naturally, his project failed.
55
     
In the Crito Plato makes the opposite case, this time against the philosopher and 
in favour of the polis and its laws and those who implement and obey them.  The private 
sphere of conduct becomes meaningless without a wider context of political reference, 
even in the case of the philosopher who attempts to override public matters in favour of 
moral fulfillment.  Philosophy is irrelevant if it undermines the established way of life.  
Without the political community, the philosopher would not even have the chance to 
explore what true justice is and what its relation with politics should be.  The wise 
individual is the outcome of the polis and by disobeying and corrupting the laws 
individual wisdom destroys its own birth place (Crito, 49c-51a).  Thus, the virtues of 
philosophy (universal justice) must give way to the people (local wisdom).  At the end, 
Socrates confesses to Crito that his conviction of death was rightful: without political 
laws, and regardless of their moral basis, the ‘idea of the philosopher’ would be an 
impossibility; Socrates himself would not even have existed.  His own attack on 
Athenian laws was therefore unjustified.  So, in Plato’s own thought, if Socrates knew 
the limits of reason he should not have pursued to impose it upon the polis.  Instead he 
should have realized that the laws provide a practical man’s equivalent of philosophy.56  
The limits of human nature in terms of rational capacities reveal that it might be better, 
both ontologically and practically speaking, to respect the laws instead of trying to 
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respect an always elusive universal truth.  Tradition, customs and civic beliefs are 
tangible and stable.  Philosophy is a corrosive power which creates unstable citizens.  
The rational member of a community is a skeptic who will never be convinced by the 
parochial values of the polis.  Instead he will always pursue the universal, thus 
undermining not only the seemingly unimportant and quite possibly false beliefs of his 
fellow citizens, but as a consequence the existence of the city itself.   
 The question is of course why Socrates insisted on his argument in favour of 
reason which eventually led to his death.  Maybe his purpose was actually to pose the 
problem in a manner that would make everyone contemplate it seriously.  Or he wished 
to set the moral standards for future political activity.  This would explain Socrates’ 
case as a ‘deliberative failure.’57  Plato had to present both arguments because he 
wished to state the obvious contradiction.  He described the Socratic case as the crucial 
instantiation in human history of this seemingly irreconcilable conflict between morality 
–as field of philosophy– and politics.  Moreover he went further and posed the problem 
in terms of priorities.  If reason and law constitute two different moral codes –depicting 
the conflict between philosophy and politics– then it is essential to find out whether we 
can assign priority to one moral code over the other so as to avoid moral and political 
inconsistencies.  What is at stake for Plato is not only the moral integrity of those 
involved in political activities –as in the case of Socrates– but also political 
effectiveness of the community, in terms of stability and power.  In the end, though, 
what matters most is the ‘good life’ universally speaking.  Of course, assigning priority 
must be based upon some kind of epistemological discovery.  Deciding whether 
Socrates’ private virtue is more significant overall than what was considered at the time 
the public norms of conduct, and vice versa, becomes a matter of deciding whether 
public virtue essentially derives from private virtue, or the other way around.  Plato in 
contrasting the Apology and Crito seems to reject the possibility of a solution to the 
problem when posed in this form.  He seems to suggest that if we attempted to resolve it 
in terms of priority of one sphere of conduct over the other we would always end up 
with a conflict or a dilemmatic situation, because some will decide in favour of the one 
and others in favour of the other.  On the one hand (in the Crito), there is the argument 
that the laws are non-corruptible whereas the human beings are, and that moral integrity 
is only possible because of the laws themselves (Crito, 53a-53c).  On the other hand (in 
the Apology), philosophy is a way of life which is intrinsically good and overriding.  
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The moral incorruptibility of the human being should be over and above the law 
because no one can guarantee the moral quality of those laws or those who make them.   
 Of course, the two arguments are contradictory.  In addition, each argument 
seems to be overriding from its own perspective.  Thus, every time we attempt to 
synthesize those two different moral codes, it will result into deep injustice for both of 
them.  For Plato –following the basic Socratic teaching that knowledge is justice– this 
vicious circle could only be broken if human beings discovered an incontestably true 
concept of what morality or justice is, in abstract terms.  The epistemological 
assumption made in the Republic is therefore that such a concept truly exists and it is 
followed by an equally strong ontological assumption that if some managed to acquire 
this kind of knowledge they would be destined to override the contradiction and realize 
justice or morality in the polis.  True knowledge reveals that there are not really two 
distinct moral codes and thus two separate and conflicting spheres of conduct, but that 
there is only one true virtuous way of living which combines private, or individual 
virtue, with public, that is with reference to the polis, virtue.  Private virtue should not 
oppose public justice.  When it does, it is only because the political communities are 
corrupt; and reasonable arguments are impossible within a corrupt environment.  This 
moral corruption is the outcome of lack of knowledge.  Thus, the virtue of the 
philosopher (who has this knowledge) should not signify resignation from politics, but it 
should mean that the philosopher will act in a consistent manner within both the private 
and the public spheres (Apology, 32b-33a).  In the end, though, a Platonic predisposition 
towards the wise person or private virtue is obvious.
58
  For Plato, the starting point is 
similar to Socrates’: that there is an abstract idea of justice which must be accessible at 
least to a handful of people.  This in turn means that there really is a way to make sure 
that a few human beings can and will be incorruptible.  In the Republic, one of the 
major philosophical problems is to persuade this handful of wise people, the 
philosophers, to govern.  Because, according to Plato’s position, only then can we aspire 
for a just and virtuous political community.   
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B) Democracy against Virtue         
Plato’s categorization of political constitutions in the Republic and his criticism against 
democracy and the democratic moral character constitute an ideal summary of how he 
understood the idea that bad ethics will always lead to bad politics and vice versa.  
Athenian politics was a perfect example of the tension between virtue and political 
activity.  The Republic was thus not only his theoretical solution to the problem of how 
to reconcile politics with justice.  It was also the pinnacle of his criticism against 
Athenian democracy, which in his mind was responsible for both the inability to govern 
effectively the polis in practical terms and, most importantly, the moral degradation of 
its citizens.  The correlation between the unsound democratic moral character and the 
disastrous democratic constitution reinforced Plato’s conviction that virtue is something 
different than what most people believed it was.  It was also indicative that politics is 
not merely concerned with the management of power but that its purpose is the ‘good 
life’.  As the case of Socrates demonstrated, the radical discovery which troubled the 
classical philosophers was related with the tension between private virtue and political 
activity.  Ordinary corrupt activities are easy to condemn and maybe to correct; but 
bringing together two separate, and up until then opposing, codes of conduct, that of 
philosophy –mainly understood as science– and that of politics, seemed to be crucial for 
the well-being of both the individual and the collectivity.    
Plato’s general philosophy is thus political in that he is in pursuit of restoring the 
unity of politics and morality against the predominant view at his time, according to 
which one can either be a virtuous man or a good politician, but never both. ‘For in fact 
Plato’s morals and Plato’s politics are closely interdependent.  Each logically requires to 
be completed by the other.’59  It was therefore his purpose to show that only the virtuous 
man can make a good politician.  This means that the Republic incorporates a 
comprehensive theory of leadership as a means of changing the foundations of human 
societies: individual virtue should not exclude collective virtue; instead it should be 
used in order to promote it.  ‘Political philosophy is a search for fixity and this requires 
the abolition of the distinction between public and private.’60  Plato was to make clear 
that collective leadership is doomed to fail politically and morally, a claim deriving 
mainly from an elitist conception of knowledge and in consequence an elitist 
understanding of moral excellence.  The Republic is therefore an attempt to answer or 
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resolve paradoxes and dilemmas, which derive from this problematic relationship 
between politics and morality and the consequent (in)ability to govern well.  This 
relationship was always troubling for philosophers and politicians, at least since 
Socrates’ time.  Plato’s answer is fundamentally antidemocratic and anti-pluralist in 
most aspects: educational, political and ethical.  ‘A collective body cannot be a 
substitute for the true philosopher’ or ‘democracy cannot decide what is right and 
wrong’ is the ultimate claim.  The Platonic theory of knowledge is the core of this 
argument.  Though, even if Plato’s epistemological assumptions were correct, there 
would be a serious practical problem regarding how to initiate a political constitution 
according to which the community would freely accept to be guided by a closed club: a 
philosophic ruling class.   
In democracy, according to Plato, each person does as he likes according to his 
individual preferences.  ‘It is “a supermarket of constitutions” where no one is 
compelled to either govern or to obey those who do, where there are no fixed principles 
of behaviour…’61  Democratic rule creates moral disarray and politically speaking 
democracy symbolizes disunity, which, self-evidently for Plato, is the basic evil for both 
an individual soul and a community’s morality.  This disunity derives from lack of true 
knowledge –which can only be unifying– and is expressed through false and 
contradicting opinions.  According to Plato, the man who seeks to master the people by 
persuading them is forced in order to do this to accept their standards and so mastered 
by them.
62
  Thus, the negative features that Plato ascribes to democratic political 
systems are personified in the moral character of the leader of the democratic mass.  The 
democratic constitution, which Plato is here criticizing, is not of course a constitutional 
democracy in modern terms.  Plato, starting from an elitist point of view, which might 
not have been too uncommon in his time, essentially describes a constitution which by 
today’s standards would be named ochlocracy, where the populist forces (demagogues) 
are dominant and conduct politics not according to the ‘rule of reason’ but according to 
their personal interests and false opinions.   
Thus, following the previous Socratic analysis, Plato’s ‘rule of reason’ mainly 
demands a kind of self-control; an acceptance that there is some good which must guide 
us against our worse selves.  Therefore, the Platonic democratic constitution seems to be 
the expression of an essential corrupting element against the quality which constitutes 
the basis for moral virtue; that is, self-discipline.  Its opposite is self-assertion which 
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naturally pursues the fulfilment of the soul’s worst, appetitive, part.  How is someone to 
persuade a community consisting of people with no self-discipline that they should be 
governed by someone else for their own good?  The Socratic case illustrates that 
achieving individual and collective virtue, at the same time, is an impossible political 
aim, especially within a community of morally impotent men.    
 
[In democratic states] they call self-control “cowardice” […] they perpetuate the view that 
moderation shows lack of style and that frugality is stinginess […] (Republic, 560d). [The 
democratic character] submits to every passing pleasure as its turn comes to hold office… 
He doesn’t deprive any pleasure of its rights, but tends all of them equally […] (561b) At 
frequent intervals, he gets involved in community affairs, and his public speaking and 
other duties keep him leaping around here, there, and everywhere. If military types arouse 
his admiration, he inclines towards military life; if it’s businessmen, he’s all for business. 
His lifestyle has no rhyme or reason, but thinks it enjoyable, free, and enviable and he 
never dispenses with it. (561d). 
  
There is an implicit desperation in Plato’s critique, in his advice to move from this 
destructive demagoguery and moral pluralism to an elitist and morally constructive 
leadership. It became his deep conviction that reason is the prerogative of only a 
handful of men and, to make it worse, the rest of the people cannot understand how this 
is related to their moral well-being.  Philosophy is therefore not simply opposed to 
politics; it is opposed to the people as a multitude.  The cause for this fierce attack on 
democracy is, as we have previously mentioned, Plato’s attempt to reconcile politics 
and philosophy in a world where politics is represented by his decadent democratic 
fellow-citizens and philosophy which is represented by Socrates.  On the one hand, in 
democratic Athens the idea of liberty was relative to a variety of interpretations and, on 
the other, there was the realization that this kind of relativism eventually leads to moral 
nihilism.  A first natural response to the Socratic case was that the morally good man 
cannot effectively engage in political conduct, and thus help his fellow citizens to 
improve morally, without either corrupting his own moral character or being in danger 
to be killed or ostracized. 
 
Now do not be vexed with me when I speak the truth.  For there is no human being who will 
preserve his life if he genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and prevents 
many unjust and unlawful things from happening in the city. (Apology, 31e) 
 
40 
 
  This contradiction or moral paradox, as described in the Apology, and followed 
by the opposite argument in Crito, entails that the moral progress of society is trapped 
within a vicious circle wherein political activity, which should ideally work as the 
guiding force for moral improvement, actually impedes it.  Socrates’ death was the 
unquestionable contemporary affirmation of that fact, and it was by no means a matter 
of coincidence, according to Plato, that it was a democratic government which decided 
to put to death the greatest philosopher that had ever lived.  Only in a democracy –
where the souls of the citizens were in such moral and political confusion regarding the 
fulfilment of social roles and the meaning of social usefulness– would the citizens 
decide to sentence to death the man who tried to make them better human beings.  In 
democracy every citizen is an expert on everything, making them thus ignorant of 
everything.  And ignorance was for both Plato and Socrates equal to immorality.  The 
citizens’ identity crisis63 was simultaneously the outcome and the cause of this general 
moral and political retardation and they had therefore no moral and political criteria 
according to which they would be able to recognize what is just and good for 
themselves and the city.  Thus, even if there was someone who had acquired the 
knowledge of what true justice is, the democratic masses could have never followed 
him.   
 
What shall we say about those spectators, then, who can see a plurality of beautiful things, 
but not beauty itself, and who are incapable of following if someone else tries to lead them 
to it, and who can see many moral actions, but not morality itself, and so on? (Republic, 
479e) 
 
How then was this vicious circle to be broken, if possible at all?  Socrates’ 
recognition of this problem led him to pursue the discovery of the true nature of human 
excellence.  His questions were concentrated toward defining virtues and then toward 
ways of acquiring them.
64
  He wanted to find those universal standards which would 
make morality an objective matter of knowledge.  Then, he would have to explore the 
possibility of applying these objective principles to real life in order to give the 
opportunity to his fellow citizens to live a moral, i.e. happy life.  The Socratic question 
therefore was ‘What is virtue and what can an individual do in order to get it?’  
Socrates, whose purpose was to attack the sophists’ conventionalism in order to abolish 
subjectivism and relativism in moral matters and thus in political conduct, conceived 
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virtue as the realization of human nature; the absolute fulfilment of our rational 
capacities and the consequent achievement of true happiness.  Thus, the distinction 
between convention in the form of politics and philosophy led Socratic thinking to 
believe that virtue is something to be intellectually conquered and then practically 
applied: virtue was a matter of knowledge similar to the knowledge of nature’s facts, 
whereas false beliefs –the basis of relativism and social conventions– were the outcome 
of ignorance and educational disorientation. 
Socrates’ major contribution therefore, according to Plato, would be the 
recognition that true moral virtue is something to be achieved only through objective 
theoretical knowledge and only as an end in itself, not as a means for something else.  
Plato follows Socrates’ argument that virtue is knowledge and its corollary that moral 
conflict, weakness, and evil are due to ignorance.
65
  However, what Socrates failed to do 
was to move from the inquiry of ‘how one is individually to acquire and maintain 
virtue?’ to ‘how do we create the context and the foundations in order to achieve 
collectively justice?’  His death, even if conceived as a deliberatively failed argument, 
and the way he accepted it, was the proof that a comprehensive account of justice could 
not be achieved at both the private and the political level simultaneously.  It signified, as 
a final political act, and as it is presented in the Apology, the contradiction between 
politics and morality and the potential results of attempting to reconcile them: it was 
meant as a unifying act, but it was also Socrates’ decision for resignation.  Eventually, it 
was an implicit but very strong admittance that the unity of private virtue and political 
justice seemed to be irrecoverable in real life.   
This of course means that Socrates understood the nature of political imperatives 
very well.  The arguments he employs to defend his position to his friend in the Crito do 
not depend solely on the importance of his private virtue.  ‘They have a public bearing, 
too, in that they reflect Socrates’ conviction that Athenian politics expressed (usually 
false) belief, not knowledge, and that it is only through philosophical enquiry that such 
knowledge can be acquired.’66  This argument means that Socrates’ attitude in the 
Apology may not be taken as an absolute and blind moralism; the attitude of a saint who 
condemns everything social and commands resignation from collective activities for the 
sake of his soul.  On the contrary, Socrates simply recognized the tension between real 
politics and an individually virtuous way of life, and without underestimating the 
significance of the former –he truly did fight throughout his life to the political and 
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moral betterment of Athens– he chose for the second, admitting that one cannot choose 
to live by the ideal standards of both.  What he practically chose was his own final 
attempt to state the contradiction and persuade his fellow citizens that education is the 
only way out of this philosophical and political predicament.  
It was Plato’s task, therefore, to prove that in order to make politics and morality 
coincide it is not necessary for the philosopher to die as a political martyr.  Socrates’ 
death in particular should not necessarily mean philosophical defeat.  Instead, Plato 
wanted to pose the problem as an inadequacy of political constitutions which 
necessarily resulted in moral confusion (most explicit in a democracy) that were 
responsible for this total separation between private virtue and political activity.  In fear 
that the Athenian democracy would continue its disastrous action against true justice 
(collective and individual) –and that it will eventually transform into the worst possible 
form of government and way of life, tyranny– he tried to succeed where his teacher had 
failed: the philosopher should neither be allowed to resign from the immoral way of life 
of the polis nor die because of it.  On the contrary, it was Plato’s radical proposition in 
the Republic, that philosophers must become rulers in order to redefine the problematic 
relationship between politics and morality, i.e. to unify them.  Thus, the individual 
should not be threatened by the collectivity, and vice versa.  Of course, this is a 
comprehensive proposition which implies that in order to defeat moral relativism and 
fight against the abandonment of the absolute standards which Socrates died for,
67
 he 
would have to change the manner in which humans beings learn, think and organize 
themselves in their pursuit of a happy life. 
Plato’s aim was to start from scratch and re-analyze how the philosophical 
foundations of ethical life can be complemented by political philosophy.  Thus, the 
latter would not be contradictory to the former,
68
 but necessary to it.  Where for 
Socrates knowledge had proved to be the cause of death for the virtuous man, for Plato 
it was to be the solution to the problematic relationship between moral excellence and 
political activity.  Or, in other words, if Socrates’ attempt was to pose the 
insurmountable problem, Plato’s attempt was to resolve it even if this meant the 
creation of a radically educational political edifice.  This attempt was based upon the 
idea that if we cannot resolve the perpetual tension between private virtue and political 
activity, then the moral demands of the virtuous man and the imperatives of the polis 
should exist in a state of permanent imbalance.  This means that human beings will 
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never realize their potential and achieve happiness.  This is why ‘In Plato we see a 
dramatic attempt to restore the unity which Socrates sees as irretrievably displaced.’69  
Socrates’ tragic dilemma was either to withdraw from the world or die for it, in order to 
keep his virtue intact.  Plato’s radical solution to this dilemma is nothing less than the 
total transformation of society; a transformation in political, moral, educational, artistic 
and religious terms, which would make possible the creation of a constitution exactly 
opposite to the existing Athenian democracy.  The Politeia should be the antidote to the 
unqualified moral and political conventionalism of Plato’s contemporary society.    
 
 
C) Doing away with the plurality of social roles 
The introductory chapters of the Republic very vividly represent how distinctive figures 
within Athenian democracy conceived moral and political matters.  They also illustrate 
that these conventional and ordinary views easily collapsed under reasonable criticism.  
Plato presents the opponents of Socrates as confused men whose arguments always end 
up to contradictions, especially when they have to propose solutions to the definition of 
justice in relation to political activity.  Plato wanted to show that all these figures with 
their different views and mistaken answers to Socrates’ questions symbolized in essence 
this vicious circle of bad political constitutions and corrupt morals.  At the same time, 
Plato implicitly raised the question ‘Who should be the experts in matters of morality?’ 
and through his analogies gave the answer according to which it is the moral men who 
must tell us about virtue.  Of course, since virtue is knowledge, the moral men cannot be 
anything else than true philosophers; and they, if anyone, really know the moral norms 
that society must obey as a whole.
70
  At the end of Socrates’ argument with Cephalus 
and Polemarchus Plato clearly advanced the radical proposition that moral men only can 
be experts in these matters, but also, and more importantly, that for them ‘it is never 
right to harm anyone’ (Republic, 335e).   
Thus in a very concise manner we have seen both Plato’s central claim and the 
paradox that he tried to resolve.  If it is impossible for the moral person or the 
philosopher to do any harm, then it is also necessary for them to help morally ordinary 
people –because the idea of morality is unifying and so for those who have grasped it 
becomes necessary to realize it in both private and public spheres.  This would mean 
that the philosophers should be compelled to rule, since by ruling they will help the 
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people restore their virtue, as this is to be defined later on in the Republic.  The question 
is, ‘if philosophers are compelled to rule how can they maintain their obligation never to 
harm anyone?’ when everybody ‘knows’ that politics is an activity that will always 
demand the violation of such inviolable principles? And in particular, how is it possible 
to initiate such radical moral change within a totally immoral community?  The general 
idea behind resolving this apparent contradiction consists of two essential features of a 
state like Politeia: first, the few philosophers, or even the single philosopher, who really 
know the absolute moral standards should rule the many that do not; and second, that 
such control is willingly exercised and willingly accepted.
71
  Therefore, the constitution 
itself will not allow for a course of action by either the rulers or the ruled that would 
violate justice and allow to morals and politics to come into contrast.  
 Since Plato’s initial moral claim reveals an absolute position it predisposes for a 
holistic political approach: in order for the moral persons to be able to rule –and thus 
impart their knowledge and promote justice breaking therefore the vicious circle– we 
will have to change society completely: 
 
Plato’s object is the creation of a political society in which it is impossible for the just man 
to be treated unjustly.  Philosophy must become sovereign if such a society is to come into 
existence […] Both the aim and the method involve implications for our understanding of 
the relation between public and private.  Socrates’ commitment to philosophy means a 
necessary tension between the private individual and public world.  For some this is an 
essential feature of political morality; it constitutes its characteristic dilemmas and 
difficulties.  But for Plato it is a tension which has to be overcome if philosophy is to have a 
place in the world and if that world is to be just.
72
    
 
In the Republic, Plato is hardly concerned with the detailed structure of society or with 
the minutiae of laws and regulations.  The reasoning is simple but also absolute: if there 
are such men like Plato’s philosopher-kings, then their true knowledge should suffice to 
create a society that will ensure the moral fulfillment of its members.  Of course the 
problem is to discover whether the existence of philosopher-kings is a realistic 
possibility.  As mentioned previously, Plato may have been very well aware that his 
great scheme was a utopia in two senses.  First, because of the epistemological 
assumption that there is an abstract ‘Form of Good’ to be discovered; and second the 
ontological assumption that, if there is such a ‘Form’, there will also be some men able 
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to acquire it and that it is their purpose as human beings to use this knowledge for the 
betterment of their community.  Both assumptions are philosophically very tentative 
and this may indicate that the Republic was an extreme statement of Plato’s central 
ideas about the relationship between philosophy and politics as well as a critique against 
the Athenian democracy.  His thoughts about real politics are to be found in other 
equally significant works,
73
 like the Crito and the Laws where his theory of knowledge 
is absent altogether.  Still, Plato had to make a convincing argument in favour of justice.  
Thus, he had first to demolish what was considered to be the dominant understanding of 
morality and its relation to politics at the time.  Thrasymachus’ twofold definition of 
morality (Republic 338c & 343c) seems to have been an invincible argument in the 
political reality of ancient Athens, and it seems to be equally strong until nowadays, in 
both its versions.  Nevertheless, these two conceptions of how morality is related to 
politics constituted the main arguments that Plato had to defeat at least in theory.  First,  
 
[the] claim that morality is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger party… 
(Republic, 338c)  
 
and second,  
 
‘you don’t even realize that morality and right are actually good for someone else –they are 
the advantage of the stronger party, the ruler– and bad for the underling at the receiving end 
of the orders.  Nor do you realize that the opposite is true for immorality: the wrongdoer 
lords it over those moral simpletons while his subjects do what is to his advantage […] 
(Republic, 343c) 
 
It has been suggested that Thrasymachus’ first version of what morality truly is reveals 
an amoralist position, whereas the second-one shows a shift to an immoralist stance.  
According to the first amoralist position ‘Justice merely reflects existing power 
distributions.’74  Thus morality is nothing in itself; it is just a cultural and political 
construction.  This amoralism is a form of extreme relativism which characterized the 
behaviour of many of Plato’s intellectual enemies (the sophists) as well as many 
opportunist political figures (which would often be the students of the sophists) of the 
time.  The relativity of moral values was also a central political view in Athenian 
democracy, as we have already seen.  Plato, like Socrates, had to face the claim that 
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there are no ideal standards of conduct and, at best, morality and philosophy are 
irrelevant to politics.  On the contrary, moral and political rules are always arbitrarily 
established in accordance to different kinds of social and individual interests. 
Responding to such an extreme relativism is not an easy task.  Plato’s first 
response to Thrasymachus based on the analogy that medicine is for the benefit of the 
patients and not for that of their doctors, and so in the same manner ruling must be in 
the advantage of the people and not of the rulers, is just a preliminary way of saying that 
there is a specifically human virtue, which if exercised will lead to a state of well-being.  
Plato was aware that the argument is not very convincing in this preliminary form.  
Thus, in the rest of the Republic he will try to defend it and construct a convincing 
theory about the advantages of being virtuous both in individual and collective terms.  
Virtue, therefore, should not belong now to man’s specific social function, but to his 
function as a man.
75
  In other words, Plato wanted to argue, if we are to create a true 
moral society we should have to understand human excellence as something initially 
unrelated and abstracted from social functions, but also as something absolutely 
necessary for those functions to be fulfilled in the best possible manner.  ‘His ideal 
politeia emerges as a conscious, rational affirmation of what individual humans 
naturally bring to the collectivity […] The Platonic “state” does not serve as an external 
point of reference for personal identity.’76   
Plato, nevertheless, should have been aware that this connection between well-
being and virtue still seemed arbitrary and unconvincing against the amoralist 
argument.  Thus not only the rest of the Republic, but most of his philosophical works 
constitute an attempt to remove this arbitrariness,
77
 which as we have seen is the 
outcome of the epistemological assumptions about the nature of knowledge.  Therefore, 
the quest for a true definition of justice mainly derives from the idea that it is political 
constitutions that should conform to human nature and not human nature to political 
conventions.  The problem is then to define human nature and its potential for 
perfection (virtue) in objective and unchanging terms so as to attack moral relativism, 
which in turn is connected to political degeneration.
78
  The essence of Plato’s view was 
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that society can never be reformed by gradual and conventional means, but only if it is 
governed according to stable and objective philosophic principles.
79
  Plato did not want 
another list of actions which, at one time and place, could potentially be characterized as 
virtuous and at another time and place as immoral, because when people realized this 
they would eventually become amoral; the basic characteristic of the Athenian 
democracy.  What he wanted to know was what it is about an action or a class of actions 
which leads us to call it just.  ‘He wants not a list of just actions, but a criterion for 
inclusion in or exclusion from such a list.’80  From the moment he was persuaded that 
such a criterion exists, irrespective of its metaphysical and elusive nature, the ultimate 
purpose was clear: to make certain that the moral standards of the state reflected as 
much as possible these absolute criteria.
81
         
The knowledge of these unchanging and universal criteria would work as a 
weapon against moral relativism and confusion and by consequence it would create a 
society where fulfilling different roles at the same time would not be acceptable.  In 
addition, this knowledge would suffice against Thrasymachus’ second view of morality, 
according to which even if there really were an ideal standard for virtuous conduct it 
would not be to the advantage of its practitioner but to the advantage of its non-
practitioner.  According to this view, justice (if it really exists) between two persons 
makes the person who performs justly vulnerable to exploitation and is therefore to the 
other’s advantage, entailing thus ‘that there is much more private profit in wrong than in 
right, and what’s more, everybody knows this.’82  Amidst moral confusion, which is the 
natural outcome of democracy’s pluralism, it is actually better to be immoral even if 
you know that you can be moral.  But since Plato was certain that he discovered these 
criteria or ideal standards of morality, Thrasymachus’ second, immoralist or realist,83 
position could not have possibly withstood his philosophical attack.  Since virtue is 
knowledge the philosophers would impart this knowledge to the whole community; 
afterwards they would all realize that justice is truly in their interest.  Therefore the 
criteria of knowledge (the ideal types or Forms) should be the same for both individuals 
and communities and they constitute the material upon which Plato’s idea of justice 
would be built.  
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This approach leaves of course no room for moral pluralism.  Plato’s argument is 
in principle holistic and its philosophical and political results absolute.  The knowledge 
of these criteria is what makes some able to rule, i.e. able to educate the rest of their 
fellow citizens about what is good and what is bad.   
 
Given that philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is permanent 
and unvarying, while those who can’t, those who wander erratically in the midst of plurality 
and variety, are not lovers of knowledge, which set of people ought to be rulers of a 
community? (Republic, 484b) 
 
This is why the Republic is fundamentally an educational and an elitist work.  
Therefore, aside the unlikelihood of Plato’s epistemological assumptions as explained 
earlier, there is also the problem that Plato’s knowledge is only accessible to a few who 
will have to overcome the temptations of the isolated philosophic life and force 
themselves to rule for the good of the community.  This entails a paradox, because by 
doing this, the philosophers will endanger both their virtuous characters and their lives: 
why should they decide to endanger their individual virtue in order to promote 
collective virtue when they know this is very unlikely to happen?  This is nevertheless 
the necessary course of action toward unifying morality and politics according to Plato.  
An additional paradox derives from the fact that Plato was aware that the moral man 
will rarely exist except in the just state, because he never believed that human character 
can be perfected in defiance of environment.
84
  But on the other hand, the just state 
cannot possibly exist except where there are just men,
85
 confirming thus the vicious 
circle between morality and politics and the view that the Republic was conceived as a 
utopian state to be used as a standard for assessing real political constitutions.        
In order to make certain that philosophers did not abstain from politics, Plato had 
to produce a definition of morality that would not give them the possibility of such a 
choice.  True knowledge should dictate that morality, or justice, is a matter of everyone 
knowing their place and function, so as to make it possible to achieve excellence in their 
allocated roles and only there.  The argument thus simply follows on the definition of 
human virtue as fulfilling one’s natural potential and then sticking to it.  Each person 
has a single talent and a single way of contributing towards the welfare of the whole 
community; thus, they all should perform that function, and that function alone (without 
interfering in the domains of others), throughout their lives.  ‘This is not argued for: it is 
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taken to be self-evident, and made into an axiom.’86   Eradicating people’s tendency to 
fulfil a plurality of social roles is essential for their virtue.  Justice would be achieved if 
the philosopher made certain that individuals would not be absorbed into competing 
roles, because Plato knows that social roles cultivate morality; and competing social 
roles promote moral disintegration, first within one’s soul and then within the 
community as a whole.    The moral consistency Socrates so much craved for, i.e. virtue 
in both the private and public spheres of human action, is thus something impossible for 
an individual with a crisis of moral identity (see the democratic moral character).  
Reason means integrity in argument and action and, paradoxically, despite the idea that 
‘virtue should not belong now to man’s specific social function, but to his function as a 
man’, what reason commands is for everyone to express their virtue by staying within 
their predetermined social roles.  This oxymoron is the necessary result of the analogy 
between the soul and the state.  Thus, virtue as a theoretical concept may be unrelated 
and abstracted from social functions, but justice realized collectively requires obedience 
to the philosophic elite.  The moral integrity of the people as a whole acquires therefore 
a different meaning in comparison to moral integrity for the individual wise person.  
That is, it is no longer based on reasonable argument, but on reasonable obedience.   
Thus, men would fall into three classes depending upon which part of the soul is 
dominant: reason, spirit and appetite; but in the end all people can be moral if they stay 
in their predetermined roles and try to fulfil them in the best possible manner.  This is 
especially important regarding the philosophers-guardians of the community, because 
their function in the community is so crucial that no rival role or responsibility can be 
allowed to interfere with its performance.  Eliminating all competing roles and 
becoming exclusively identified with the role of the procurer of the public good is the 
only way to be certain that private interest (even if this is identified with living the 
isolated contemplative life) will not conflict with public benefit.
87
  For Plato, this is not 
merely a way to have a good ruler who is also a good man, but it is the only way to 
answer the timeless question: how ‘to be a human self?’88  Preserving one’s moral self-
integrity can only be achieved if we stop posing contradictory demands to it.  The 
ruler’s purpose as a human being is to rule well, i.e. promoting the interests of the 
community as a whole, because only the ruler has the ‘power of seeing things as a 
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whole.’89  Thus, it is not wise for us either to demand or let this human being get 
absorbed into several other social or private occupations. 
Since justice should be comprehensive, the ‘one man, one job principle’ is not 
restricted to just one class within the ideal community.  Self-discipline, the main 
constitutive quality of justice that was essentially lacking from the Athenian democracy, 
is a quality that must permeate all classes.  Inner morality is defined as the rule of 
reason over the other parts of the soul and this would mean that the third class of the 
community be capable of morality (definable in the same terms as philosophic 
morality), by accepting philosophers as their rulers and staying within their allocated 
roles.  This is still morality; it is not as deep or thorough as philosophic morality, but it 
reflects an ordinary virtue based on true belief; the highest form of knowledge the non-
philosophers can achieve, after they have been guided by their rulers.
90
  The structure of 
the community reflects therefore the structure of the soul, but also, and most 
importantly, it reflects its state, i.e. if the structure is balanced then unity and harmony is 
achieved, whereas if the structure is unbalanced we have injustice and unhappiness.   
 
From the outset, when we first started to found the community, there’s a principle we 
established as a universal requirement –and this, or some version of it, is in my opinion 
morality.  The principle we established, and then repeated time and again, as you’ll 
remember, is that every individual has to do just one of the jobs relevant to the community, 
the one for which his nature has best equipped him […] Furthermore, the idea that morality 
is doing one’s job and not intruding  elsewhere is commonly voiced […] (Republic, 433a) 
 
In the light of Plato’s conception of justice it is only natural to see democracy and 
its consequent moral pluralism or relativism as the outcome of a seriously unbalanced 
moral character: if a man can be either led only by reason or only by appetite or, in 
other words, by his soul or his body
91
 democracy definitely reflects the second ignoble 
category.  However, in the analogy of the Republic this principle of specialization 
makes sure that both individually and collectively only Reason is to be followed.  Self-
discipline is the way to fight the appetite for participating in more than one social role.  
This would not only make impossible achieving virtue by fulfilling one’s true nature, 
but it would also create confusion and disunity i.e. injustice, both in one’s soul and his 
community.  Of course, there is a collateral cost when our explanation moves from the 
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individual to the polis or from the philosophical to the political.  If it is quite self-
evident for one to follow his own reason when true knowledge has been acquired, it is 
not self-evident at all why one class should follow another in collective terms when 
such knowledge is not available beforehand.  This problem, for Plato, constitutes a real 
test for the moral character of the philosophers-rulers, since we accepted their 
hypothetical existence.  The Guardians will have to persuade the rest of the community 
to follow them, but the only way to do such a thing amongst immoral men would be to 
lie to them.     
 
God included gold in the mixture when he was forming those of you who have what it takes 
to be rulers (which is why the rulers have the greatest privileges), silver when he was 
forming the auxiliaries, and iron and copper when he was forming the farmers and other 
workers. (Republic, 415a) 
 
The ‘Myth of the Metals’ is Plato’s central example of how the rulers’ special 
moral permissions should be actually seen as moral responsibilities for the overall good 
of the community.  His claim is essentially that those who have true knowledge, those 
who have seen beauty itself cannot really violate morality, because their knowledge 
actually constitutes morality.  Thus, the lie is not simply propaganda made in the interest 
of some ignorant politicians –as in the case of democracy where the demagogues are in 
the end being deceived by their own lies. This, instead, is a ‘Noble Lie’ which should 
not be considered a violation of morality.  It is to be considered as the proof that the 
philosophers-rulers do indeed fulfil their moral obligation toward transforming society.  
They cannot choose not to take the moral responsibility for what is seemingly an 
immoral course of action and, when they realize that, this course of action ceases to be 
immoral.  Staying out of the ‘Cave’, although tempting for the philosophers, is against 
Plato’s definition of virtue and against the principle of specialization as the application 
of justice.  Going into the ‘Cave’ is the only way for the philosophers to achieve moral 
completion even if this means that they will have temporarily to re-adjust to the ways of 
its immoral inhabitants. 
 
Our job as founders of the community, then, is to make sure that the best people come to 
that fundamental field of study: we must have them make the ascent we’ve been talking 
about and see goodness.  And afterwards, once they’ve been up there and had a good look, 
we mustn’t let them get away with what they do at the moment […]  Staying there and 
refusing to come back down again to the prisoners […] (Republic, 519) 
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It is of course still another paradox that even in Plato’s reasoning morality and 
politics will be unified only if we allow for an ‘innocent’ violation of morality.  This 
may be a hint that Plato understood virtue dialectically and not simply as pure 
innocence.  That is, virtue cannot be achieved by avoiding all moral conflicts or 
difficulties so as to keep the moral character intact.  Instead virtue is the outcome of 
engaging with the conflicts, understanding them philosophically and then overcoming 
them.  Such a conflict is the Socratic contradiction revealed between his arguments 
made in the Apology and the Crito.  In other words, the philosophers must have grasped 
what the realities of life are and they must be ready to risk their lives in order to 
overcome them.  The reluctance to tell the lie is the ultimate lesson on what the relation 
between politics and morality really rests.  The philosopher-king owes it to society that 
has so trained his natural talents that he now can combine philosophy and politics in its 
service.  ‘Such a man will not refuse this just demand on his educated talents.  It is, 
however a demand, and therefore a constraint.  But it is one that is much in the interests 
of the philosopher as in those whom he rules.  The trained philosophic nature would 
prefer the pleasure of living a life of contemplation.  But his self-interest lies elsewhere 
–in ruling’,92 even if this temporarily means that he will have to violate the moral 
demands of his private virtue.   
Therefore, the solution to the problem of political morality is for Plato self-
evident exactly because of the philosophers’ characteristic reluctance to rule which 
makes them incorruptible by politics.  Those who do not really want to rule should be 
more resisting to the temptations of power when they actually come to rule and they 
will have the necessary iron will to use politics in order to transform and re-educate the 
polis.  This is essentially the answer to Thrasymachus’ immoralist position according to 
which political power is pursued for the personal advantage it brings back to those who 
hold it over others.  For the virtuous man, on the contrary, there is no interest in political 
power because there is no interest in taking personal advantage over others –seeing 
beauty itself is likely all the virtuous man will ever need in order to be complete and 
happy.  Only when someone becomes wise enough to understand this truth can in fact 
be trusted to rule in such a manner that he pursues, not his own advantage, but the 
advantage of those he rules.
93
  If the initial seemingly immoral action is for the sake of 
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the community, it is not really an immoral action.
94
  For Plato, the ‘Noble Lie’ is not 
another instantiation of morally disputed conduct in politics.  For the philosophers-kings 
there cannot be morally disputed action because they have true knowledge.  When they 
lie, they are not taking political chances by exercising practical wisdom; instead they 
construct the just polis based on the unquestionable perfection of the ‘Forms’.  Their 
goal is justice, because they know what justice is.     
 
 
D) The merging of politics and morality: a philosophical experiment 
The Republic was essentially an illustration of Plato’s experimentation with the idea 
that we can have an elitist group of people with some very particular characteristics 
which would allow them to conduct politics in a just manner and never be corrupted by 
it.  His moral ideal is that ‘of rationalists who look to the aristocratic dominance of 
reason to impose stability in the soul, in parallel with the dominance of an intellectual 
elite who will impose stability in society through a proper subordination of an 
unenlightened lower class’.95  Their true knowledge of what is the good would allow 
them to have a set of special moral permissions which at the same time were special 
moral responsibilities in order to realize their enlightened leadership.  Philosophers have 
access to something the rest of us do not: that which enables true identification in all 
important cases.
96
  What seem to be like contradictions and paradoxes to other peoples’ 
minds are simply clear images of what is and should be done in the philosophers’ 
minds.  This is why there is no need for them to share responsibility for their radical 
actions with the rest of the community: only they know what to do, thus only they 
should take political responsibility.  The analogy of the philosophic guardian to a dog is 
revealing of the image Plato had in mind for the ‘untouchable’ leaders of this ideal 
community. 
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Where are we going to find a character that is simultaneously gentle and high-spirited, when 
gentles and passion are opposites? […] We seem to be faced with an impasse; it turns out 
that a good guardian is an impossibility. (Republic, 375c) 
 
The impasse Socrates is referring to is nothing else than the seemingly 
irreconcilable tension between public benefit and private virtue.  For Plato, if we 
managed to reconcile those contradictory characteristics in a man’s soul –like he did 
with his philosophers-kings– we could also reconcile politics and morality.  The 
definition of justice, the principle of specialization, is a state of collective existence 
which would make this reconciliation possible.  However, in accordance to Plato’s 
philosophy his conception of justice is already an axiom.  It is not related to the social 
process which constitutes its basis, in final analysis.  This process is his theory of how to 
acquire knowledge and his conception of collective education; but in the Republic the 
end of this knowledge is already given, metaphysically.  The private and the political 
imperatives have been reconciled in the Politeia as the different psychological forces 
have been reconciled in the soul: self-discipline meant no conflict; no conflict meant 
unity; and unity meant happiness.  Nevertheless, the cost of this reconciliation at the 
collective level, as Plato probably recognized, was too great to be acceptable.  His 
account of social education has been repeatedly criticized as being too monolithic to 
allow for a plurality of moral experience.   
 
Anything which tells against the rule of reason in morality and politics is an object of 
suspicion […]  Literature encourages us to see moral conflict from the point of view of the 
participants […] Their moral position is not an inadequate version of a deeper reality but an 
expression of personal character and identity.  Plato’s insistent rationalism neglects this.97      
 
This traditional criticism against Plato’s philosophy is undoubtedly useful. However, it 
disregards the case according to which the Republic was only conceived as a 
philosophical experiment and not meant as a literal attempt to change human societies.  
It might be better to think of it as a perfect reflection of a metaphysical image in Plato’s 
mind.  The Politeia must be perfect in all the ways in which things of this world are 
deficient –it should be eternally and unvaryingly what it should be.  This is what makes 
it an object of knowledge.  ‘If it were flatly impossible to have knowledge of this world 
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just because it is this world, then philosophers, would be no better at ruling than anyone 
else, and the whole point of Plato’s enquiry into knowledge would collapse.’98   
Moral pluralism was for Plato necessarily translated into moral relativism and 
whether this relativism meant an amoralist or realist (see Thrasymachus’ arguments) 
view of politics made no difference.  Both were conducive to unhappiness.  This moral 
pluralism was both the obvious outcome and the basis of the democratic mindset which 
would like to have a word on everything.  This means that the democratic argument is 
always deficient because there never is any expertise to support it.  Therefore, this 
image of the Athenian distorted morality derived from a confusion of individual, 
political and, generally, social roles.  This kind of morality was impossible to be 
theorized and systematized.  Thus it could only be wrong as a foundation for a sound 
political and ethical theory.  ‘It seems likely that Plato would more or less equate 
knowledge of a thing’s goodness with knowledge of its function [...] Therefore, there is 
no gap in theory between knowledge of goodness and knowing a person’s function in 
society.’99  True morality can and should be theorized even if this had as a consequence 
an absolute social structure.  Individual virtue can only be reconciled with collective 
virtue if they are both conceived as necessary to each other.      
 
The gap between private and public, the idea that there can be an ethic of one which the 
other lacks, is for Plato a source of political strife and an inconsistency not to be tolerated in 
a rational political community.
100
 
 
In the meantime, all the apparent practical contradictions and moral paradoxes that arise 
from this concept, at both the individual and the collective level, are resolved because of 
true knowledge.  Knowledge, which in Plato’s case is based on a metaphysical concept, 
is the unifying agent in this attempt to illustrate morality and politics as strong allies to 
achieving human happiness.  The other unfortunate fact, probably also recognized by 
Plato himself, is that absolute knowledge can only be translated into absolute attitudes.  
Thus, there is a very thin line that separates the tyrant from the true philosopher-king, 
and it might not be wise to rely on the existence of the ‘Forms’ if we wish to make this 
distinction.      
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2. Happiness Requires Politics: Aristotle’s Social Conception of Virtue  
 
 
A) Virtue as practical activity 
Aristotle shares with both Socrates and Plato several ancient Greek assumptions in 
relation to the study of ethics and politics.  Mainly, he shares the notion that the ultimate 
end of a happy or a good life presupposes a moral perfectionism which is not 
fundamentally different as an ultimate aim from Plato’s.  They both think of politics 
while aiming at a universally acceptable account of well-being.  Their common end is 
an objective definition of happiness and the context within which this is achievable is 
the polis.  Virtue, or moral excellence, is a prerequisite of happiness, in Aristotle’s case, 
or it is happiness itself, in Plato’s case.  The good life is identified with a harmony 
between the different forces within the human soul, a harmony which is equalled to 
morality, as we have seen in the Republic, or the capacity to become virtuous in 
Aristotle’s theory.  However, despite their similar aim, i.e. an objective idea of the good 
life, Aristotle and Plato differ in their conception of how we come to understand 
morality and in their conception of the purpose of politics or of the frameset within 
which humans can achieve moral perfection.  Thus, the nature of the interrelationship of 
politics and ethics is heavily determined by each thinker’s theory of knowledge that 
entails specific understandings of human nature, which in turn requires a specific 
political organization in order for human nature to flourish.  Aristotle and Plato’s 
epistemologies reflect their different estimations of human capacities.  Such 
epistemologies also reflect their own psychological dispositions toward the future of the 
human species –as we have already seen, Plato was obviously pessimistic about this.  
Thus, the good life may be identified with happiness and virtue within the just political 
community, but how we get to this stage of existence and organization and how we 
maintain it, if at all possible, is a source of great disagreement between Plato and 
Aristotle.  This is because Plato’s conclusion is that happiness, virtue and political 
justice are essentially the same thing, irrespective of the possibility of ever achieving it; 
whereas for Aristotle eudaimonia is not the same as virtue or political justice and it is 
more difficult to achieve than the latter.   
Aristotle’s two major works, apropos of the relationship between politics and 
ethics, were the Nicomachean Ethics, which shows us what form and style of life are 
necessary toward happiness (eudaimonia) or the good life, and the Politics, wherein he 
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analyses what particular constitution, what set of institutions, are necessary to make this 
form possible, while safeguarding it.
101
  There is an intention, in Aristotle’s political 
philosophy as a whole, to unify politics and ethics following the example which Plato 
set, but there is also, clearly, some hesitation from his part regarding how far this 
unification should be pursued for.  This unity is a presupposition for the achievement of 
happiness but its existence depends now on different concepts than it did in Plato’s 
unitary account of knowledge.  In the Republic the unity of virtues was a matter of 
proving that there was a single and unchanging principle that should determine all 
action in a coherent manner.  This abstract principle could only be acquired 
philosophically and it was this principle which dictated that an individual or a 
community could acquire all the virtues at once, in the form of perfect knowledge, or 
none at all.  For Aristotle, the unity of virtues (which again mainly refers to the 
reconciliation of private and public virtue) was a matter of proving that all human 
activities are interrelated in a complex manner, but nevertheless aiming at an objective 
end which is determined by nature.  This objective end becomes understandable and 
realizable by inferring knowledge from experience and sensual perception.  This 
inductive method based on experience implies the acceptance, in principle, of the fact 
that there are limits on the capacity of humans to acquire perfect knowledge; something 
that has as ramifications the possibility of a perfectly consistent relationship between 
politics and morality.  There are therefore two basic reasons why Aristotle’s account of 
the unity of ethics and politics should follow that of Plato’s: first, because we already 
have a major thesis in favour of that possibility in philosophy –but against it in real life.  
Second, because Aristotle, although heavily influenced by Plato in other respects, is 
trying to overcome his pessimistic absolutism.   
The outcome of Aristotle’s attempt is possibly an insuperable to this day 
realistic account of rationalism in practical activity.
102
  Partly because Aristotle’s 
thought is so remote from modern politics and knowledge and partly because of his 
critical relationship with Plato’s own thought, Aristotle seemed to have developed a 
clearer view of the reasonableness of practical reason and of the proper language of 
moral argument than any succeeding philosopher.
103
  ‘Aristotle recognised that 
deliberation about practical possibilities is the primary form of moral thought from 
which the primary form of moral judgment emerges: namely, the judgment that of all 
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the possibilities that are open, the best action to take, all things considered, is so and 
so’.104  Still, as we are going to see further down, Aristotle’s account is also limited by 
the same preconceptions which made Plato’s thought seem sometimes unrealistic.     
Aristotle’s philosophy sets the purpose or the end of man as the activity of the 
soul in accordance with virtue, which is achieved through the exercise of our human 
qualities endowed by nature; and the most prominent of those qualities –again following 
the Socratic tradition– is man’s rational powers.  Thus, the exercise of the human 
capacity to reason can lead to the good life, human excellence and man’s happiness, 
which is the ultimate good since it is self-sufficient and not a means to anything else.  
Ethics, as Aristotle conceives of it, is a practical investigation that aims not merely at 
theoretical knowledge but at personal change, that is, there is a practical end: the 
purpose is not simply to know what virtue is, but to become good, i.e., actually to live 
the eudaimon life.
105
  Here he breaks off from the Socratic axiom that virtue is 
knowledge.  Knowing that there is a concept of ‘good’ does not necessarily entail being 
good.  The crucial part in Aristotle’s syllogism is that this peculiarly human capacity for 
rational thought has to be exercised continuously otherwise it cannot, naturally, be 
realized.  This is why eudaimonia is not the same as virtue or justice (contra Plato): 
virtue is a continuous activity; justice is the political consequence of virtue and 
eudaimonia is the overall outcome of both, given that some other external factors –not 
controlled by the moral agents–need to be fulfilled.   
Moral perfection is not thus the end of a theoretical rediscovery of first 
principles that were lost amidst the ongoing moral decadence and confusion of the 
human species.  Instead, human excellence is the outcome of a practical activity in 
accordance with this peculiar human capacity for reason.  The problem, obviously, is to 
show how humans can initiate the process which leads to practical reasoning.  In other 
words, since the simplicity of abstract concepts had led to an impossible metaphysical, 
i.e. separated from reality, understanding of morality, Aristotle had to develop a 
different epistemology.  An epistemology which would firstly make the universal or 
abstract, and the particular or practical, coincide and which would secondly offer a 
convincing explanation as to which one should develop first.  His argument was 
extremely simple: we have to use our given capacities to reason in order to infer 
knowledge from our experience.  However, this experience can only be social because it 
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is Aristotle’s ontological assumption that human beings are social animals; they need to 
communicate in order to develop an understanding of their selves as moral agents and 
they need to participate in community’s affairs in order to flourish as individuals.  The 
philosophical argument is thus completed by the political argument according to which 
the natural field of the exercise of virtue is the political community.  Politics is the place 
where the coincidence of the universal and the particular is possible because it is at the 
same time the natural expression of the human peculiar capacity to reason and the 
outcome of knowledge as it has been inferred from human experience. 
If virtue is theoretical knowledge, like Socrates and Plato suggested, then 
according to an account which conceives true knowledge as abstract and never-
changing, a reflection of pure rationality, the particular must be determined by the 
universal because true knowledge can only be universal.  In Plato’s conception the 
universal is represented by the wise individual, who has captured the ‘Form of 
Goodness’; and the particular by the community, which must follow the wise 
individual.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is how Plato conceives the 
prioritization of private and political virtue before he offers his radical solution.  Thus, 
the concurrence of the universal and the particular is easily achieved in theory because 
the particular is deducted from and thus defined by the intellectually conquered 
universal.  This Socratic notion required that human reason can be perfected in order to 
discover the universal without external help.  External resources are irrelevant to pure 
knowledge insofar humans are able to suppress the non-rational parts of their souls (the 
parts which are heavily influenced by materialistic needs, i.e. passions, basic instincts, 
etc.).  When the rational part dominates the non-rational part of the soul pure knowledge 
is possible, and pure knowledge automatically reveals the true nature of morality, which 
is not ethos (habit based on practical activity) but knowledge.  Acquiring perfect and 
unitary knowledge also means that morality and politics should no longer be separated; 
instead they merge into one principle that reflects the abstract and universal perfect 
Form.  When the perfect Form is discovered it will change political reality into 
unchanging perfection (dikaiosune).  Of course, as already explained, the 
epistemological problem of Plato’s theory is whether there is a perfect Form to be 
known in the first place.  Then the ontological problem follows as to whether it is 
possible for some men to acquire the Form only by intellectual means and whether this 
should be their only purpose in life.   
Crucially, Aristotle was not ready to transcend –even experimentally– the limits 
of human rationality because he was very well aware that those limits were posed by 
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our own nature, and practical solutions require that we work in accordance with our 
own nature, not against it (like Socrates suggested in the Apology).  Thus developing an 
ethical theory which would not be practical would be pointless.   Therefore, external 
resources are indeed necessary because they fulfil human natural needs –otherwise 
Platonic rationalism is closer to the divine or metaphysical than Plato was ready to 
admit.  Human needs should be a formative element in our way to human excellence, 
not an obstacle to it.  But in order for this to happen, human needs must be cultivated in 
such a manner so as to constitute a correct basis for human reason to flourish.  It is 
therefore the necessity of these external resources that now separate eudaimonia from 
the practice of virtue and make it more difficult to achieve than the latter.  For Aristotle, 
it is not certain that the virtuous man will eventually live the happy life because external 
factors can be an obstacle to this.  Still, moral perfection was considered possible for 
him, at least in the sense in which Plato considered it possible, i.e. under ideal 
circumstances.   
Given Aristotle’s view about the necessity of including imperfect human nature 
in the moral and political equation, the alternative to explaining virtue not as theoretical 
knowledge but as a practical activity was obvious.  Thus, virtue, and consequently 
happiness, cannot be possessed once and for all; it must be realized and exercised 
throughout one’s life.  This makes the unity of politics and ethics a constant aim for the 
members of a community as a whole; but it is a unity which nevertheless comes about 
naturally under the right circumstances and correct guidance.  On the other hand, if, 
according to Plato, virtue is knowledge, it lies in the philosopher’s will to go back into 
the Cave and realize it.  This is the only practical expression of the unification of 
morality and politics in his theory and Plato was at pains to persuade his audience about 
the necessity of this unification or, in other words, the necessity of politics for the 
philosopher: why should someone who acquired true knowledge and achieved moral 
perfection care for the realization of collective happiness, especially when this latter 
process posed a fatal threat to this happiness?  The philosopher had to go back into the 
Cave because a unitary explanation of morality cannot exclude the collective; for Plato 
to give different explanations for morality and justice would be to reject his own theory 
of knowledge: thus, the polis had to be morally saved even if its salvation meant 
endangering individual virtue.  The philosopher’s purpose is to overcome his anger or 
indifference for the moral decadence of his community and behave as he should in order 
to protect the unity of virtue and political justice.   
61 
 
Nevertheless this process seems to refer more to a soteriological doctrine, than 
to a philosophy which conceives the interdependence of politics and morality as a 
natural phenomenon.  Collective morality was a compulsory aim dictated by the 
metaphysical unitary ‘Form of the Good’.  Plato realized that it might be possible to 
acquire individual happiness (based on the Socratic case) and he attempted to offer 
justification for spreading this happiness to the community even against the will of its 
members.  He never managed actually to find one that was not separated from reality 
and this meant that philosophy and social practice would remain irreconcilable in a 
similar manner that perfect individual virtue and politics were irreconcilable.  Aristotle 
rejected Plato’s –in essence– pessimistic absolutism.  If the polis should remain the 
normative matrix for evaluative moral criteria, then politics should be a formative 
element of morality, not a necessary evil for it.  Thus, conceiving virtue as activity 
makes the unification of politics and ethics seem as the natural outcome of the natural 
way of living, which is nothing else than the political way.  So, if according to Plato the 
realization of collective happiness was a necessary evil –in the form of politics– for the 
philosopher, for Aristotle politics is the necessary presupposition for its realization in 
the first place. 
 
The point is that if we begin by asking for an account of goodness which is compatible with 
the good man suffering any degree of torture and injustice, the whole perspective of our 
ethics will be different from that of an ethics which begins from asking in what form of life 
doing well and faring well may be found together.  The first perspective will end up with an 
ethics which is irrelevant to the task of creating such a form of life.  Our choice between 
these two perspectives is the choice between an ethics which is engaged in telling us how to 
endure a society in which the just man is crucified and an ethics which is concerned with 
how to create a society in which this no longer happens.
106
 
 
 
B) Practical and theoretical reason 
Aristotle’s academic background, with extensive studies in biology and ‘ancient 
physics’, shaped his thought towards recognizing nature’s variety of expressions.  Thus, 
human life was naturally part of this variety and it was variable itself.  It is because of 
this background that he quickly understood virtue as a practical and continuous activity 
which will have to be formed amidst the contingencies and predicaments of life.  This 
does not mean that he considered universal moral explanations impossible or that he 
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gave absolute priority to politics over philosophy (against Plato).  Moral conflict was 
still a philosophical problem that needed resolution.  However, Aristotle understood that 
extreme unification under abstract principles is not the solution to this conflict (a view 
which was then translated into his political doctrine against extremities).  Thus, he 
always strives for the appropriate level of generality which will illuminate without over-
simplifying.  Aristotle’s theory of knowledge dictates that we use the method of 
induction in order to acquire first principles: we need to use particulars in order to 
generalize, not use generalizations in order to find particulars.  Obviously, for Aristotle, 
starting with generalizations would oversimplify the plurality of life in this world and 
especially the complexity of human experience.   
The natural outcome of this methodology was a fierce attack on Plato’s idea of the 
Forms.
107
  According to Aristotle, Plato cannot account for the diversity of the uses of 
good, because to speak of the good ‘itself’ or ‘as such’ does not clearly add anything to 
good.
108
  Plato had represented goodness as a common property imbedded in the 
structure of reality and open to our study and contemplation.  For Aristotle, this theory 
left no sufficient place for the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, 
between thinking about actualities and thinking about possibilities.
109
  Goodness, 
therefore, separated from the world we experience and existing independently of it, is 
useless.  ‘It is crucial that we do have understanding of the world; a theory must be 
wrong that cuts us off from what is supposed to make the world intelligible.’110 
 
So there could not be some common Form over and above these goods.  Again, good is 
spoken of in as many senses as is being: it is used in the category of substance, as for 
instance god and intellect, in that of quality – the virtues, in that of quantity – the right 
amount, in that of relation – the useful, in that of time – the right moment, and in that of 
place – the right locality, and so on.  So it is clear that there could not be one common 
universal, because it would be spoken of not in all the categories, but in only one. 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1196a)  
 
So, if it is not wise to seek a unitary principle in order to resolve moral conflict 
and confusion (which seemed the obvious thing to do), how should virtue be conceived 
of?  For Aristotle, in reality there are many kinds and levels of explanation, and they do 
not exclude one another.  Philosophy should try to understand and rationalize this 
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complex material and come up with an analysis about how we can achieve better 
consistency and avoid conflict which is the outcome of our misperception of the 
phenomena.
111
  This variety of phenomena is especially striking within human societies.  
For this reason ethics cannot be an exact science like it was conceived to be by Plato 
who thought of science as knowledge of the unchanging universals.  Thus, ‘Plato was 
misled when he assumed that all predications of good must refer to a common quality 
and that they must be governed by a common criterion’.112  Instead, the study of ethics 
and politics deals with individual cases and it aims at deeds rather than the necessary 
demonstrable truth; that is why Aristotle is against deduction in moral matters and 
understands virtue as a predicate which defines an active life as a whole.  Ethics and 
politics should be used in order to help us explain the complex nature of human 
behaviour and offer solutions in favour of happiness and stability respectively.  
However, the source of these solutions cannot be sought into the metaphysical realm 
and it is not a unitary principle; instead it is to be found in the experience we acquire 
from real political communities which are the outcome of human language and thought, 
hence their complexity.
113
   
The good is then defined in terms of the human specific characteristics as these 
are recognized after extensive research and collection of data.  Human beings have a 
specific nature which can be studied and explained; and if this is done correctly it will 
reveal us what is the purpose that nature urges us to fulfil.  Aristotle’s explanation is 
therefore teleological, which means that the dictations of our nature are towards a 
specific telos.  This telos can only be identified with happiness because happiness is a 
state of self-sufficiency and it cannot be a means to something else; it is the end of 
human development, the equivalent of Plato’s dikaiosune.  This teleology is Aristotle’s 
own means toward reconciling what Plato failed to reconcile with his austere 
programme of education, which sometimes seems to disregard the limited human 
capacities to reason.  The good in Aristotle’s theory is grounded on an understanding of 
human societies inferred from his biological studies.  It seems easier in this way to 
make the universal and the particular coincide, because an account of the good which 
derives from a philosophical naturalism can be at once local and particular –because the 
polis is the natural end of collective life and thus a prerequisite of happiness– and yet 
cosmic and universal –because it has been teleologically defined in terms of the 
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invariable characteristics of a whole species.
114
  We have thus a universal, fixed and 
necessary definition of man according to his capacities as those are endowed to him by 
nature; not against it like in Plato’s account.  We also have the particular moral agent 
with a character that will fulfil these capacities up to certain but variable degree 
depending upon the cultivation of these capacities.
115
  This cultivation greatly relies on 
the political context within which the moral agent is being active.   
The outcome of this approach is an account of reason in ethics which is more 
intricate than Plato’s and avoids the worst consequences of its extreme rationalism.116  
The aim is to make possible for nature’s forces and human rationalism to work 
synergistically.  If this be possible, then the interrelation of moral confusion and 
political decadence (that influenced so much Plato’s political philosophy) can be 
explained and overcome in a different and more realistic way.  Still, this view resolves a 
major problem but it creates another one; because even if pure rationalism may not be a 
realistic aspiration for mortal beings, a rationalism which is severely dependent on our 
nature may not leave enough margins for any aspirations toward moral perfectionism.  
Aristotle therefore thought of a third element which would work as the catalyst in the 
relation between human rationalism and the natural limits imposed upon it.  This third 
element is habit or ethos and is supposed to reconcile the tension which is depicted in 
the strong Platonic division between ‘soul and body’ or reason and passion.  The 
harmony of virtues can thus only be achieved when nature, intellect and habit all work 
toward the common aim, which has been previously teleologically determined.  But 
given that nature is stable and we cannot do much to change it –we can only fulfil it– it 
remains that we need to cultivate our intellect and our character; the first by teaching 
and the second by correct habituation. 
 
Virtue, then, is of two kinds: that of the intellect and that of character.  Intellectual virtue 
owes its origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its attainment 
requires experience and time; virtue of character (ēthos) is a result of habituation (ethos), 
for which reason it has acquired its name through a small variation of ‘ethos’.  From this it 
is clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us by nature.  For nothing natural can 
be made behave differently by habituation […] Virtues, however, we acquire by first 
exercising them […] What happens in cities bears this out as well, because legislators make 
the citizens good ha habituating them, and this is what every legislator intends.  Those who 
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do not do it well miss their target; and it is in this respect that a good political system differs 
from a bad one. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a-1103b) 
   
This is how Aristotle conceives the distinction between theoretical and practical 
reason; the former exercised in the contemplative realms of philosophy and theory and 
the latter in the practical activities of ethics and politics.  Since virtue has to be 
exercised in order to be realized it follows that virtue has an aspect which is not 
intellectual, but is, as it were, a feature of character.
117
  The distinction between moral 
and intellectual virtue reflects the distinction between the non-rational and rational parts 
of the soul.  It also reflects Aristotle’s fundamental dualist understanding of human 
nature, which was of course also present in Plato’s philosophy.  The irreconcilability 
between politics and morality in Plato’s thought was mostly the outcome of the dualist 
conception of the human soul; it might have been possible to overcome it in an 
individual, but it was a utopian demand for a political society as a whole: the question 
of how we can persuade the unwise community to accept reason as their ruler proved to 
be unanswerable in practice.  Reasonable obedience in the form of self-discipline seems 
similar to blind obedience if one’s soul is not guided by pure reason.  In other words, 
apart from the philosopher-kings no one really understands the ultimate purpose of self-
discipline.  Aristotle attempted to overcome this problem by developing a less sharp 
distinction between the rational and the non-rational part of the human soul which 
would make the transition from individual to political virtue not a leap of logic but a 
natural necessity.   
Therefore, the non-rational part has now more in common with the rational part, 
and is capable of both opposing it and obeying it.
118
  Thus, the non-rational part has 
been given the capacity by nature to coincide with the rational part.  It is not necessary 
to be suppressed by it (like in Plato’s account), but it is necessary to be cultivated 
toward it, and the most effective manner to cultivate it is to do it collectively because 
society is the mirror which guides human agency.  The purely rational part is thus 
related to intellectual virtues; and the second non-rational part, which is nevertheless 
also perfectible, is related to moral virtues, or virtues of character.  In this way there is 
no necessary conflict between reason and desire, such as Plato envisages, although 
Aristotle is fully aware of the possibility of such conflicts; besides this is the why, 
                                                 
117
 Ibid., 35. 
118
 Roger Crisp, ‘introduction’ in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, xiv. 
66 
 
according to him, we engage in ethical inquiries.
119
  For him, desire can be cultivated so 
as to converge with the dictations of reason.  Therefore, we can also distinguish between 
two kinds of rationality corresponding to intellectual and moral virtues: rationality in 
thinking, where reasoning is what constitutes the activity itself; and rationality in 
practical activity where we may succeed or fail in obeying the precepts of reason.  If we 
are to succeed in the latter, we must have habitually exercised our desires not to 
constitute an obstacle to our rationality.  In the same manner the accumulated wisdom 
of past generations could be infused into the political system of a given community so 
as to gradually habituate its members into virtuous behaviour and thus reconcile politics 
and morality in a difficult but natural process.     
 Nevertheless, there is still some ambiguity in Aristotle’s view because, 
according to him, if man’s end should be activity in accordance with virtue, we come up 
again with the same problem Plato faced before him, that is, what is the highest form of 
virtue.  Is it the one which is related to collective practices and habits or the one which 
is related to thinking and is an individual’s affair?  This question is logically followed 
by a second-one, i.e. which one develops first and acquires priority over the other?
120
  
We have seen how Plato’s answer regarding the first question was unconvincing and 
relied on the assumption that happiness or morality is a matter of discovering the Form.  
His answer to the second question also depended on his theory of knowledge: the 
rational part must develop first.  Aristotle on the other hand argues that the rational and 
the non-rational parts must be developed simultaneously and in a cooperative manner, 
but naturally the non-rational part will be the first to be trained since reason is a capacity 
which is fully developed after a certain age.  However, the first question, regarding 
which is the highest form of virtue, might have never been answered unambiguously by 
him.  Aristotle, as a philosopher, is inclined to recognizing the contemplative life as the 
highest form of life; but Aristotle as a natural scientist is obligated to consider the 
consequences of his naturalism.  Thus, between the three proposed ways of life, that of 
gratification, that of politics and that of study, we should definitely choose to avoid the 
first, but it is uncertain which of the other two will best lead to eudaimonia. 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b-1096a, 1177a-1178a)   
This ambiguity is a reflection of the perennial tension between the universal and 
unchanging, on the one hand, and the particular and variable, on the other.  Our habits 
represent the latter whereas our rational capacity represents the former.  An account 
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which manages to resolve the tension between virtue and politics must give clear 
priority to either of the two.   A leap of logic similar to Plato’s is required in order for 
Aristotle to render such an account philosophically viable.  Such a leap –the fact that the 
polis is taken to be the natural end of collective organization and thus the only way to 
achieve both individual and collective happiness– unavoidably infuses Aristotle’s 
theory with a metaphysical element.  This time the metaphysical element is not to be 
found in the unitary principles of mathematics.  Instead his teleological understanding is 
based on a ‘metaphysical biology’.121  Still, his theory is more connected to reality than 
that of Plato’s, because Aristotle craves for a realistic and practical conclusion and he is 
not interested in radical philosophical solutions.  Thus, the contemplative life might be 
the highest form of life but the intellectual virtues are not the defining virtues of our 
attempt to achieve moral completion.  They are necessary up to some undetermined 
degree –because it is in our nature to seek theoretical explanations of this world– but 
they are not the starting point.  The starting point must be practical in order to be 
feasible at all.  In the end, if we have to give priority to either intellectual virtue or 
moral virtue, we choose the latter, because theory is inferred from reality and not the 
other way around. 
 
The activity of intellect, on the other hand, in so far as it involves contemplation, seems 
superior in its seriousness, to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own proper 
pleasure, which augments the activity; it seems also to possess self-sufficiency, time for 
leisure, and freedom from fatigue, as far as these are humanly possible […] Such a life is 
superior to one that is simply human, because someone lives thus, not in so far as he is a 
human being, but in so far as there is some divine element within him […] But we ought 
not to listen to those who exhort us, because we are human, to think of human things, or 
because we are mortal, to think of mortal things. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b)   
   
Aristotle’s dubiousness, his inner oscillation between his ideal of the contemplative life 
and his practical approach to ethical and political matters, is here very clear.  At the end 
of the day though, his political philosophy as a whole is a lesson in favour of human 
beings as political animals.  Thus, the starting point must be tangible and explainable, 
which means that it must be related to virtues easily understandable (that is by 
perception) and trainable.  It must also be related to the community as a whole.  The 
good for man can be then by definition connected to the exercise of virtues in order to 
justify the purpose of politics, or in other words to justify the conclusion that the polis is 
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the natural end for human beings.  This starting point is then moral virtue, which is a 
disposition to the right desires; a disposition that can be changed or habituated from an 
early age in order for the non-rational part of the human soul to get closer to the rational 
part.  This is consistent with Aristotle’s epistemology: we do not start from the 
invariable in order to change the variable, but we start from the variable in order to 
grasp the invariable.  Habituation is achieved through repetitive practice in accordance 
with a set of rational principles which in turn have been previously acquired through 
experience.  Thus, for Aristotle, to be virtuous means to have the capacity to engage in 
practical reasoning which is in turn supported by the cultivated disposition to act well.  
Conversely, this disposition cannot guarantee virtue if the capacity for practical 
reasoning is absent.  ‘The virtuous disposition is intelligent, and this means the exercise 
of deliberation, judgement and choice.’122   
 
 
C) Politics as phronesis: Ethics can only be social 
Rationalism in activity means the capacity to infer guiding principles for action from 
previous experience.  Since Aristotle’s ethical enquiry has a practical aim this inductive 
reasoning is aiming at how humans may become good and behave well; not merely at 
knowing what morality is
123
 (a knowledge that in Plato’s case meant automatically the 
possession of morality as well).  Becoming good and behaving well is of course a 
matter of developing one’s character.  This brings us to the definition of moral virtue as 
ethical judgments which depend upon habituation and prior deliberation.  These ethical 
judgments are transformed thus into everyday choices which in turn reinforce 
habituation creating thus a dialectical process towards moral perfection.  Pleasures and 
pains are a useful guide here because just as they can corrupt us by distracting us from 
habits of virtue, so they can be used to inculcate the virtues.
124
  Every time one makes a 
choice which signifies the coincidence of desire and reason the corresponding virtue 
becomes more stable and stronger in one’s disposition.  Therefore, from the moment 
moral virtues have been settled into our disposition we have the ability to observe the 
‘mean’ between excess and deficiency relative to us.  The concept of virtue as a mean is 
not a doctrine of moderation; instead it is determined by rational principle which has 
been inferred by the already virtuous agent.
125
  The concerns of practical life are 
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therefore analysed with an appropriate degree of rigour and abstraction.  Practical 
reasoning is able to combine, in one single and situated practical action, the agent’s 
cultivated disposition and ability to rationalize without suppressing the non-rational part 
of his soul, but working in tandem with it.  This latter part of the argument is crucial for 
the understanding of ‘virtue as a mean’ and also for the understanding of politics as the 
equivalent of prudence or phronesis.  The aim is to avoid extremities because we seek 
practical and realistic solutions to moral conflict and confusion; moral and political 
harmony and stability are thus the outcome of everyday virtuous choices which exclude 
excess and deficiency in practically all matters.  Reconciling the universal with the 
particular renders therefore the Aristotelian virtue as an ability to choose in accordance 
with a mean.  This shows us the structure of our dispositions to action, and clarifies 
them to us without forcing them into over-simple, artificial moulds.
126
   
‘The virtues [or vices], then, are certain forms of choice or involve choice’127 
which in a cyclical manner either further cultivate or impair the ability to act virtuously.  
‘To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclination; it is to act 
from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues… The educated moral agent 
must of course know what he is doing when he judges or acts virtuously.’128  The 
Aristotelian prohairesis, i.e. choice based on prior deliberation which is expressed in a 
rational voluntary action, is essentially a practical syllogism which by nature, according 
to Aristotle’s teleology, entails a political action; a political action which will avoid the 
extremes –another attack on Plato’s radicalism which dictated the extreme political 
unification of the community against moral conflict.  Rational choice consists then of 
two elements which correspond to his dualist conception of virtue.  Every time a moral 
agent makes a choice he exercises moral virtue, and when he does it according to 
principles which have been rationally inferred by experience he exercises his reason.  
The system of rules, which embodies all those principles that have been rationally 
inferred from experience, constitutes the political context of moral agency, and its 
quality essentially determines the degree of moral excellence the agent will be able to 
achieve.    
Therefore, Aristotle’s ethical argument cogently leads to the knowledge of the 
purpose of the state.  Knowing what the good life consists in is a necessary part of 
political science.
129
  Social discourse is by definition an ethical and political discourse 
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because all the actions we call virtuous or vicious are essentially socially and rationally 
–the particular and the universal– evaluated and are praised or blamed because they are 
acquired dispositions or attitudes to the emotions rather than simple biological feelings 
as ‘facts’.  ‘Social conversation, then, is a consequence of ordered societies.  We can be 
individuals as moral agents only because we are social.’130  The essence of the virtuous 
life in Aristotle’s polis, wherein the cultivation of man’s inherently political character 
went through the act of ruling and being ruled, was to reinforce both the agent’s moral 
character with the right evaluative criteria and the polis’ collective morality, at the same 
time.  The political argument constitutes in that way a natural continuity of the ethical 
argument.  There is an end (the good life), which is totally objective for him,
131
 and 
there is politics which is the natural way for man to achieve that objective end.  It is 
natural because the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing i.e., 
to live the eudaimon life, is the end and the best.  And for Aristotle, the proof that the 
state is naturally the ultimate end for man (the situation in which he finds the 
opportunity to fulfil the potential to become self-sufficient by exercising his special 
capacities, that is, reason) is that when the individual is isolated and unable to live in 
society, he is not self-sufficient; he is not exercising his natural human abilities; he lacks 
the evaluative mirror for his moral agency; so he must be either a beast or a god (The 
Politics 1253
a 
1-30).   
Man must be able to exercise his phronesis or prudence; the practical activity 
that may lead him to eudaimonia through the application of the right moral principles –
inferred from experience– in particular situations.  The political community’s aim 
should be to offer the opportunity and the right guidance for the exercise of prudence.  
This means that the Politics, as a work, follows the Nicomachean Ethics, but the 
political is always assumed to be logically prior, because ethics is the outcome of 
habituation and politics is itself conceived as the most important kind of habituation 
(because man is a political animal).  Politics constitutes therefore the necessary and 
natural milieu in which human beings develop the characters they need to enable them 
to live humanly.  Human excellence or virtue, according to Aristotle, can be realized 
only under the aegis of correct compulsive norms, the just laws of a political 
community.  For this reason ethical discourse concerns itself with moral virtues which 
presuppose some rule-based common life or other.  In that manner the political agenda 
has been set up clearly during the ethical argument: if moral virtue is the outcome of 
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habituation (that is framed on principles inferred from experience) then we need 
political data based on perception in order to commence the induction of political rules 
which will offer the necessary guidance for everyday virtuous action.  Political 
philosophy is therefore the natural outcome of such an approach.   
The polis is logically prior to each of its members because it is the polis by 
which humans secure their well being.
132
  Aristotle’s polis is not a philosophic academia 
which is purported to enlighten philosophically its members (sufficient enlightenment 
for moral completeness according to Plato).  Aristotle’s education primarily refers to the 
habituating effect that the practical aspect of a polis’s life has on its citizens, i.e. the 
polis is a school of life, the frame of an ongoing practical moral education; but 
Aristotle’s ethical objectivism signifies his conception of the polis as a school for the 
good life.  The member of the polis is the citizen who participates in this education 
toward the collective and consequently individual well being.  According to Aristotle, 
the degree of this participation determines also the degree of the exercise of our natural 
political capacities and the quality of this education determines the quality of the 
citizens.  This is why the best form of the state (the best constitution of political action) 
should be the one that allows the citizens to rule and in turn to be ruled.  Because the 
excellence of the citizen-ruler is not the same as the virtue of the ruled citizen: what a 
citizen does when ruled is different from what he does when ruling; and practical 
wisdom, that is, phronesis –to know what is the best action for each circumstance– 
which is the purpose of Aristotle’s ethical inquiry, demands from the citizen to learn the 
habit of ruling by being ruled.  This process is the equivalent of training our passions 
and desires to follow our reason so as to be able exercise reason, but not against human 
nature.  A man who has been trained in being ruled should be better equipped to ruling 
because his desires will not pose an obstacle to his practical reason.     
When a man is in the position of being ruled he exercises correct opinion but 
when he takes his turn to rule, he engages in practical reasoning or prudent choice-
making in the circumstances.
133
  Phronesis is the ability to act so that principle will take 
concrete form.  It is not only itself a virtue, it is the keystone of all virtue, for without it 
one cannot be virtuous.
134
  Correct opinion seems to be just an ability to diagnose the 
virtuous or un-virtuous conduct of those ruling and praise it or criticize it accordingly.  
Thus, ruling is obviously more significant for Aristotle, in relation to the formation of 
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the character, because it incorporates the element of voluntariness along with rational 
deliberation about a choice which may severely affect the moral outlook not only of the 
conducting moral agent but also of the recipients of this action.  Political responsibility 
is thus connected in a definitive manner with Aristotle’s concept of prohairesis and 
character formation, ‘for the excellence of a ruler differs from that of a citizen’. (The 
Politics, 1277
a
 20)   
Ruling cultivates and requires at the same time the agent’s practical wisdom, 
which is intelligence regarding foresight in particular situations, morally defined.  This 
‘moral intelligence’ needs to be trained and can only been trained when it faces the 
necessary internal and external moral threats, of which politics is infamous.
135
  Political 
situations will certainly pose threats to virtue as exercised in relation to oneself and to 
virtue as exercised in relation to others.  The practically wise agent will be able to 
resolve those threats, achieving therefore justice.
136
  Practical wisdom is thus the 
cardinal virtue because it signifies the inter-determination of politics and ethics.  It 
allows the universal principle to be applied without conflicting with either individual 
virtue or virtue as it is defined by the public role.  ‘Public responsibilities, public rule, is 
concerned with securing the good life of its members through laws that habituate 
citizens to virtuous practices over and above securing life itself’.137  When this public 
rule is conducted by the practically wise the good of the citizens is secured by 
implementing and maintaining the right laws, by guarding justice.  In such a community 
the universal (the good man) and the particular (the good citizen) will coincide because 
those who rule conceive justice as the good of others as human beings.     
To recapitulate, Aristotle is engaged in the single enterprise of understanding the 
workings of states, and of the people who are part of them, so that the political 
philosopher can securely determine how the state should be constituted, if it is to satisfy 
the purpose which human nature requires of it.
138
  The good life is a life which seeks to 
acquire and exercise the goods of the soul, which are the peculiar virtues of humans.  
And the study of the best constitution or the best state becomes thus a part of the study 
of the human nature.  Politics is the same state as phronesis or prudence: a (virtuous) 
practical activity towards eudaimonia.  But while phronesis refers primarily to the 
individual’s virtue, politics is more concerned with acquiring and preserving 
eudaimonia for ‘a people and a polis’.  So it follows that those who conduct politics 
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should also be prudent, at least in the ideal polis.  Politics is conceived of as the 
architectonic virtue whose end is the best good,
139
 the equivalent of Plato’s dikaiosune.  
However, unlike Plato, whose main concern was to change politics in order to let the 
already moral rule (making thus the unison of morality and politics possible), for 
Aristotle politics is the ultimate practical activity; the one that allows the realization of 
morality in and by practice.  Thus Justice is not thus a theoretical principle waiting to be 
discovered and applied; instead it is the outcome of virtuous action, and for an action to 
be virtuous it has to be promoting the good of the polis and its members; the good 
which has been inferred from experience and has been objectively defined.  
 
 
D) The political and the contemplative man  
Notwithstanding Aristotle’s forceful attempt to present ethics and politics as naturally 
inter-determined, he recognizes that there is a difficulty in discussing the moral benefits 
of the political life over the private-contemplative life.  As already discussed, such an 
ambiguity derives from the potential tension between the rational and the non-rational 
parts of the soul, a tension which seemed to be insurmountable in Plato’s analogy of the 
polis and the soul.  In the conclusion of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that 
the private-contemplative life is potentially the perfect happiness for man, creating thus 
some kind of confusion as to which is the best way eventually to live the good life: the 
political life, which is necessary for the habituation of the moral dispositions, or the 
contemplative life which is self-sufficient since it is occupied only with the intellect?  
Aristotle does not give a definite answer although this can be inferred from his work as 
a whole.  Nevertheless, because of this ambiguity, he is unable to avoid the 
metaphysical element in his ethical argument which, unlike his political argument, 
seems to be unwilling to reject totally the Platonic views on the essence of morality and 
the dualist state of the soul.  In recognition of this difficulty and in defence of the 
natural unity between politics and ethics Aristotle claims that the outcome of the 
contemplative life, i.e. wisdom, is not the same as prudence which is the outcome of 
correct habituation and experience; indeed, it is a more finished form of knowledge, but 
it does not produce results in the political world because it is irrelevant to it: 
contemplation, or theoria, is a natural tendency for all humans irrespective of any 
external factors.
140
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The idea of ‘thinking of thinking’, an escape from the mundane limitations of 
our cognitive abilities, which always require a distinct object, is obviously very 
important for Aristotle and reveals Plato’s influence on his thought.  However, it is clear 
that it is not further developed by him because he understands that it will not be of 
interest to his audience, and it might create further confusion in respect to 
eudaimonia.
141
  He therefore concludes that wisdom, regarding theory, is irrelevant to 
ethics, since ethics presupposes a relation of one’s self to others; it cannot be confined 
within an individual and it therefore requires a more pluralist and realist –at least 
methodologically– approach.  The metaphysical element lies in the fact that Aristotle 
implies that pure wisdom, theorizing about theory, may be possible individually and, in 
fact, it must be pursued for the sake of eudaimonia, because it brings humans closer to 
the divine, without ever making clear whether this pursuit is a realistic-one and whether 
it should take priority over practical matters. 
 
[T]he metaphysical contemplation of which furnishes man with his specific and ultimate 
telos, can itself take no interest in the merely human, let alone the dilemmatic; it is 
nothing other than thought timelessly thinking itself and conscious of nothing but itself.  
Since such contemplation is the ultimate human telos […] there is a certain tension 
between Aristotle’s view of man as essentially political and his view of man as 
essentially metaphysical.  To become eudaimon material prerequisites and social 
prerequisites are necessary […] [Thus] in many passages where Aristotle discusses 
individual virtues, the notion that their possession and practice is in the end subordinate 
to metaphysical contemplation would seem oddly out of place.
142
 
   
The more realistic aspect of Aristotle’s view is that wisdom may be enough for 
one’s own happiness but it is not sufficient for the collective eudaimonia which, in the 
end, should be the final end according to his teleological position.  Of course, this 
implies another kind of dualism between individual and collective happiness.  The wise 
man who is the one likely to achieve the first may not be appropriate for realizing the 
latter.  The wise man may not be appropriate for public matters.  Conversely, the just or 
prudent man may be cut out for the latter but he will never be able to explore the realms 
of contemplation in depth because of the limits posed by social life’s needs.  The central 
question that reflects such an ambiguity in Aristotle’s theory is whether we should 
prefer to live the life of the wise or the just man.
143
  The life of the wise man means 
                                                 
141
 Annas, ‘Classical Greek Philosophy’, 303. 
142
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 158. 
143
 Coleman, A History of Political Thought Vol. 1, 184. 
75 
 
fulfilling intellectual virtue while the life of the just man means cultivating dispositional 
virtue.  Against Plato’s unitary principle that glorifies the intellect and dismisses the 
human disposition as the part that must be suppressed, for Aristotle, we should direct 
ourselves to the betterment of the two goals: of an active life intellectually and of an 
active life practically, that is, politically.  Nevertheless, his conclusion about moral 
perfection is not so different from Plato’s.  Perfect harmony will once again be possible 
only in an ideal state, where society will be morally self-sufficient so as not to pose 
obstacles to its members in their pursuit of intellectual virtue.  These two goals reflect 
Aristotle’s conception of the duality of the human nature: the activity of thinking is self-
sufficient whereas the activity of politics is socially dependent; they are both necessary 
to each other, but they are difficult to synchronize.  The wise man is self-sufficient 
whereas the just man is only just in relation to others; thus being wise does not entail 
being just and vice versa.  In the end though, the self-sufficient activity of thinking 
requires an already self-sufficient community of members, thus de facto the just man 
seems to be the prerequisite for the wise man, and not the other way around.  
The distinction between moral and intellectual virtue and the attempt to assign 
priority between them illustrates how Aristotle conceives this dualism in the human soul 
and the resulting tension between the philosopher and politics.  Humans are the only 
beings so heavily self-divided because they are the only beings who have the capacity to 
act as ethical agents.   Philosophy seems to be the outcome of this division as are its 
ever-lasting attempts to reconcile our rational aspirations for intellectual perfection and 
the impediments posed by social interaction, leaving thus true happiness as a confusing 
concept.  The practical solution, according to Aristotle, is to conceive the two parts not 
as undermining each other, but as two parts that must be synergistically developed in 
order to become perfect.  Nevertheless, in final analysis, his teleology gives a natural 
priority to moral virtue because man is a political animal and individual self-sufficiency 
is a wishful thought, whereas collective self-sufficiency is a tangible aim; for Aristotle, 
an aim almost realized by the ancient Greek polis.  We can infer, therefore, that the 
priority is given by Aristotle to moral virtue over intellectual virtue and to the political 
over the individual.  Aristotle used the Greek polis as the objective normative standard 
for assigning priority to the political, which was nevertheless an arbitrary assumption.  
Plato’s own failed attempt toward moral objectivism was also permeated by the 
arbitrary concept of the Form.   
The above argument reveals that despite Aristotle’s certainty in the strong 
interrelation between ethics and politics, he accepts that in practice, at least, there is a 
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possibility for the discontinuity between individual virtues (potentially reflecting the 
perfect intellect) and political virtues (potentially reflecting the perfect character).  He 
discusses this possibility in the Politics where he is considering ‘whether the happiness 
of the individual is the same as that of the state or different.’  His answer is that in 
reality no one can doubt that they are the same (The Politics, 1324
a 
5).  Even for the 
wise man who lives the perfect private-contemplative life, there should be a natural 
inclination toward the realization of his wisdom in political action (reverberating here 
Plato’s own conviction that the philosopher must return to the Cave regardless of the 
cost for his personal moral integrity; in fact he must return for the sake of it).  The 
philosopher naturally wants to participate in promoting general eudaimonia.  The 
political nature (as it has been defined by Aristotle’s metaphysical biology) commands 
that the philosopher translates his wisdom into justice.  However, where for Plato this 
translation is self-evident since the philosopher has acquired perfect knowledge, for 
Aristotle the transition from wisdom to practical reasoning and politics is more 
complex.  One reason for this is because he never makes clear whether perfect wisdom 
is even possible at all.  The second is because of the problem between the particular and 
the universal or the practical and the abstract, which in Aristotle’s account of practical 
reasoning is a problem of how to reconcile politics and ethics under an objective 
definition of happiness: 
 
If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be acting well, the active 
life will be the best, both for every city collectively, and for individuals.  Not that a 
life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are 
those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of 
practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are 
independent and complete in themselves; since acting well, and therefore a certain 
kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind 
is most truly said to act.  Neither, again, is it necessary that states that are cut off 
from others and choose to live alone should be inactive; for activity, as well as other 
things, may take place by sections; there are many ways in which the sections of a 
state act upon one another.  The same thing is equally true of every individual.  If 
this were otherwise, the gods and the universe, who have no external actions over 
and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection.  Hence it is 
evident that the same life is best for each individual, and for states and for mankind 
collectively (The Politics, 1325
b 
15-30). 
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In Aristotle’s understanding, politics and ethics should merge inescapably into 
one concept –but not into one and single unitary principle.  He repeatedly argues that 
the aim is not a theoretical discovery of morality but the realization of happiness which 
is the outcome of the study of ethics and politics.  Nevertheless, he recognizes –
following the Socratic discourse– that if there is one serious obstacle to this single 
concept, it should be the tension between the contemplative-isolated life and the 
political life because they constitute two different, potentially conflicting, ways to 
eudaimonia.  Self-sufficient individual virtues are obviously threatening the socially 
depended political virtues because they conceive the moral agent as a-social.  The 
individual virtues may therefore be against the fulfilment of public roles towards 
collective justice; and vice-versa, politics seems to exclude moral self-sufficiency.
144
  
‘How can we make those two concepts coincide?’ is Aristotle’s central question; not so 
different to Plato’s previous argument that saw their coincidence only in a utopian 
Politeia.   
Aristotle states the political problem in relation to morality clearly and in the 
very modern terms of political ethics: ‘How can that which is not even lawful be the 
business of the statesman or the legislator?’ (The Politics, 1324b 25); and further down, 
‘some renounce political power, and think that the life of the freeman is different from 
the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman 
best’ (The Politics, 1325a 20).  The debate between the philosopher and the politician, 
firstly developed by Plato, seems to be troubling Aristotle.  But ultimately, for him, man 
is a political animal and ethics, as a whole, is an inherent element of human societies, 
which in final analysis are always political societies.  Thus, the proper cultivation of the 
first presupposes a systematic development of the second.  The purely philosophical 
life, which is an ultimate aim for man (and, arguably, as we saw, incompatible to the 
demands of political life), cannot by itself be sufficient for his moral perfection: 
individual virtue and political virtue cannot be disconnected; now, not because perfect 
knowledge commands it, but because Aristotle’s teleological naturalism dictates the 
interdependence of moral and intellectual virtue. 
 In this relationship between the two kinds of virtue, the disposition of character 
is, as we analyzed above, the most crucial part because it is the starting point for moral 
development.  It is when the members of a political society realize this that the 
significance of the state as the main habituating institution becomes apparent.  The 
creation of the good political community is thus the outcome of deliberation and it is a 
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rational choice.  In this way Aristotle is again attempting to reconcile the natural with 
the rational and the dispositional: the state (social organization) is the natural end for 
human beings, but how this end is going to be realized depends on the rational 
capacities of its members which in turn infer the right principles of social organization.  
Therefore the degree of these rational capacities and of their exercise determines the 
criterion according to which we judge the quality of a polis.  ‘The nature of a thing is 
what it is when fully developed’,145 but in the case of human beings full development 
relies on the use of the inherent ability to reason.  Therefore the polis is not the final 
point in a process of developing moral life towards happiness but it is its culmination in 
terms of moral quality.  This is why it signifies an end not in temporal, but in 
teleological terms: it is explained by reference to the good of its citizens which has been 
previously inferred from the study of the human nature.
146
  Thus, the priority of moral 
virtue over intellectual virtue derives from the priority of the political over the 
individual.  This is not simply because the whole is naturally more important than the 
part (as it was Aristotle’s normative assumption), but because the political is the most 
important activity towards achieving the good life both collectively and individually.  In 
other words, intellectual virtue cannot be possible at all outside the political community; 
but this also implies that intellectual virtue can never be perfected: 
 
Thus the good man’s final achieved self-sufficiency in his contemplation of timeless 
reason does not entail that the good man does not need friends, just as it does not entail 
that he does not need a certain level of material prosperity.  Correspondingly a city 
founded on justice and friendship can only be the best kind of city if it enables its citizens 
to enjoy the life of metaphysical contemplation.
147
   
 
 
E) Reconciling politics with virtue: practical wisdom and the conditions of 
eudaimonia  
The end of moral education is for Aristotle, like for Plato, human excellence, that is, the 
best human excellence which is related to living well or eudaimonia.  Their difference 
though is striking in how each philosopher understands happiness and the direct 
connection of education with the ultimate virtue.  It is primarily a methodological 
difference which nevertheless results in opposite theories of knowledge and naturally in 
opposite understandings of politics and ethics.  For Plato virtue is the outcome of 
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theoretical abstract training in first principles, the Forms; there is not a distinction 
between moral and intellectual virtue as such.  Political organization is the outcome of 
knowledge and in its ideal form represents a political structure which is universal and 
unchanging.  We have seen how this conception leads to an understanding of politics as 
a field to be dominated by philosophers, corresponding to the domination of reason over 
passion.  Thus, the end of education is perfect theory or pure wisdom, which then will 
re-define the problematic reality.  Now, even if Plato himself did not develop a 
comprehensive explanation of the Forms
148
 what he intended to state was very clear: 
philosophy, as science, is a matter of stability and precision, based on unchanging 
knowledge.  All those elements are of course only to be found in abstract thought and 
universal concepts corresponding to an education in geometry and numbers.  Thus, if 
we want politics not to pose a threat to morality we need to start conceiving of it as a 
scientific matter, and as a scientific matter it should be left to the experts i.e. the 
philosophers.  The radical character of this proposition is not mitigated even if we 
consider that Plato only wanted politics to be checked by philosophy; to be judged by a 
set of criteria which have been rationally discovered; not to be dominated by them in a 
real and absolute sense. 
For Aristotle, on the other hand, virtue is the outcome of practice; ethics is a 
study of everyday habits.  Naturally, education cannot start from abstract first 
principles.  Instead, the first principles should be inferred by us according to our social 
experience.  Thus, moral perfection is separated from intellectual perfection because it 
is related to improving daily habits, not theoretical understanding.  Perfect virtue is not 
the means for re-defining reality, it is the outcome of an ideal reality; thus, the purpose 
of moral education is not pure wisdom but practical reasoning.  This is why constructing 
the ideal state is a prerequisite of perfect virtue.  Theoretical knowledge is not 
unchanging; it is variable like forms of biological life are variable.  However, if it is 
difficult actually to locate Plato’s Forms, it is equally difficult to ascertain what kind of 
social experience should be used as normative matrix from which we can infer first 
principles.  The question is ‘On what basis do we start the construction of the ideal 
state?’  Of course, for Aristotle, the model for this kind of inductive knowledge was the 
Greek polis, though an idealized version of it.  This is the reason for Aristotle’s own 
indecisiveness in regard to whether philosophers should actively pursue the discovery of 
an ideal society or they should just stay within a pluralist approach which is dictated by 
real life’s experiences (methodologically following his own biological studies).  
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Aristotle was able to recognize and understand the pluralist nature of life and he 
attempted to make the diversity of the regimes of the Greek city-states intelligible to his 
audience in both political and ethical terms.  But this is a recognition which is always 
completed by an attempt to find the natural telos of all life; the telos which is by 
definition strongly connected to objective evaluative criteria.  Thus, his political 
pluralism is contradicted by his ethical objectivism.    
Aristotle, as a political philosopher, is ready to accept the variety of political 
conduct (unlike Plato); he was aware of the possibility of bad laws which are better than 
no laws at all; he is even ready to propose seemingly unethical strategies toward 
preserving political power; but he is not ready to accept the ethical consequences of this 
variety, because his aim is to change political societies, not merely to describe them.  
After having understood the plurality of political and ethical life he had to propose an 
argument for their betterment.  However, the plurality of political and ethical life was 
conceptually limited within the paradigm of city-states.  Like Plato, Aristotle also treats 
an ideal version of the ancient Greek polis as a normative concept, failing to understand 
how a historically situated entity cannot be set as the source of his teleological 
objectivism.  Since Aristotle is not ready to resolve this contradiction between moral 
perfectionism and political reality in a radical manner, like Plato did, there will always 
be an inherent ambiguity in his political philosophy regarding the ideal life: his 
perfectionism seems to be the outcome of either the unrealistic isolated contemplative 
life or the unrealistic vision of the ideal polis.   
Aristotle’s understanding of political and ethical pluralism is related to his 
recognition that practical life is too chaotic to be systematized, too variable to offer the 
much needed coherent experience according to which we can infer first principles.  So, 
Aristotle seems to be struggling with this ambiguity himself, knowing that any attempt 
towards justifying the contemplative life too strongly is doomed to become very similar 
to Plato’s own metaphysical ideas, whereas any attempt to characterize the variety of 
political constitutions as clear evidence in favour of an insurmountable pluralism is 
doomed to turn similarly into –the much condemned by Plato– an unqualified moral 
relativism.  Intellectual perfection seems to be incompatible with political virtue 
because it can only be conceived in absolute and isolated (divine) terms whereas 
political virtue or prudence has to deal with variable socially defined ethical situations.  
How can we then avoid this ambiguity?  Aristotle’s solution may not be philosophically 
totally convincing, but it offers a realistic overriding objective i.e. that the avoidance of 
extremes in politics, the minimizing of civic disruption and the risk of revolution, strife 
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and war should be the starting point for a morally better life.  ‘Aristotle’s political 
values stress stability not at any cost but through the exercise of prudence’149 in order to 
make individual virtue a real possibility.  This means that ethical conduct is not defined 
only by its outcome because the outcome is never certain and never permanent.  For 
Aristotle, practical wisdom is the ability to reconcile certain types of action, which are 
in principle prohibited or enjoined irrespective of circumstances and consequences,
150
 
with the good of the community as a whole.  His view is thus teleological and morally 
objective without being consequentialist.
151
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3. Machiavelli’s Theory: The Disunity of Politics and Morality vs. Morality as 
the Necessary Ground for Politics 
 
 
A) The breaking from classical political philosophy 
Plato’s dialogues are tackling a problem that seems to be touching the limits of human 
perfectibility and thus remains irresolvable.  The relationship between politics and 
morality as presented previously appears to be problematic because of the question of 
how we can reconcile private virtue with political justice.  This reconciliation seems to 
be the prerequisite for Plato’s vision of a community where philosophy and politics are 
not divorced.  In the Apology the Socratic conclusion is that the only way to realizing 
true justice is private virtue.  In the Crito the Socratic counter-proposition is that the 
violation of the collective laws, even if these are unjust, is the starting point of both 
moral and political degradation.  Moral and political unity would only be possible in the 
ideal Republic, an absolute regime not without some serious practical dangers for both 
its leaders and the rest of the community.  Despite these dangers, Plato seems to 
conclude, a virtuous life, isolated from the community it was born from, was not worth 
living.  Morality, by definition, cannot be a-social; its philosophical unity requires a 
comprehensive political realization.  Thus, after the description of the problem and the 
acknowledgment of its difficulty, Plato made a practical as well as a moral choice: the 
purpose of philosophy is to aid politics, and politics should choose to rely on 
philosophy.  Their tension is recognized, but the possibility of good life relies on 
virtuous agents having the knowledge to overcome it.  
Aristotle, on the other hand, believed in two major aims of politics; first, to 
provide the peace and necessities –the external goods– that are essential for leisure and 
for the study of the human good, which is the only truly leisured activity; and second, 
that it aims to provide the civic virtues that guarantee the justice, stability and harmony 
of the polis.
152
  The harmony of the polis was the outcome of the ethical completion of 
both the collectivity and the individual.  Good politics meant ethically good citizens, in 
an interactive relationship, and even if total coherence between ethics and politics is 
impossible in reality –because of the limits of human rational capacities– man should 
aim for it because he is, in the end, a political animal.  The highest form of life is the 
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collective life.  Happiness and justice are social phenomena; there can be no moral 
agency outside the community; human nature itself leaves no doubt about that.  Thus, 
the interdependency of politics and ethics was not simply a normative assumption for 
the classical philosophers.  It was also a practical choice with strong evaluative 
connotations: happiness, justice or the good life demanded this interdependency, even 
if, most of the time, the hard realities of social life show us how difficult this is to 
achieve. 
The significance of Machiavelli’s political philosophy also stems from his views 
about politics and its implicit, as we are about to see, connection with the world of 
morals.  This is why in a study of the relationship between politics, justice and ethics he 
must naturally follow Plato and Aristotle, despite the chronological and contextual 
difference; or, maybe, because of it.  The degree of divergence about Machiavelli’s 
central view, his basic political attitude and ethical understandings makes him a pivotal 
thinker in the evolution of political philosophy especially with regards to what should 
be the role of morality in political conduct.  It is one of the few general agreements 
about Machiavelli that he engages in this debate with the ancient classical philosophers.  
However, there are several interpretations as to whether he was affected by classical 
political philosophy in a positive manner or he strongly wanted to deny the possibility 
that ethics is really that important for the good conduct of politics.  At a first glance, 
Machiavelli seems to be one of the thinkers of early modernity who illustrate very 
precisely the tension or even the rivalry between conventional ethics and the purposes 
of politics.  Still, it is one thing to recognize the descriptive character of his works, i.e. 
explaining the fact that political action may not be conducive to an ethical life, and it is 
a different thing to claim that Machiavelli himself prescribed an amoral ethics as the 
only way to more effective politics.  Despite the predominantly political and seemingly 
amoral character of Machiavelli’s works, it is this implicit ethical ambiguity of his 
works that makes him such an important thinker with regard to the interrelation between 
a political regime and its ethical aims.  Some of the most common questions about his 
works go like this:  Is there, according to Machiavelli, a specific way to political life, 
based on a given set of moral principles and ends?  Or, is Machiavelli attempting to 
analyze the political attitudes of his time, and offer some technical advice in support of 
greater governmental capability and cast aside ethical considerations as irrelevant, or 
even, detrimental to political regimes?   
Machiavelli was historically related to the civic-humanist movement, which 
attempted to renovate or rediscover ancient wisdom and ways of thinking about political 
84 
 
and moral matters –mainly wisdom coming from Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Thucydides 
and Plutarch.  On these grounds it is commonly accepted that he should have followed 
the general trend of his time and tried to think of how classical arguments about politics 
and morality could contribute to the debates of his time.
153
  Thus, Hampshire argues, 
‘Machiavelli’s theory of history was like a neo-classical building, a lively imitation of 
ancient models’.154 However, it is still inconclusive whether he is a moral and political 
philosopher purporting to teach people how to see through deceptive appearances in 
politics.  Is Machiavelli a public educator, within the tradition of Socrates and Plato, 
who seeks to uphold the “rule of law” against the “rule of men”155 as a medicine against 
both political and ethical disorder?
156
  Or is he a skilled professional who, from the 
point of view of a technician of politics, only wanted to explain why the preservation of 
the state should only and always “rely on power but never on moral principle”?157 
Whether there is a dichotomy, or interdependency, between politics and ethics, I 
want to argue, is the question which constitutes the source for the most fundamental 
differences in understanding Machiavelli’s works, but also the reason for his 
philosophical importance.  Based on this question we can distinguish between three 
general interpretative traditions –with several variations among them– which read his 
political works, first, as a statement of hard political realism or amoralism, which 
dictates the separation of politics and ethics altogether (a repetition of Thrasymachus’ 
arguments); second, as an attempt to revive a patriotic –or in contemporary terms 
communitarian– republicanism (of which there are two variations, one closer to political 
amoralism and one more ethically principled but juxtaposed to Christian morality); and 
third, as a covert way of explaining how corrupt times entail a transvaluation of virtues, 
which means that people must train themselves to distinguish real virtue from apparent 
virtue as the only way to ethical and political completion –a view closer to classical 
republicanism in the sense that the ethical objectives of the state can be considered as 
universally legitimate for the human species.   
The three approaches may express sometimes similar arguments and agree on 
the interpretative complexity and difficulty of Machiavelli’s work, but their 
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fundamental disagreement comes from different understandings regarding the ethical 
essence and objectives of his work.  Despite the inconclusiveness with regard to his 
ultimate political and moral aims, and given that it is true that there is enough margin 
for every “reader to make up her or his own mind on how to reconcile the 
irreconcilable”158, we can assume that, for Machiavelli, the irreconcilable was 
something similar to the Socratic perennial question on how to live a just life in an 
unjust world.  His actual answer is certainly political, whether positively or negatively 
conceived in moral terms, and does not reduce the importance of the analytical 
explanations he offered about the nature of the relationship between politics an ethics.  
Thus, even if he did not intend to start a deep philosophical discussion about the nature 
of morality and of its authority, by his concreteness and sharpness as a political advisor 
he forced the deeper question to the surface.
159
  That is, we need to expose the forces 
that drive governments to conceal the morally repulsive extent of conceit and violence 
to which they hold themselves committed in defence of some kind of national 
independence or some other collective aim.
160
 
 
 
B) The amoral Machiavelli: A first traditional interpretation 
Each interpretative tradition has serious reasons to claim that Machiavelli’s thought was 
indeed radical and original and marked a break with classical and medieval political 
philosophy and signified the transition to Modernity.  Each tradition argues for a break 
on different grounds and according to different motives.  However, we should notice, 
each tradition makes an argument always with regard to the above fundamental question 
on the relationship between the ethical and the political.  In other words, ‘Machiavelli’s 
problem’ is commonly recognized as the intersection between morality and politics.  
What is not commonly agreed on is his own answer to the problem.  Machiavelli 
preaches that aggression, conquest, domination, violence and deceit stand opposite to 
justice.  Yet all these denials of justice seem, more often than not, to be indispensable 
means to the security and survival of any city.
161
  Naturally, the starting point is the 
question of whether Machiavelli was indeed against any deep philosophical analysis of 
politics, which would require the elaboration of those core ethical concepts about 
human nature, the human good and justice as a basis for political action.   
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According to the first ‘amoral interpretation’, he was the primary thinker, who 
clearly expressed that the central problem of political ethics was the contradictory 
claims of the ‘ethically good’, on the one hand, and the ‘practically necessary’, on the 
other.  His civic humanist and Christian background, in combination with the political 
realities of his place and time, enabled him to develop a very definite but limited set of 
“unethical value judgments”: that we should consider men as they are, and government 
as a utilitarian, human institution; and not judge men by one set of transcendent moral 
standards and classify regimes by their intentions, but both by their actual behaviour.
162
  
Morality in politics is decided by results; its ethics are its consequences.  Thus, the 
concept of virtue takes a new meaning; since the overriding concern for a ruler is now to 
maintain his rule, his main political virtue should be the special ability that allows him 
to achieve this.
163
  The new non-philosophic ‘reason of state’ means a permanent 
conceptual transition from governing a republic according to rules of justice to the 
knowledge of the means of preserving domination over a people.
164
  According to this 
reading Machiavelli’s response to Socrates is that philosophy is indeed irrelevant to 
politics.  The certain knowledge of moral principles and goals must be substituted by a 
variable perception of what is politically effective at any given time.    
Benedetto Croce describes Machiavelli as “an anguished humanist... a moralist 
who ‘occasionally experiences moral nausea’ in contemplating a world in which 
political ends can be achieved only by means that are morally evil, and thereby the man 
who divorced the province of politics from that of ethics”.165  Generally speaking this 
tradition gives to the political an independent status of its own: of politics for politics’ 
sake.
166
  According to this approach we should recognize Machiavelli, whether his was 
or not a moral man himself, as the first major writer of politics who recognizes the 
practical objectives of the government as irrelevant to ethical claims.  Until his time, 
every political philosopher had assumed that the political states cohere, or should 
cohere, because of some moral unity,
167
 following the normative assumptions made by 
Plato and Aristotle.  With Machiavelli it was made clear how ethical objectives obscure 
political aims, sometimes on purpose, leaving thus leaders with the task of 
understanding that the state must have a different ‘amoral ethics’, which in turn 
demands a different understanding of political skill as permanently separated from 
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private virtue.  The “reason of state” takes priority for those who want to govern, but 
not based on any principled grounds.  Its consequentialism is as amoral as it gets: the 
end is the power of the state itself, nothing more.  Power is self-reproducing and thus 
has intrinsic value that overrides all ethical objectives.  This ‘Machiavellian’ reading 
suggests not only that philosophy is irrelevant to politics, but that it may be harmful for 
those who want to perpetuate their rule.  The priority of ‘the reason of state’ therefore is 
the outcome of this desire to dominate; and to dominate for good, one must conceive 
how morality is impertinent.  The corruptibility of the human disposition is incorrigible, 
making thus the educational role of the state unimportant in comparison to its ability to 
use its physical power effectively.  The moral character is irrelevant to the way politics 
is conducted because politics can only enforce and punish types of behaviour, not to 
develop them morally. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that this explanation about the relationship between 
politics and ethics was indeed forcefully brought to the fore by Machiavelli, there can 
be objections to the claim that his praised originality and consequent philosophical 
impact is based on his actual prescription of amoral politics.  Why would it be so 
radical, to prescribe something that had already been practically implemented and had 
been analyzed theoretically in the past?  The harsh, amoral and pragmatic political 
language separated from any true ethical objectives did not constitute, essentially, a new 
argument.  Plato and Aristotle had made the same arguments on political amoralism and 
the necessities that come with the desire for power more eloquently long before 
Machiavelli.  To ascertain or even argue that in reality politics and ethics are separated 
and must remain so for efficiency’s sake was philosophically hardly original.  Many 
philosophers had stated the problem in their attempt to resolve it.   
Machiavelli as an irresponsible political advisor, or a morbid realpolitiker, can 
persuade himself that all political negotiations, when fully analyzed, can be seen to have 
outcomes that are wholly determined by the power relationships among the parties 
involved.  This is the equivalent of scepticism about practical reason, and both in its 
political and private form this scepticism is implausible for many reasons, but mainly 
because it oversimplifies the dynamic of individual practical reason when realized into 
politics.
168
  MacIntyre is therefore correct when he says about Machiavelli that 
‘[a]lthough he pays verbal obeisances to the distinction between ethics and politics, he 
makes clear the irrelevance of drawing it too sharply.  Such a distinction depends upon 
there being a distinction between private and public life of such a kind that I can 
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consider what it is best for me to do without considering in what political order it is 
requisite for me to live, either because I treat the political order as given and unalterable 
context of private action, or because I think the political order irrelevant for some other 
reason.  Machiavelli resembles Plato in making it clear on how many occasions ethics 
and politics merge.’169   
 
 
C) Civic Humanism and the separation of politics and ethics: A second 
traditional interpretation (variation one of Machiavelli’s false Republicanism)   
According to the second general interpretative tradition, Machiavelli is closer to 
humanist republicans than to amoral political realism.  Considering the unconvincing 
‘amoral reading’ of his works, this might be justifiably a more plausible alternative.170  
Still the source of the problem in this alternative reading is his moral argument:  How 
does Machiavelli’s republicanism fares, when separated from ethical arguments?  There 
are two variations of Machiavellian republicanism as a result of this problem.  The first 
variation conceives politics and ethics as irrelevant and the sole ethical criterion used to 
judge the political objectives of a community is a pure form of consequentialist 
utilitarianism.  In this form of patriotic republicanism what matters is the survival of the 
state.  There are no moral qualifications for this end, and this is why The Prince and The 
Discourses can be used interchangeably as political guides.  If Machiavelli himself 
preferred a more collective type of government this can be explained purely in terms of 
practical effectiveness.  It can be said, therefore, that Machiavelli is understood here as 
a prominent advocate of his time.  What was new in the Renaissance was an attempt to 
respond to some of the problems caused by the instability which resulted from the 
claims of Christian morality against those of the polis.  The attempt to revive ancient 
republicanism was essentially an attempt to implicate citizens in the moral 
responsibility for those actions taken for their sake.  This in turn meant the rediscovery 
of clear ethical standards for public conduct which were not related to Christian 
morality.
171
  The problem was to find those ethical standards in a world where the polis 
as a way of life did not exist anymore, the alternative being a patriotic utilitarianism.            
The tradition of civic humanism, in which Machiavelli is classified by this 
approach, generally praised the concept of civic liberty, by which they meant ‘the rule 
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of law’.  Its opposite was absolute, irrational will above all law.  This meant that civic 
humanists wanted to be related to ancient classical republicanism in an authentic 
manner.  Many of their arguments were structured by the standards of Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian texts, according to Roman law and history, and according to the indigenous 
communal practices which evolved ‘prudentially’ to suit contingent circumstances.172  
However, it is with regard to their prudential reading of contingent circumstances from 
the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries that we can observe the equation of liberty and 
participatory citizenship to have been narrowed from the ancient view that all citizens as 
‘political animals’ should take turns in ruling and being ruled, to a notion that collective 
politics is about finding the right leaders to govern the led.
173
  It seems that the practical 
wisdom of the citizen was then confined to a study of how to choose a governor that 
will govern according to the given sets of practical ends.  Thus, despite the declarations 
of this tradition toward the revival of ancient civic republicanism, especially in the city 
of Florence, the polis as the natural means through which men fulfil their human 
capacities no longer existed.  Therefore, the combination of the conditions of political 
corruption and the disappearance of the morality of the polis demanded a focus on a 
different kind of creative rule (much stronger and autonomous) and consequently a kind 
of passive citizenship (citizens as critical but not participating subjects).
174
  Still this 
was a kind of false ancient republicanism, because the civic spirit cannot be maintained 
if not based on stable evaluative criteria for both the rulers and the citizens; and 
consequentialism cannot provide such a stability since it overrides all other criteria.   
These basic characteristics of civic humanism derive from the decline of the 
polis and the rise of the large-scale state.  This process has had immense consequences 
for the conceptual relation between ethics and politics.  The milieu of the moral life is 
transformed; it now becomes a matter not of the evaluations of men living in the forms 
of immediate community in which the interrelated character of moral and political 
judgments is a matter of daily experience, but of evaluations of men often governed 
from far off, living private lives in communities which are politically powerless.
175
  
Rhetorical skill was to be used to persuade fellow citizens by means of words so that 
they perform actions that are advantageous to the ‘state’.  The end of the state was 
determined thus by the skill of persuasion,
176
 or the ability to appear virtuous although 
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what ‘virtuous’ meant was not clear.  This ability was the natural outcome of the 
dominant Christian morality, a bifurcated morality: on the one hand, there were the 
absolutely unquestionable commandments, unchanging and contextless but also 
arbitrary; and on the other hand, there were the self-justifying rules of the political and 
economic order.  The realm of secular power seemed to acquire its own norms and 
justifications.  Moral rules were technical rules about the means to these ends.  
Moreover they were to be used on the assumption that all men are somewhat corrupt.
177
     
According to this interpretation Machiavelli’s originality lies in the addition to 
the humanist reliance on the ruler’s rhetorical skill something even more necessary for 
the maintenance of power: military force.  As Skinner argues, Machiavelli challenges 
his own humanist heritage in denouncing the humanists’ failure to emphasize the 
significance of sheer power in political life.  They basically misunderstood the scope of 
necessity.
178
  For Machiavelli, according to this reading, princes and republics set the 
same fundamental practical end: the preservation and stability of the state, or else the 
collectivity; and the necessary ‘virtues’ toward this end cannot always be consonant 
with Christian or civic humanist virtues, although he does not preach abandoning 
conventional moral norms in general.  What he actually preaches is that understanding 
the scope of necessity entails an understanding of politics as the art of what is 
practically possible and what means can be used in order to achieve it.  According to 
this kind of Machiavellian realism the separation of politics and ethics is not a 
normative assumption, but it is a practical acknowledgement that effectiveness requires 
from political agents the abandoning of moral consistency in different spheres of action.     
Nevertheless, this kind of Machiavellian republicanism does not seem to be so 
far away from the first, ‘amoral’ reading of his works.  It is true that with the arrival of 
Christianity eternal happiness (salvation) became a spiritual and private matter and 
politics could only become more pragmatic and separated from ethical considerations.  
When the moral ends are set within another world, the community as a political body 
only aspires to preservation and the moral integrity of its rulers becomes irrelevant.  The 
patriotic necessities are thus hardly ethical because the main target is the physical 
preservation of the community, which in turn means giving priority to strong rulership, 
not the community’s way of life in the Aristotelian sense.  This kind of ethically 
impassive republicanism demotes political reason to mere calculation.  The ‘reason of 
state’ may assert here some basic patriotic principles only to reduce them later into 
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political utility, irrelevant to what is considered as conventional virtue.  It is this 
irrelevance that leads to moral and political degeneration, because when conventional 
virtues are not connected to political conduct there are no standards, apart from utility, 
by which a community can judge its political leadership.  This is why we end up with 
conceptions of ‘politics as a morally perilous arena for action.’179 
 
 
D) Pagan against Christian ethics: A second traditional interpretation (variation 
two of Machiavelli’s false Republicanism) 
Isaiah Berlin is the major proponent of the second variation of Machiavellian 
republicanism, which, this time, rejects the separation between politics and ethics.  
Berlin agrees with the view that Machiavelli is not a systematic moralist and that he 
merely wishes to write about government affairs and the general practical purposes of 
every political community.  He also agrees that the Florentine theorist did not idealise 
human nature.  Berlin corroborates the ‘Machiavellian’ reading according to which men 
appear to care little for liberty and they place it well below security, property or desire 
for revenge.  In the same line of argument, society is, normally, a battlefield in which 
there are conflicts between and within groups.  These conflicts can be controlled only 
by the judicious use of both persuasion and force.  ‘What is certain is that unless there is 
a firm hand at the helm, the ship of the state will founder’.180  In The Discourses 
Machiavelli argues that the ideal state is a republican state where the citizens are 
morally equal to their rulers and politically capable toward the promotion of the glory of 
their community.  However, there are situations in which a strong prince is preferable to 
a weak republic.  According to Berlin, Aristotle and the later Stoics would have 
endorsed all this; but from the fact that there is such a thing as an art of government, 
indispensable to the attainment of goals that men in fact seek, it does not follow that 
Machiavelli did not care to what uses it was applied, and merely produced a handbook 
of scientific political ‘directives’ that was morally neutral.181    
For Berlin, Machiavelli’s aim is a good society that enjoys stability, internal 
harmony, security, justice and a sense of power and of splendour.  His republicanism is 
not devoid of ethical objectives, because the amoral approach would not make his 
theory so original, or even philosophically ambiguous.  His problem is how can men 
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achieve those goals and what faculties do they have to develop in a Christian world?  
The answer seems to be that men should invent some measures that will sustain and 
entrench those necessary faculties that will lead to a healthy society.  Those measures 
though, are an offence against the contemporary (Christian) morality; so the major 
question is in what sense can those measures be said to be justified?  For Berlin this is 
the central point of Machiavelli’s entire conception with regard to politics and ethics;182 
the moral justification of the political community after fifteen hundred years under the 
dominant Christian morality.  In one sense those measures can be justified and in 
another they cannot; and these senses must be distinguished more clearly than 
Machiavelli found it necessary to do.  This does not mean that Machiavelli divided 
politics from morals.  ‘Machiavelli dwells with passionate intensity on the conflict 
between the commitments and obligations of a responsible political leader and the 
commitments and obligations of the prevailing Christian morality of his time.’183  
Thus, according to Berlin’s famous interpretation, Machiavelli does not 
specifically distinguish morals from political and amoral values.  What he institutes is 
something even more revolutionary for his time: a differentiation between two 
incompatible ideals of life, and therefore two moralities.  One is the morality of the 
pagan world and against this moral universe stands first and foremost Christian morality 
itself.
184
  He argues that it is in fact impossible to combine Christian virtues with a 
satisfactory, stable, vigorous and strong society on earth.  Consequently a man must 
choose; and to choose a Christian life is to condemn oneself to political impotence.
185
  
The difficulty of making this choice reminds us of a major philosophical problem in 
relation to political action: Plato’s principle of specialisation as the only way to defeat 
the morally destructive fragmentation of social roles that depicts the variety of the 
conceptions of the good that human beings have.  In this reading, Hampshire argues, 
Machiavelli believes that a ‘weak and philosophically confused person cannot 
understand that every kind of human excellence comes from a strong concentration of 
energies and that it always has its consequent cost.  Such a person dissipates his 
energies and falls short of any form of human excellence.  All virtue, like all genuine 
learning, results from a specialisation of human powers.’186      
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Berlin speaks of different ethical traditions i.e. the Christian or Kantian tradition, 
the Stoics, or even some types of utilitarian ethics.  But he insists that there exists an 
equally time-honoured ethics, that of the Greek polis, of which Aristotle provided the 
clearest exposition, as discussed above.  Since men are beings made by nature to live in 
communities, their communal purposes are the ultimate values from which the rest are 
derived.  Ethics so conceived –the code of conduct, or the ideal to be pursued by the 
individual– cannot be known save by understanding the purpose and the character of the 
polis.  This is the kind of pre-Christian morality which, according to Berlin, Machiavelli 
takes for granted, and entails a conception of the good that is far more widespread and 
influential than is generally acknowledged in books on moral philosophy.  In this 
conception, the most evident form of greatness is supreme political power, the power of 
a successful statesman.
187
  Thus, when Benedetto Croce says ‘that Machiavelli 
discovered the necessity and the autonomy of politics, politics which is beyond good 
and evil’, Berlin responds ‘[b]eyond good and evil in some non-Aristotelian, religious 
or liberal-Kantian sense; but not beyond good and evil of those communities, ancient or 
modern, whose sacred values are social through and through.’188  Machiavelli seems to 
offer here an elaborate and adjusted version of Aristotle’s political ethics.  ‘Hence in 
opposing the “laws of politics” to “good and evil” Machiavelli is not contrasting two 
“autonomous” spheres of acting –the “political” and the “moral”, because those two can 
never be separated: he is contrasting his own political ethics to another conception of it 
which governs the lives of persons who are not of any interest to him.’  He is indeed 
rejecting Christian ethics, but in favour of another system, another moral universe; he 
opts for a rival (Roman or classical) morality, an alternative realm of ends.  In other 
words the conflict is between two moralities, Christian and pagan, not between 
autonomous realms of morals and politics.
189
  
For Berlin the originality and the tragic implications of Machiavelli’s thesis 
reside in their relation to a Christian civilization.  To preach what Machiavelli preached 
during the climax of the age of Christianity and to be forcing men to make a conscious 
and painful choice between two entirely different worlds, like he did, is not an 
achievement to be easily outrun.  In choosing the life of a statesman, or even the life of 
a citizen with enough civic sense to want your state to be as successful and as splendid 
as possible, you commit yourself to rejection of Christian integrity.  It may be that 
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Christians are right about the well-being of the individual soul, taken outside the social 
or political context.  But the well-being of the state is not the same as the well being of 
the individual – they ‘are governed in a different way’.190    
Machiavelli was not, of course, the first who effectively managed to express –
and eventually accept as an inherent feature of social life– the corrupting effects of 
politics on moral character.  Choosing the Christian life, which entails political 
impotence, is reminiscent of Socrates’ choice to listen to his daimonia instead of 
committing political injustices.  The difference is that in Machiavelli’s time, the 
problem of moral integrity was not related to reasonable conduct within both the private 
and the public spheres, as it was the case with Plato and Aristotle’s conceptions of 
virtue; instead it is related to fulfilling Christian commands regardless of the 
circumstances.  Both accounts of private virtue require a moral consistency which 
cannot be compatible with the demands of politics.  However, whereas the classical 
account proposes a new conception of politics which will be in harmony with reason, 
the Christian account proposes a conception of politics separated from moral 
considerations.  This account, naturally, can only be based on a consequentialist 
reasoning.           
Nevertheless, it was made clear by both Plato and Aristotle that the 
reconciliation of private virtue and political justice, of the particular and the universal, 
could not be reduced to consequentialist principles.  A strongly contextual 
republicanism, which is based on utilitarian principles of physical survival, is doomed 
to become unethical and thus to degenerate into political amoralism.  Machiavelli must 
have understood the dangers of this republican ethical void because of his political 
experience and his academic relationship with the ancients.  However, for Berlin, 
Machiavelli was the first to recognize the moral problem in terms of incommensurable 
ethical values; the problem was no longer how to resolve the tension between private 
and public virtue so as to get closer to justice, but to choose a way of life amongst a 
pluralism of values which cannot be reduced to any primary moral principles.  
Empirical knowledge only allowed for such a relative conclusion.  In the context of this 
pluralism, the unity, or at least interdependence, of politics and ethics is restored only 
within a specific set of values, but rejected as a universally accepted ethical objective.  
The reconciliation between the particular and the universal is not simply rejected, but 
disregarded as irrelevant.  
                                                 
190
 Ibid., 64. 
95 
 
The above approach to Machiavelli’s republicanism (with its two variations) 
can, I think, be understood better when we try to answer the famous Machiavellian 
question how ‘the ends justify the means?’  According to the first more unethical 
variation we should understand the maxim like this: for Machiavelli, ‘Humans, in 
always judging particular actions in the circumstances and men’s characters by 
appearances, have no access to an agent’s intentions or higher reasons: they show 
themselves to be consequentialists.  The end does not justify the means; they have no 
access to the means which may have been many and various, and only see the end, 
judging it against what appears to be their self-interest... judgment is always of 
appearances.’191  But having no access to the means is equivalent to saying that “the 
ends justify the means” because no ethical standards –apart from utility– can be used in 
order to judge political action.  This is an understanding that sets the ends of the state as 
the integrity of a historic territory and security of its population.
192
  This integrity is 
defined as long-lasting power which would allow the realization of those republican, 
very practical, ends.
193
  Here the ‘reason of state’ is not amoral, but its ethics is 
autonomous and judged by its own standards.  This is why the passive citizens or the 
people of a community cannot have access to the means and can only evaluate practical 
results.  These results might be achieved more easily by either a prince or a republic; 
this does not matter morally.   
The second variation of Machiavelli’s republicanism understands justifying ends 
as those that are appropriate to the security and virtue of the republics and their 
citizens,
194
 as juxtaposed to Christian otherworldly moral ends.  This may be considered 
as a kind of more principled republicanism, according to which so far as security and 
civic spirit are satisfied the ethical benchmark for the justification of unethical conduct 
–in Christian terms– has been fulfilled.195  Here the ethics of the state is not autonomous 
but it presupposes a distinction between different ways of life, equally valued in moral 
terms and politically incompatible.  The citizens or people may have access to the 
means but only when they consciously choose to reject the a-political way of life and 
understand the ethical value of their lives as teleologically defined by their community.  
This teleology is not of course Aristotelian in the sense that it derives from a naturalistic 
universal explanation of the human beings’ purposes.  The end of ethics is the 
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community itself, but its members do not relate to this end based on a persuasive and 
self-reflective ontological reason.  Machiavelli explains how this end can be fulfilled by 
either a principality or a republic, though he does make clear that, morally, the republic 
is superior since it allows more of its members to understand the practical and moral 
purposes of the community.  
In the final analysis, the two variations of this interpretation converge to an 
understanding of ‘the ends that justify the means’ as having defined a set of practical 
ends, i.e. the ‘welfare of the patria’,196 which are ethically overriding, meaning that 
virtue is recognized so long as it promotes the physical existence of the community.  In 
the first version, the appearance of virtue is understood as the necessary political skill 
for the development of power; true virtue is only a natural projection of this power, not 
its essential prerequisite.  It is true that power is not here perceived for its own sake –as 
in the amoral reading of Machiavelli–, but denying the possibility for a collectively 
established set of ethical criteria for political conduct –at least within the particular 
community– always comes with a danger of rulers abusing this power.  Necessarily, 
then, the rejection of the interdependency of politics and ethics degrades the citizen-
ruler relationship into a utilitarian one, where the utility of the practical ends is both 
decided and fulfilled by those who already wield power.  Thus, the thin line that 
separates the “welfare of the patria” from the amoral dominion is obscured even more, 
usually in favour of those who are politically strong.   
Berlin’s (and Hampshire’s) view, on the other hand, finds Machiavelli’s 
originality in preaching the necessity for the restoration of the unity of private and 
public virtue.  However, this unity is, in this republican version of Machiavelli, not a 
universal ethical objective; instead it is the outcome of a choice between two opposing 
moral worlds.  The problem of course remains: how can one justify this choice if there 
are no universal ethical standards against which it will be judged?  In this reading, 
Machiavelli’s conception of the good rests on a profound respect for history as the only 
judge of political conduct and the only attainable transcendence of death.
197
  Berlin’s 
interpretation, based on value pluralism, classifies Machiavelli in the Aristotelian 
republican tradition as opposed to Christian ethics.  But he does not offer a solution to 
the problem that the Aristotelian normative teleological exegesis of human nature 
cannot be transcribed to a Renaissance theory as such.  His answer is that of value 
pluralism, i.e. it is one thing to give political instructions in a world where man’s 
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definition as political animal is universally accepted, and it is another to give political 
advice where there is no universally accepted conception of the good.    Thus, if there 
are no means to acquire cognitively a notion of what is a life worth pursuing in 
universally accepted ethical terms, political theory will always be in danger to be 
reduced into technical utilitarian guides.  This may explain Machiavelli’s ambiguity 
when read from a perspective that always aims at unitary explanations of morality.  
Plato’s argument, for example, was exactly this: that any kind of value pluralism denies 
a stable point of reference for human conduct.  This kind of ethical scepticism will 
inevitably degenerate first to consequentialism and eventually to political amoralism.   
 
 
E) Machiavelli’s moral politics: A third unconventional interpretation  
The third traditional interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought constitutes an answer, 
which is not widely accepted, to the above problem of the relationship between 
incompatible conceptions of the good and political expediency.  This view attempts to 
find in his works the arguments against an ethical relativism which derives both from 
the separation of politics from ethics and from value pluralism.  According to this 
approach, Machiavelli’s purpose was the revival of politics grounded upon stable and 
universal ethical criteria.  These criteria should not necessarily be derived from ancient 
concepts of ethics and politics directly, but their discovery could be based on a classical 
reasoning.  In this argument, the importance he assigns to law and law-making, even 
under the form of extreme force,
198
 against social degeneration and moral decay should 
indicate that his theory is strongly moral.  The importance Machiavelli assigns to the 
founding of ‘free orders’ derives from his conceptions of free agency and free will, of 
which politics is a necessary feature.
199
  Thus, Machiavelli speaks of lawgivers and 
reformers of public opinion as teachers and educators, something that brings him in line 
with Plato and Aristotle who spoke about philosopher-kings and statesmen educators 
respectively.  He implicitly but continually speaks the language of virtue and explains 
the comprehensive transvaluation of ethical principles
200
 that took place while 
Christianity dominated the ancient world.  He also demonstrates the interdependence of 
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political context and moral agency in an attempt to enable a better appreciation of the 
nature, limits and potential of moral integrity where politics is deeply corrupted.  
Eventually, even the arguments in favour of the ‘Machiavellian’ autonomous ‘reason of 
state’ acknowledge his general point that the assessment of political conduct should 
involve a set of virtue ethics.
201
   
The problem is of course to determine what kind of virtue ethics and what 
conception of the human good, if any, his political theory is grounded upon.  The 
general consensus of most interpretations of Machiavelli’s works –not only of those 
presented previously– is that his aim was to demonstrate the relativity of evaluative 
judgments about politics and the conception, first presented by Thrasymachus in the 
Republic, that the only certainty in politics is power itself.  In contrast to this 
understanding, the interpretation of Machiavelli as an ethical thinker proposes that he 
attempted to explain what must be done in order to philosophically establish an ethical 
benchmark for good politics.  According to this view, the crux of the argument lies in 
his, sometimes implicit, points regarding the transvaluation of moral principles and 
virtues.  Therefore, Machiavelli chose to use historical examples related to leadership in 
order to show that political success might sometimes seem to be a matter of fortune or 
cunning, but on closer inspection there are a few fundamental philosophical principles 
that are always behind it.  These principles can only be extracted after a careful 
philosophical reading of history.  This reading should reveal that what is considered as 
the human good throughout history is not as relative as it might appear at a first glance.  
The examples on leadership are revealing because, according to Mark Philp, 
‘[h]ow those who rule us conduct themselves has more than ordinary significance 
because of the power they exercise, and yet that experience of power can make it 
difficult to retain self-control and a sense of proportion to act responsibly… [thus] the 
more serious problem is that how one should act is often unclear’.202  This 
understanding of morally responsible leadership implies that, for Machiavelli, judging 
political action required an Aristotelian version of practical wisdom as based on 
practical reasoning, i.e. the prudent man determines what is right to do, at the right time, 
in the given circumstances.  However, as discussed previously, Aristotle’s account of 
practical wisdom was not determined by the variability of ethical and political values.  
In a similar line of reasoning, when Machiavelli argues about responsible leadership as 
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the ability make the right decisions within the given circumstances, he does not make a 
statement of moral relativism.
203
  Practical wisdom should always rely upon a set of 
normative ethical evaluations if it is to avoid being reduced to calculative reason.  The 
main target of this interpretation of Machiavelli is to find what exactly those ethical 
evaluations are, given the fact that Aristotle’s metaphysical biology cannot be the 
starting point for Machiavelli’s own ethical purposes and, in the end, for his 
republicanism.  In other words, it is one thing to sustain a concept of practical wisdom 
within the universally accepted communal point of reference, i.e. the polis; and it is 
quite a different thing to do the same in a Christian world as described previously. 
According to this interpretation, Machiavelli’s method of redefining ethical 
principles for good politics has many similar points with Socrates and Plato’s method.  
In the same manner in which Plato attempted to rediscover lost moral principles for 
political action through the criticism against the corrupt Athenian democracy, 
Machiavelli tried to find a reliable system of evaluative judgments regarding politics, 
through uncovering how honest words often cover dishonest deeds, in both republics 
and principalities.  The process of assessing political persuasions requires critical 
standards that would necessarily be juxtaposed, on the one hand, to moral relativism and 
political cynicism, and on the other to religious a-political precepts for moral agency.  
Plato’s critique against the Athenian democracy and its demagogues constitutes the best 
guide against relativism and cynicism.
204
  Machiavelli added his own account with 
regard to the relationship between religion and politics.
205
  
Erica Benner is the major proponent of the unconventional moral interpretation 
of Machiavelli’s work.  Her argument is that Machiavelli’s –very philosophical– aim 
was to know how to wield a rhetoric that is persuasive yet non-corrupting.
206
  This 
interpretation requires that we see the covert meanings of his works which lie below the 
seemingly amoral political language and propositions for immoral practices.  Thus, 
Machiavelli tried in fact to develop an ethics of self-responsibility which is based on the 
historical knowledge that humans seldom live to their highest moral standards, but they 
constantly employ them, which means that moral agency has intrinsic value for them.  
Therefore, the right method for finding the necessary ethical standards should be to 
study the historical examples of disordered conduct, and understand in what way, 
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morally and politically, they were disordered, in order to be prepared and able to avoid 
them in the future.   
 The problem is of course how we can be certain that Machiavelli did not in fact 
refer to these examples of disordered action merely because he desired to show that 
there is nothing else but disordered action.  According to Benner, Machiavelli belonged 
in the Socratic tradition, along with Xenophon, Plato and Thucydides, who, in their 
works, sometimes developed carefully hidden arguments purported to set out harsh 
truths to agents who were, on the one hand, corruptible and, on the other, free to fight 
against their own corruptibility.  This method of constructive dissimulation
207
 conceived 
writing as a civil medicine which was targeted specifically against moral degeneration 
as the source of political insufficiency.  According to this kind of reasoning, the cynical 
language in The Prince is not Machiavelli’s own language, but his demonstration of 
how moral and political corruption are interrelated and mutually advancing.  Thus The 
Prince was meant to be a lesson against moral and political corruption and 
Machiavelli’s own warning to the citizens against the deceiving language of the rulers.  
Learning the way of the devil is useful not because it teaches humans how to follow it, 
but because it teaches them how to avoid it.
208
   
Thus, according to this interpretation, the usual ‘Machiavellian’ distinction 
between virtue and political effectiveness appears to be too simplistic.  Following the 
Platonic example, Machiavelli’s education aims towards understanding what virtue is, 
before pursuing it.  According to such an argument, the public good is not necessarily 
grounded upon evil, but it is based on capturing what constitutes evil and then fighting 
against it.  In this sense, the moral transvaluation, which Machiavelli is famous for 
explaining, is not a prescription against conventional ethics –whether Christian or of 
any other kind– and in favour of practical political effectiveness.  It is instead an attempt 
to analyze how those who wield political power use excuses of moral corruption from 
the citizens’ part –usually based on the ontological Christian assumption that humans 
are by nature evil– in order to justify their own unethical conduct.  Of course, this 
unethical conduct perpetuates political domination.   
Therefore, in Benner’s interpretation, Machiavelli understood the fundamental 
reasons that lead to moral and political corruption.  He also accepted the fact that this 
corruption was so advanced that it had brought a transvaluation of moral virtues and 
principles; and so he proposed that two possible solutions are available: first, opting out 
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of civil life altogether (the Socratic conclusion in the Apology); and second, finding 
unusual ways to reason with fellow citizens and leaders –who had already been affected 
by the transvaluation of virtues– in order to develop the necessary capacities for critical 
ethical judgments
209
 (what Socrates did in his real life).  These ways of reasoning are 
unusual because Machiavelli had both to describe the transvaluation of virtues and 
principles so as to make it understandable, and to manage to persuade his readers 
against their own corruption (which was the natural outcome of this transvaluation).  
Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War intended to do the same thing with the 
corrupt Athenians.  Machiavelli, therefore, according to Rousseau, ‘sought to teach 
“great lessons to peoples” while “pretending to teach lessons to kings.” ’210  So, Benner 
argues, ‘behind first appearances of amoral instrumentalism or even cynicism, he sets 
out strong reasons for people to adopt simple yet rigorous ethical standards that apply in 
external relations as well as in civil life.’211   
This reasoning is of course strongly reminiscent of Plato’s own thoughts about 
the nature of politics.  According to the ‘amoral interpretation’ of Machiavelli, the 
famous concept of ‘dirty hands’ has its origins in the Machiavellian advice to princes to 
cultivate the appearance of morality, but never the actual practice of it: ‘Therefore,  a 
ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this 
becomes necessary […] because circumstance do not permit living a completely 
virtuous life […] because if one considers everything carefully, doing some things that 
seem virtuous may result in one’s ruin[.]’212  However, as already mentioned, this is 
hardly original, because it is not different, at all, from the argument Adeimantus, and 
especially Glaucon, made in favour of the appearance of morality in the Republic: ‘That 
is why I’ll speak at some length in praise of the immoral life; by doing so, I’ll be 
showing you the kind of rejoinder I want you to develop when you criticize immorality 
and commend morality.’ And further down: ‘The point is that everyone thinks the 
rewards of immorality far outweigh those of morality’ (Republic, 358d and 360d).  So, 
the ‘ethical reading’ proposes, Machiavelli does not prescribe the appearance of 
morality; he only explains how it is used by immoral agents.   
Machiavelli’s criticism against religion might then be explained by his reference 
to the ecclesiastical authorities as the best example of politically institutionalized moral 
hypocrisy.  If religion is supposed to be the source of morality, then the actual conduct 
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of the Christian church in his time must have been considered by him as the epitome of 
the appearance of morality covering a ruthless pursuit of power.  Thus, in order to learn 
how not to be good, one needed only look at Christian religion as an organized political 
power.  The Church would attempt to cover the worst unethical conduct under the 
pretences of the one and true morality.  For Machiavelli, according to this interpretation, 
the Christian church offered an example of the purposeful concealment of the true 
relationship between politics and ethics.  It was not a religious act, but a purely political 
one.  True religion, on the other hand, is useful as a contributing factor to individual and 
social ethical completion.  Because when a theoretical explanation on the 
interdependency between politics and ethics is deliberately beclouded; when there are 
no reliable ethical standards in the city; then invoking the ‘power of the heaven’ is the 
only refuge for a true moral judgment.  Socrates’ invoking of his own gods against the 
corrupt understanding of Athens’ political religion is a similar example, in this instance, 
regarding the use of reason against moral confusion.  Machiavelli’s ‘pious cruelty’ is 
not an attack on religion in general, but an attack on arguments that use the concept of 
religion in order to avoid reasonable criticism.  On the other hand, true belief in 
Christian principles may be the last refuge in case no other evaluative moral criteria are 
available.  So, secular rationalists should recognize that concepts of the divine or 
supernatural are frequently used to express reasonable ethical judgements about human 
self-responsibility.
213
  
Still, in order to find this peculiar Machiavellian ethic, which is so strongly 
related to good politics, one must analyze and respond to the claims which are related to 
what is considered by the first two interpretative traditions as his weak philosophical 
points: his theory of knowledge and his conception of the human nature.  Thus, if one 
must understand Machiavelli’s ethics, one must answer some basic questions: Is it true 
that his intentions in studying history are confined in stressing the historical 
contextualism and thus relativism of what people judge as bad and good?  Is it true that 
he does not explore the deep waters of philosophical anthropology and he is incurably 
sceptical about the possibility of human judgements on moral and political agency?
214
  
The conventional interpretations of Machiavelli find in his works an attempt to make 
clear, that humans can only acquire empirical knowledge and that this empirical 
knowledge reveals nothing more than the relativity of social orders.  Even in Berlin’s 
more principled version of Machiavelli’s republicanism knowledge is limited to what 
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we learn from history with regard to creating and maintaining a well-governed state.  
Usually, it teaches us that in order to do that we have to transcend conventional moral 
rules.
215
  In this sense, his criticism against the Christian church is merely another 
indicative description that purports to show that even this which should have been the 
embodiment of morality, is in reality nothing more than a façade for the undisturbed 
pursuit of political desires.    
The interpretation of Machiavelli as an ethical philosopher must, therefore, be 
based on a rejection of these two basic arguments: first, the extreme form of skepticism 
that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish what deeds have genuine value 
from what appears falsely valuable or praiseworthy; and second, the reductive form of 
empiricism that subordinates ethical considerations to undeluded observations about 
what is or has been in the past.
216
  Instead of this ‘Machiavellian’ reductive empiricism, 
Benner argues, there is a connecting thread in Machiavelli’s historical examples which 
indicates an attempt to find normative principles in order to fight what seems to be an 
incurable corruptibility of human moral standards.
217
  Behind all these examples of 
disordered action and troubled communities there is a lesson against experience as the 
sole source of knowledge, because it can both be insufficient and misleading.  The 
actual outcomes of historical actions do not tell us the whole truth about human agency.  
There are reasons and principles to be found, which would explain those outcomes in 
ethical, ontological terms.  This is a more genuine Aristotelian reading of Machiavelli’s 
works in the sense that his study of the human nature should lead to normative 
reasonings about dispositions, capacities and desires that he sees as unchanging in the 
human species.
218
  These reasonings should then allow the discovery of some actions or 
principles that have being perennially ethically praised, or criticized, by humans and 
thus must have some intrinsic positive or negative value, not influenced by 
chronological or topical considerations.  These are the principles on which politics must 
be grounded upon in order to be both successful and ethically meaningful.  
MacIntyre, although overall not a proponent of such an interpretation of 
Machiavelli, is here corroborating this reading of his works with regard to human 
nature: 
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Finally there is a lesson to be learned from Machiavelli’s example as much as from his 
explicit teaching.  In periods in which the social order is relatively stable all moral 
questions can be raised from within the context of the norms which the community 
shares; in periods of instability it is these norms themselves which are questioned and 
tested against the criteria of human desires and needs […] Living in an age of flux, 
Machiavelli’s understood the transience of political orders, and it is this which in one 
way makes his appeal to the human nature so striking. For the counterpart to a belief in 
the transience of political and social orders might easily not have been a belief in a 
timeless human nature with permanent needs against which these orders can be 
measured and in terms of which they can be explained.
219
  
 
In this sense, Machiavelli is indeed more philosophical than it is usually thought.  
His historical examples essentially offer a guide on the basic characteristics of human 
nature as a benchmark for assessing moral and political agency.  Why would he argue in 
favour of a political and amoral utilitarianism, when in reality he attempted to find a 
stable point of reference against the transience of social and political orders?  A 
universal definition of human nature, whether negative or positive, could only work, for 
Machiavelli, as the starting point of a political philosophy, whose aims transcend the 
simple description of bad political reality.  What constitutes the religious argument that 
Machiavelli exposes, analyzes and finally criticizes, but certainly does not prescribe, is 
the acceptance of the corruptibility of the human disposition as unchangeable, and its 
consequent political amoralism.  When Machiavelli dissimulates
220
 about justice by 
referring to Thucydides’ texts, he wishes to reveal the transvaluation of ethical virtues 
under the pressure of war and civil war, and the difficulties that the citizens face in 
making political judgments where ethical standards are corrupt.
221
  This is a corruption 
for which the responsibility lies in the hands of both the leaders of a community and its 
people.  
According to Benner, Machiavelli does not deny the corruptibility of human 
nature as such.  But the philosophical remarks in the historical examples he cites 
amount to a view of human nature as prone to both bad and good actions.   This, in 
combination with the importance he assigns to laws as the basis for a well-ordered 
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society, should lead to his implicit, but central, point throughout his works that the 
human capacities to order laws can always be used to turn the badness of human nature 
into goodness.
222
  What is then this ‘true knowledge’ which is inferred from the 
reasonable examination of history and what are the moral and political truths which 
good politics can be grounded upon?
223
  Here, Thucydides’ teachings offer again the 
guiding principles: Nicias’ argument against the Athenian expedition to Sicily uncovers 
what is for Machiavelli the basis of true ethics and good politics; that is, it is the height 
of imprudence to try to take what you cannot hold.
224
  Xenophon and Plutarch’s 
histories, as well, if correctly read, strongly recommend that behind every great political 
failure lies an action of self-assertion which seems to be violating some basic human 
conceptions about the good life. 
  If this was indeed Machiavelli’s central ethical argument, then we face a stark 
contrast between the previous two interpretations and the latter more ethical reading of 
his works.  The fundamental Machiavellian triptych on virtue, necessity and fortune is 
now understood in completely different terms.  Whereas for both the amoral and the 
republican interpretations virtú is literally taken to be meaning manliness, with its 
characteristics of self-assertion and lack of moderation, which are essential when facing 
necessity and fortune, for the ethical interpretation of Machiavelli, such an exposition of 
virtú could only be ironic.  Because, according to Benner, what we can understand from 
Machiavelli’s implicit points, is that the relationship between virtú and necessitá is in 
reality the exact opposite: 
 
Necessity is useful when agents see it as self-imposed and freely accepted. But it is very 
dangerous when they see it as imposed from without, since people grow more obstinate 
in their resistance when necessity is forced upon them by others […] The distinction 
between removing and imposing necessities related in the following way to the 
differences between more and less responsible actions.  Irresponsible agents may think 
that the only way to deal with enemies is to eliminate them with violence.  Responsible 
agents know that unilateral and immoderate measures might eliminate some enemies, 
while creating many more.  Irresponsible agents endorse ruthlessness toward enemies 
because they view conflicts only from their own perspective.
225
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Therefore, on the one hand, we have the Machiavellian necessity conceived as 
an obstacle to physical domination, self-preservation and self-assertion –which are 
commonly considered as amoral ends– where ‘[t]he classical ideal of self-control is 
dismissed with a shrug’226 and virtue is only a calculative ability; and on the other hand, 
we have a strong and positive dialectical relationship between necessity and virtue, 
where virtú is understood as reflective prudence, which allows the moral agents to 
conceive necessitá as prudent self-restraint and responsibility.
227
  Self-ordering or 
imposing laws on one’s self is thus the necessary political action before ethical 
completion. 
 The other element of the triptych, i.e. fortune, also reveals the difference in 
understanding the concept of ethical and political conduct between Machiavelli’s 
divergent interpretations.  The amoral and patriotic readings of his works are similar in 
explaining fortune as the female equivalent of virtú’s manliness.  Thus, force and 
abruptness are necessary in order to face the contingencies of politics.  The virtuous 
agents will be able to resist fortune and become politically successful because they have 
the capacity to respond swiftly and cunningly to any unexpected circumstances.
228
  Only 
the self-assertive strong man can conquer the capricious woman.  Thus, both fortune 
and necessity are interrelated to virtú in a negative manner, that is, they constitute its 
obstacles which must be overcome by any means necessary.   
Opposite to this understanding is the interpretation that wants Machiavelli’s 
conceptions of virtú and fortune as antithetical forms of causation.  This is a logical 
consequence of the interdependent relationship between virtú and necessity, which 
signifies the importance of self-reliance, independence and self-restraint of the moral 
agent.  Fortune, unlike the self-imposed necessity, is related with causal resources that 
are not an agent’s own.  ‘Whenever he describes an individual or city as “fortunate”, 
Machiavelli implies that it relies too much on something other than its own virtue […] 
Machiavelli repeatedly insists that agents must choose which kind of causation they 
want to rely on most.’229  It is here once again maintained that the historical examples, 
Machiavelli supposedly used as guides for effective political conduct, are not in reality 
offering models for imitation, but the exact opposite.  Agents who in the past relied too 
much on fortune and superficially exploited the ‘extraordinary situations’ in order to 
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achieve glory, very rarely contributed significantly, in the long run, to the welfare of 
their communities.
230
  Machiavelli, does not, in effect, really propose to current leaders 
to imitate those agents who acted in a self-assertive manner; instead he explains to them 
that if they do, they might achieve a temporary glory, but they will eventually fail 
because they would not have built their political order upon stable and clearly 
understood ethical values, of which good laws are the necessary complementary 
feature.
231
 
 
 
F) The transition to modernity and the creation of ‘good orders’: can ethics be 
the ground for politics? 
In the last interpretation of Machiavelli’s political works as fundamentally philosophical 
–in terms of proposing hardcore ethical values as the only sufficient basis for good 
politics– the so called necessary set of virtue ethics for the good judgment of political 
conduct seems to be revolving around the major classical virtue of self-control.  One 
central question remains with regard to how this fundamental virtue is justified while 
grounded neither upon a classical teleology nor upon consequentialism.  According to 
Benner’s view, for Machiavelli, the lesson to be taught by most philosophical accounts 
of history is that along with the deficient moral nature of human beings, there is an 
equally fundamental and universal principle i.e. their desire for freedom.  Understanding 
those two basic principles would allow the lawgiver or the reformer to create good 
orders.
232
   
Empirical knowledge and non-empirical reasoning reveal two things: first, that 
relativism on the meaning of words and values leads to corruption; and second, that 
there is a perennial tendency to underestimate free agency, which is a basic moral fact 
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or a “reasonable necessity”.233  Every politician must, therefore, act on the normative 
assumption that every human being has a concept of free agency which must be 
respected as a fundamental ethical reason in one’s life.  This in turn means that it is a 
basic human power to give or withhold authority, and so, Benner argues, the desire to 
be treated as co-authors of the laws and orders one lives under is the bedrock of 
Machiavelli’s philosophical reasoning about freedom.234  The political argument that 
naturally follows, wants people to give accounts of their actions to others, because free 
will does not necessarily entail good exercise of it.  This is why the classical central 
virtue of self-control is of such importance: free will demands self-responsibility;
235
 the 
moral principle is only realized through a political concept. 
 This connection of ethics and politics goes against an understanding of 
Machiavelli as an amoral political advisor and, partly, against him as a devoted 
republican who recognized the conflict between different conceptions of the good.  
Where people, individually or collectively, set their practical ends and use whatever 
necessary means to achieve them, they have seldom seen their self-assertion being 
respected and glorified in the long run.  On the other hand, people who assert their 
capacity for free action and at the same time understand the huge responsibility such an 
assertion entails are inherently worthy of respect.
236
  Thus whether we talk about 
principalities or republics, the fundamental principle of exercising free will demands the 
willing authorization as the foundation of free orders.  Therefore, the political end is not 
here the community itself –in a physical sense which goes beyond ontological 
assumptions about human nature and thus rejects the universal ethical significance of 
politics.  Instead the political end is to cultivate every agent’s ability to set limits to their 
freedom; limits that every agent will consider as legitimate.   
Politics must found the people’s power on stable ethical principles in order to 
reproduce and maintain it in the long term.
237
  The ethical principle derives from the 
ethical demands that human beings place on themselves.  And what human beings 
mostly demand, according to all historical examples, is that they have the ability to 
exercise their free will.   This is the fundamental criterion behind Machiavelli’s set of 
virtue ethics which constitutes the benchmark for political conduct.  Free will is a 
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presupposition of virtue, but it is not virtue itself.  Virtue requires the ability to constrain 
free will, and in an Aristotelian note, the good practical judgement heavily depends on 
this ability.  In addition, it might be limited by circumstances, or fortune, but in the end 
free will cannot be ruled out because of fortune.
238
   
In the same manner Aristotle argued that, in final analysis, responsibility for 
moral and political agency lies with the individual irrespective of the circumstances and 
the social context within which the individual acts.  In a few words, the amoral 
conception of free will understands free agency as unlimited and irresponsible self-
assertion based on power, whereas the ethical conception of free will understands free 
agency under the “laws” of self-restraint.  In the first conception free agency will be 
naturally heavily depended on fortune, whereas in the second conception circumstances 
are irrelevant to one’s ability to be self-responsible (they might change the actual 
outcome of one’s conduct but not its ethical premises).  For Machiavelli self-restraint 
was a prerequisite for freedom, as for Plato self-discipline was a prerequisite for 
happiness.      
 The view on Machiavelli’s non-philosophical republicanism analyzed above 
conceives politics as a necessary evil based on the assumption that since we cannot 
change human nature all we are left with is force.  Berlin, as well, understands the 
difficulty of uniting politics and ethics when there are no ethical ultimate ends in the 
Aristotelian sense.
239
  In Benner’s reading, on the other hand, Machiavelli offers a 
strongly ethical argument about politics; i.e. ‘however bad the natural conditions of a 
site or the natural humors found in men, human capacities to “order laws” can always be 
used to turn these toward good than bad.’240  Thus, the moral explanation of 
Machiavelli’s republicanism is based on the classical ancient conception of law as the 
sole criterion which makes it easy to distinguish between an ochlocracy and a republic.  
Force derives thus from man’s virtue in ‘ordering laws’.  In the same line of reasoning, 
the only pessimism or realism in his political philosophy derives from his description of 
virtue as self-critical prudence.
241
  So, Benner argues, ‘On philosophical reflection the 
highest possible standards may turn out to be less elevated than many people 
supposed.’242  Neither Aristotle nor Machiavelli argued that this kind of human moral 
development is easy.  But, like Plato first realized, the hard reality of politics as a field 
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where power expunges morality from people’s considerations does not suggest that 
people abandon politics, or worse that they learn how to become immoral; instead it 
invites people to self-reflect and find ways to change politics and thus improve their 
lives. 
In summary, Benner’s view about Machiavelli’s political philosophy, proposes 
an argument according to which the innate capacities of human beings for free agency, 
along with their imperfect moral natures, constitute the basis for political ordering.  
Legitimate authority depends on acts of consent, not on the quality of orders 
irrespective of how they are established, i.e. the ends do not justify the means under any 
circumstances.  Thus, Hampshire here agrees, the answer to Machiavelli’s problem may 
be that there is a recognisable basic level of common decency, which he explains as 
procedural justice, and that even in weighing in, politically, conflicting moral claims 
and competing conceptions of the good this level of common decency can never be 
violated.
243
  The interdependency of politics and ethics is therefore inferred by 
Machiavelli from the fact that the ethical value of exercising free-will must translate 
into the general principle of authorization; i.e. always seek consent and consultation, 
regardless of the relative power of agents and subjects.  Thus, readings of Machiavelli 
that reduce popular desires for freedom to ‘private’ purely self-interested desires for 
security can be rejected based on three observations derived from the basic principles 
exposed above: first, security and liberty are something wider than private interest; 
second, security must be related to the above concept of human freedom, and not to 
mere physical survival or particular property rights; and third, that free agency entails 
substantive powers and possibilities for human action.
244
   Natural desires for security 
can only be satisfied by ‘making laws and orders’ based on the fact that freedom is both 
valued subjectively and objectively.
245
   
Thus, the “means” cannot be justified when they disregard the value of free 
agency, and if Machiavelli is in some respect a republican, this must be because he 
would prefer a city where self-reflection about the value of freedom is a collective, 
rather than a limited to an individual or ruling class, characteristic.  A republic can be 
politically more successful because it makes easier for its members to understand the 
ethical significance of both the state and of their own reasons for participating in its 
actions.  They can think of their own freedom as intrinsically valuable and thus never let 
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anyone take it away.  This is why where the establishment and the maintenance of clear 
and collectively recognized ethical criteria are easier, good politics is a necessary 
development: respect for free agency guarantees political success.  This constitutes an 
ethical guide for both the internal and external relations of a political community.  It is 
therefore not true that Machiavelli develops two sets of moral values: one for the 
relations between states and one for dealing with one’s fellow citizens.246  Free agency 
is the universal principle which must constitute the basic criterion of good political 
conduct.  
 In conclusion, this understanding of Machiavelli proposes a different approach 
to the contemporarily much debated subject of role-related virtue.  The supposed 
separation between politics and ethics brought with it the radical argument in the 
Renaissance that virtue is role-specific and that we need different set of moral values for 
each sphere of conduct: ‘Virtuous soldiers are strong and brave, virtuous generals 
intelligent and determined. The virtuous man is the man who has those qualities that 
lead to success in his chosen activity.  The virtuous man will know when to seize his 
chances and will recognize what needs to be done.’247  The modern argument on role-
specific virtue derives essentially from the previously examined Platonic and 
Aristotelian concepts of virtue but without its teleological, ethically normative and 
universal purposes.  For, if success in a chosen activity is measured by the ethical aims 
of humanity as such, then virtue is both role-specific and, more importantly, universally 
defined.
248
  If success in a chosen activity is only measured against the arbitrary 
standards that the activity itself creates, then virtue is indeed role-specific but devoid of 
any ethical importance beyond the activity itself.   
In this last ethical understanding’ of Machiavelli, his originality does not derive 
from his rejection of the unity of virtues and the separation of politics from ethics, but 
from his attempt to restore this unity based on a newly defined concept of free agency.  
This concept of free agency is the only way to ensure the interdependence of politics 
and ethics, in a relationship where the rule of law takes priority over the –generally 
outlined by the mainstream republican interpretation– public good.249  In this sense, 
Machiavelli was indeed a radical thinker and one of the originators of Modernity.  
Virtue is here role-specific as far as success within a chosen activity is concerned 
(subjectively), but it is also universally determined as far as this activity promotes free-
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will and its ‘alter ego’ i.e. self-responsibility; expressing thus an individualism that can 
only be understood ethically through politics.   
Whether this argument signifies, according to Benner, a transition from virtue 
ethics (unreliable in the long term, but still indispensable as an evaluative tool for 
political conduct) to deontological reasoning (where prudence can only be sustained if 
procedurally guided)
250
 needs not to be concluded presently.  However, this 
interpretation does offer a consistent answer to problems raised from different ethical 
traditions regarding the relationship between politics and morality in Machiavelli’s 
works.  First, the ethical reading of Machiavelli’s theories goes against the tradition of 
‘civic humanism’, because it understands the intrinsic ethical significance of the 
individual as the end of politics.  Thus, free-agency takes priority over political freedom 
as we mean it in a patriotic sense.
251
  Second, Machiavelli’s ethical objectivism does not 
need consequentialism in order to make politics comprehensible.  Against all those who 
see in his works an amoral political thinker whose only evaluative shelter is 
utilitarianism, this reading conceives the bedrock of his reasonings as obligations that 
should hold irrespective of anticipated actual results.
252
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4. Weber’s Fragmentation of Value:                                                                   
Political Responsibility in a World Without Symbolic References    
 
 
A) Transition to modernity: The variety of conditions of existence and political 
organization 
Given the appropriate level of philosophical reconstruction, some of the problems Plato, 
Aristotle and Machiavelli attempted to tackle were essentially similar, despite the 
contextual differences which determined the form and essence of their works.  Those 
problems have been generally defined, in this exposition, around the relationship 
between politics and ethics and the philosophical but also practical difficulties that this 
relationship entails.  Machiavelli, regardless of what is the final interpretation of his 
work, concentrates all the characteristic and controversial features of this relationship.  
Irrespective of what he truly believed or preached, his work marked the difference 
between classical and modern political philosophy: that successful political conduct 
depends on a new understanding of morality which is now understood through the 
central dilemmas that the exercise of power poses.  For the ancients virtue or rightness 
in action was something good in itself; thus the unification of ethics and politics should 
be explicated and conceived as a natural phenomenon.  For the moderns, the arrival of 
Christianity has brought a new set of imperatives in ethical life in the form of 
obligations (deriving from obligations to God).  These obligations usually dictated the 
separation of politics from ethics.
253
  Whether Machiavelli further endorsed this 
separation or not is a matter of debate currently.  In any case, his work offers the 
analytical tools to understanding the transition from this conception of classical virtue to 
a different –one; i.e. the modern conception of virtue as a dictate of an imperative 
reason which might at times (more often than not) be in conflict with the moral 
demands of politics.   
Therefore, we have the classical rational way to true happiness of which politics 
is indispensable; the authoritative prescriptions of Christian reason which might be 
incompatible to politics; and, as a result, the need to discover a stable ethical value that 
will work against the resulted destructive pluralism in political matters.  It has been 
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shown in the Machiavellian analysis that the answer to this pluralism is either a form of 
political consequentialism (against the unity of politics and ethics) or the hypothesis that 
politics should be grounded upon a stable ethical value or some kind of basic justice.    
The next obvious question is to ask how one can utilize Machiavelli’s ‘unsurpassed 
account of the salient conditions of political life’254 and move from the classical 
approach to ethical problems of political philosophy to a more contemporary 
perspective of the relationship between politics and morality.  A key figure in this 
transition is Max Weber.  Weber’s political thought has a peculiar form, in the sense 
that his work is sociologically oriented and thus his political terminology seems 
sometimes to derive from strict sociological categorizations, without the evaluative 
connotations which political philosophy is usually struggling with.  Thus, ‘The 
importance and originality of Weber’s political thought have at times been obscured by 
commentaries which have presented his work as a relatively straightforward 
contribution to a version of modern social science which eschews political 
controversy.’255    
However, this conception of politics, heavily based on sociological terminology, 
is far from meaning that Weber’s political thought was restricted or reduced to 
sociological, scientific definitions of political action.  In fact, Raymond Aron argues 
that Weber’s own conception of the relation between science and politics constitutes the 
heart of his philosophical thought.  ‘For Weber was always passionately interested in 
the question: What is the ideal type of political man?  The ideal type of the scientist?  
How can one be both a politician and a professor?  The question was for him personal 
as well as philosophical.’256  This is, in a sense, reminiscent of Plato’s own personal and 
philosophical struggle towards a science of politics which would not only offer the 
chance for an objective education in politics and morality, but also, and as a 
consequence, an opportunity for philosophers –the scientists of antiquity– to become 
good politicians.  It is therefore a valid aim to reconstruct Weber’s works within the 
tradition of political philosophy which originates in the political and ethical thought of 
the classical philosophers.  This is a long and sophisticated tradition, something which 
cannot be said of the history of sociological theory.  The focus of this tradition, 
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according to Wilhelm Hennis, is on ‘human nature and the process in which this nature 
is related with the social organization of life.’257    
 Hence, behind the massive quantity and variety of Weber’s works on sociology, 
political economy and the cultural orientations of social structures, there is a central 
question, a main theme, which subtly unites all those different and diverse sociological 
topics under one ontological, or existential in Aron’s words,258 aim: that is, the plurality 
of conditions in which humanity is self-organized, evaluates its own action and sets its 
ethical ends accordingly.  This marks the transition from Machiavelli’s ambiguity to the 
clearly articulated question that characterizes contemporary politics: it is not simply the 
Greek question of how to live, but the question of how to live with people who are of a 
different authoritative and salvationist religion.
259
  We must therefore not lose sight of 
the fact that Weber’s aim is related to a concern with human beings and the quality of 
their existence (the political problem has always been how to live).  This means that 
overall the different disciplines within which Weber developed his thought are 
overridden by a conception of political science which he understands in the classical 
sense.
260
  Hence, it is not strange that Weber’s social theory revolves around ‘higher’ 
questions such as ‘what relations do ethics and politics actually have?  Have the two 
nothing whatever to do with one another, as has occasionally been said?  Or, is the 
reverse true: that the ethic of political conduct is identical with that of any other 
conduct?  Should it really matter so little for the ethical demands on politics that politics 
operates with very special means, namely, power backed up by violence?’261     
All these questions are conducive to the argument that ‘Weber appears to stand 
at the end of a history of political science declining through the centuries from Plato to 
Aristotle, and at the beginning, as a stable point of departure, of all scientifically viable 
political science research.’262  With Plato, Weber shares the concern about the necessity 
for political education as an indispensable feature of a vigorous society,
263
 because, he 
argues, ‘it is precisely the vocation of our science to say things people do not like to 
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hear –to those above us, to those below us, and also to our own class.’264  He also shares 
the existential concern with regard to the possibility of politics as a science, or in other 
words, with the possibility of ever producing a stable and reliable guide so as to resolve 
the tensions between active and intellectual life.  With Aristotle, Weber shares the same 
understanding of the significance that diversity has in analyzing and evaluating social 
and political life.  Aristotle’s politics made the diversity of regimes of the Greek city-
states intelligible, and through this diversity he attempted to pinpoint the objective 
ontological justifications of the ethical and political life of the polis.  Weber’s political 
sociology is involved with the same kind of questions on ethical legitimacy within the 
context of a universal history which, nevertheless, reveals an irreducible pluralism of 
social life.
265
   
With Machiavelli, finally, Weber shares an interest in the essence of political 
society because their own interest in public affairs and politics itself.  ‘This is a breed of 
sociologists who are nostalgic for political action; Weber, like Machiavelli, is 
incontestably of this breed.  He would have liked to engage in the political contest, to 
exercise power; he dreamed of being a statesman rather than a party leader’.266  Like 
Machiavelli, Weber conceived statesmanship as the virtue of first understanding and 
then reconciling the contradictory demands of politics and ethics.  Successful political 
activity was, for both thinkers, a more complex concept than their initial analyses 
implied.  This complexity could only be understood after the systematic explication of 
the causal relation between what humans consider as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and how far they 
are ready to go, practically, in order to achieve their ethical aims.  At the end of the day, 
Weber is a political philosopher in the classical sense because his aim was to reveal the 
inner logic of human institutions.
267
  This logic he found to be hidden in the ethical self-
evaluations of human beings, evaluations which –as history reveals to us– are the cause 
for the variety of forms of social organization.  It also indicates, as Weber believed, the 
importance of the individual and its power to change the world through self-reflection, 
which results into a realist approach to political affairs. 
Why and how, then, does Weber constitute the end of this classical line of 
political thought?  He struggled with the old fundamental question those thinkers had 
struggled, i.e. ‘what is the best political order and its relation to the human character?’  
And despite their different ontological and epistemological purposes and conceptions, 
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he shared with Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli a serious concern regarding the special 
ethical characteristics of political activity due to its direct and massive consequences on 
the quality of life of human beings.  According to Hennis, Weber is the pivotal point in 
this tradition because he was the first who fully understood and studied all the 
fundamental ‘highest questions’, but at the same time he realized the necessity of 
abandoning not the questions themselves, but the desire for their permanent and 
universal answers.  Hence, on the one hand, questions which cannot be answered with 
certainty are not ‘idle’ questions; they are essential, as well as our attempts to respond 
to them, which is what Weber attempted to do.
268
  On the other hand, the ‘highest 
questions’ cannot be comprehensively and consistently answered because Weber’s 
epistemology is based on an empirical demonstration that men have lived in different 
societies as a result of different beliefs.
269
  Weber’s diverse sociological works are 
consistently permeated by this search for the essence of humanity amidst an endless 
plurality of situations, both practically and ethically speaking.  Their main, unifying 
theme is therefore the study of ‘the personality and the life orders’.270 
 
The life orders, however, do possess a kind of inner regularity, an organized form of 
rationality that must be confronted by all who become involved in it.  The tension between 
the regularities of these orders, ‘spheres’, ‘values’,  [and] the fact that we ‘are placed into 
various life-spheres, each of which is governed by different laws’ [are] unavoidable.  There 
is, however, a fundamental problem that is prior to these reciprocal tensions of the life 
orders: that each of these orders involves a demand, type, form, a variety if ‘impositions’ or 
perhaps opening-up of possibilities for future conduct, a formative tendency for 
‘personality’.271  
  
The epistemological basis of Weber’s value pluralism can be sufficiently 
explained when juxtaposed to Plato’s own epistemological foundations of human 
activity and ethical purposes.  Plato’s attack on moral relativism began from the 
assumption that political reality should correspond to an ideal Form which is unitary 
and resolves the problem of the variety of moral evaluations (and thus the practical 
paradoxes that those entail).  The ideal Forms represented the perfect essence of reality, 
or reality as it should have been, had humans not being prevented from capturing it due 
to their limited capacities to philosophize.  Plato proposed thus a way for humans to 
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expand their rational capacities and discover and apply the ideal Form and therefore 
redefine reality; his plan was extremely educational.  Unfortunately, this solution 
presupposed that the ancient greek polis was a universal normative concept, i.e. Plato, 
and Aristotle after him, assumed that the ethical end is in one way or another derived 
from the form of the current social organization.  Weber constructed his own 
understanding of value pluralism attempting to overcome this classical misconception, 
i.e. reality could not be limited to the temporal normative type of the greek polis, or to 
whichever is the dominant social paradigm.  On the contrary, as Weber inferred from 
this classical misconception, it is unrealistic to attempt to grasp ethical aims in their 
totality and perfect essence based on social phenomena.  History has taught us that we 
use ideal-types of social actions, formations or institutions as a way to distil their 
principal features and help us understand them more easily.  They are a kind of 
yardstick against which we compare and evaluate empirical particular cases.  Ideal types 
only approximate to social reality; they do not and cannot mirror it faithfully.  Thus we 
cannot somehow capture the ‘real essence’ of social reality because social reality does 
not possess a ‘real essence’.  Instead, it is constantly reconstructed or represented in 
various different ways depending on the conceptual apparatus through which we view it 
in the first place.
272
  The conceptual apparatus is determined by various factors of which 
the general mindset, lifestyle or culture of a society is the most significant.   
The ideal type as a yardstick of evaluation remained of course a Platonic idea.  
Social reality that must be evaluated against its own ‘real essence’ was one of the first 
fundamental philosophical problems that Plato posed.  However, in his philosophical 
account facts were directly related to values or ethical judgements in an essential 
manner and the true definition of facts was the sufficient requirement for holistic 
solutions to all problems at the political, social and symbolic level.  On his part, 
although Weber accepted the universality and the perennial nature of those problems, he 
thought that their solutions are neither universal nor permanent.  Every time, the 
solution will be a different one, depending on the particular evaluative context in which 
the problem is raised.  At the outset of his philosophy of value pluralism he makes a 
radical distinction between facts and values which entails a fundamental difference 
between the order of science and the order of value.
273
  Thus the Platonic transition from 
the ‘yardstick of evaluation’ to the objective truth that politics must realize never takes 
place for Weber.  If values and facts are distinguished then science and politics must be 
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also distinguished.  This does not mean that political science should not engage with 
existential and ethical questions; these are still there in, more or less, a similar form.  It 
only means that political science should help us understand those questions; help us 
improve our lives upon this understanding; but abstain from imposing universal answers 
because there are none.  
Weber affirmed the view that once the focus shifts to the variety of institutional 
forms, their types and sub-types and the equivalent pluralism of evaluations which lie 
behind those forms, a theoretical device such as the ideal-type is indispensable as a 
means of bringing some conceptual order to the chaos of reality.  But this does not 
change the fact that ideal types are morally loaded constructs, and thus, scientifically 
speaking, they can only be relative types.  So, social facts do not exist as things in their 
own right and accordingly they cannot be used normatively.  What counts as a social 
fact is very much determined by the moral spectacles through which we view the 
world.
274
  Thus, according to Aron, when you read Max Weber, you have the 
impression of a humanity who continues to raise fundamental questions about the 
meaning and purposes of life, questions which have no logically imperative answer, but 
different meaningful answers, all equally valid ‘–though, to be on the safe side, let us 
say equally valid in terms of premises that are all hazardous or arbitrary.’275  However, 
despite his relativistic understanding of human history and, as a consequence, of the 
relationship between ethics and politics, Weber did not step away from seeking practical 
answers to the existential problems of humanity.  This means, again, that we are placed 
on the most ancient ground of political science; ‘the mutual relation of “conditions of 
existence” (political in the older context, social in the modern) and the quality (“virtue”) 
of man […] It should be read as “the science of the whole man”, countering a science of 
“constructed” and “unrealistic” beings, the “mathematical ideal model” of “abstract 
theory”. ’276 
This analysis of Weber’s epistemology, in combination with his existential 
concerns, once again raises the central paradox of political philosophy since Plato: how 
do we reconcile ethical relativism with universally legitimate ontological aims which 
usually entail particular forms of political practice?  It is this opposition between 
Weber’s scientifically qualified value pluralism and his existential pursuits, which 
resulted into a new, modern conception of politics, despite Weber’s classical approach 
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to ‘political science’ as discussed above.  This conception signified the transition from 
classical holistic accounts of political philosophy to the more contemporary approaches 
of politics as an autonomous ethical order.  The problem of ‘virtue’ within an endless 
variety of ‘conditions of existence’ seems to be irresolvable and it is quite difficult to 
find a normative guide for action within such conditions.  Weber’s thought was 
revolving around the fact that the primary point of ‘practical’, ‘moral’ and ‘social’ 
sciences is no longer the political community in the ancient sense.
277
  That is because 
the political community no longer existed.  In addition, the fragmentation of value, or 
more correctly the realization of it, had lead to ‘the disenchantment of the world’.  The 
realization of this ‘disenchantment’ meant that the traditional philosophical foundations 
of all political ideologies and doctrines were threatened by a relentless undermining of 
their own presuppositions.
278
  
The outcome of this ‘disenchantment’ is Weber’s political realism.  He says, 
  
‘The final result of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in completely 
inadequate and often even paradoxical relation to its original meaning.  This is fundamental 
to all history, a point not to be proved in detail here.’279 
 
It should not come as a surprise then that Weber belonged in this school of 
modern thinkers who recognized that modernity brought along with enlightenment, 
reason, and science, the collapse of ultimate foundations –a collapse that makes politics 
in a secular, post-metaphysical age look tragically groundless and uncertain.
280
  Such an 
approach to politics and ethics compared to the normative tradition of political 
philosophy going back to Plato, does indeed seem to fall into a realist and descriptive 
strand of political sociology.  Here, ‘The tensions and conflicts of the life orders 
become more intense, gain force, the more each is exposed to the ‘dictate of 
consequentiality’.281  Nevertheless, as we suggested previously, Weber follows 
Machiavelli into this attempt to overcome the pessimistic connotations of his own 
understanding of the worlds of politics and morality.  Thus, his realism does not fully 
capture his theory of the political.
282
  Instead, his political thought seems to reflect his 
inner oscillation between the world as essentially unethical (in Thrasymachean terms) 
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and as fully ethical, but irrecoverably morally fragmented.  Both paths, following 
Plato’s reasoning, seem to lead to the same result, i.e. political amoralism.  Thus, one of 
the main problems for Weber is how to respond to this amoralism without resorting to 
arbitrary ethical means, which would in the end only reinforce the vicious circle of 
relativism.   
According to Weber, now that the political community no longer existed, this 
amoralism is represented in the form of the ‘ethically neutral’ contemporary market.  
‘Domination through a constellation of interests had an ethically neutral character, that 
is, it was not susceptible to ethical interpretation.  This resistance, opacity, of the world 
in which we are “placed” to ethical interpretation is the “fate” with which Weber’s work 
struggles’.283  The market signifies the institutionalized transition from classical 
conceptions of the ‘good life’ and politics which are strongly connected to the 
community of life to the contemporary ‘disenchanted world’.  Value pluralism entails a 
rationalization of life in terms of interest and pure utility, in the place of the classical 
rationalization in terms of reasonable shared conceptions of the ‘good life’.  Utility is 
the dominant value of the apparently ethically neutral market.  Thus, we infer, the 
market is naturally related to the cultural characteristics of the modern ‘disenchanted’ 
cosmos.  In such a rationalized cosmos ethical demands with ontological purposes are 
impossible and utility becomes the substitute, or more correctly the excuse, for moral 
arbitrariness.
284
  Hence, ‘[t]he rationalization of Western culture, brought by science and 
modern capitalism, means, among other things, that “there are no mysterious 
incalculable forces that come into play” and consequently “one can in principle, master 
all things by calculation”.’285      
 Weber’s conception of value pluralism and the consequent ‘disenchanted world’ 
seemingly leaves the discussion about the essence and purposes of politics at a dead 
end.  ‘How do we make political evaluations and set political aims within a world where 
political economy has taken the place of political philosophy?’  This is the question that 
brings to the fore all the ethical contradictions and moral conflicts that a politician, a 
citizen, and the moral character in general, will have to face in the modern world.  In 
other words, the theme of ‘the personality and life orders’ raises, once again the 
problem of moral virtue (excellence), or integrity (consistency) in the more 
contemporary terms of value fragmentation and relativism.  This problem is now not 
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merely difficult to solve in practical terms (like it was for the classical thinkers), but 
essentially irresolvable at the philosophical level.  The ‘life order’ which amplifies the 
paradox for the ‘personality’ and indicates clearly our philosophic inability to offer a 
way out for the active person is no other than that of politics.  There is a tragic tone 
implied in Weber’s political thought related to the predicament of the moral character in 
a world where politics is ethically neutral and political economy seems to override 
political thought.
286
  Nonetheless, one has to make a choice and try to confront the worst 
consequences of this realism, 
 
[B]ecause of this fact, the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner 
strength.  Exactly what the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power and 
uses power, looks like a matter of faith.  The politician may serve national, humanitarian, 
social, ethical, cultural, worldly, or religious ends […] However, some kind of faith must 
always exist.  Otherwise, it is absolutely true that the curse of the creature’s worthlessness 
overshadows even the externally strongest political success.
287
   
 
 
B) Domination and the existential meaning: The ethical  importance of the 
nation 
In Weber’s philosophy of science there is seemingly no leading value upon which one 
can choose to pursue this or that course of practical action.  To search for such a value 
is, as mentioned previously, to seek the inner connection between his practical-political 
views and positions and his ‘purely scientific’ approach to sociological themes.288  
According to Andreas Kalyvas, for Weber, neither structural economic imperatives nor 
objective historical laws nor a blind faith in scientific reason and universal morality 
would ever relieve modern individuals from their responsibility to decide about the 
political form of their collective existence.  This was a matter of political struggle, 
decision, and contingent social-historical factors.
289
  Hence, the paradox: on the one 
hand, we have the admission that the symbolic foundations of politics and therefore of 
power are threatened; on the other hand, that societies must fight in order to re-establish 
those necessary foundations.  But they can only do this using the same power which is 
now lacking any stable ethical justification. 
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The broadening of the subject-matter of philosophical reflection […] has led many of us 
laymen to believe that the old questions about the nature of human understanding are no 
longer the ultimate and central questions of philosophy […] What we find is a chaos of 
different evaluative criteria, some eudaemonistic, some ethical; often both are present 
together in an obscure identification of one with the other.  One finds value judgements 
being made everywhere without compunction […] it is the exception rather than the rule for 
the person making a judgement to clarify in his own mind, and for others, the ultimate 
subjective core of which he proceeds to judge the events he is observing.
290
 
     
The same clarification of value judgment in one’s own mind must also take place in 
political conduct.  Fulfilling this kind of responsibility was the political answer to the 
fragmentation of value and demanded a certain kind of charisma.  Charismatic politics, 
Weber argued, must be able to transcend ideological plurality and social fragmentations 
in the name of a new unitary worldview.
291
  This transcendence requires both the 
understanding of the peculiar ethical demands of the political ‘order’ and the 
understanding of one’s self in relation to those demands.  The system of values is 
therefore the outcome of power struggles and vice versa.  The relationship between 
power and value is reciprocal.  This means that the exercise of power always 
presupposes certain forms of substantive, but subjective meanings and ethical values.  
‘It rests on a foundation of shared maxims and social imaginary significations.  The 
symbolic struggles among antagonistic charismatic movements aim precisely at 
producing competing discourses and beliefs for justifying the founding of new 
structures of authority and of new political and social thought.’292  A movement is, 
nevertheless, charismatic only when this self-reflection and understanding is prior to the 
unifying political act.  It is therefore an intentional movement of self-evaluation and 
redefinition of society’s ethical norms.  
 However, and despite Weber’s conception of charismatic domination –an ethical 
conception of exercising power sufficient enough to compensate for the lack of power’s 
symbolic foundations– ‘[t]he implications of this shifting of perspective from the 
substantive content and ends of the political to its mere use of physical coercion are not 
difficult to see […] There are neither specific values nor intrinsic ends that the state has 
to realize nor ethical concerns unique to its nature.’293  This is the unavoidable 
consequence of Weber’s value pluralism and the origins of his political realism.  Weber, 
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nonetheless, was concerned for the practical consequences of his own conclusion, 
because social and individual activity within politics was for him an essential feature for 
beings who wished to determine their own fates.  Weber’s realism does not mean that in 
his political thought it does not matter whether politics lacks ethical causes or not.  He 
has been described as Nietzschean when it comes to values.  He distinguishes between 
two types of rationality: Zweck and Wertrationalitat.  The former describes instrumental 
rationality toward achieving a goal without values or Sinn, whilst the later describes the 
moral, purposeful aims.  Weber argues that although there can be arguments about 
values in terms of instrumental rationalism these are ultimately insoluble.  The latter 
insight means politics is an irresolvable struggle for rule to achieve value aims.  
Moreover, every individual’s value rationality is ultimately valid, thus legitimate.  Yet, 
the validity of this individual autonomy in terms of rationally determining one’s own 
ethical causes and aims has to be achieved in the context of modern circumstances often 
guided by the realization of the ‘disenchanted world’. 
  Because of the fragmentation of values and the ‘disenchantment’ of the world, 
there is an essential contradiction between political ends and ethical aims.  Political 
ends can only be achieved through the use of power and its justification; but 
justification depends upon moral evaluations so it is inevitably connected with human 
ethical aims.  This justification and legitimacy of politics are, however, concepts with 
variable meaning and sometimes not easily comprehensible because of the variety of 
human values and their equal status; in other words because of moral relativism.  
Weber, therefore, had to bring together the inexorable fact of domination with the 
existential search for meaning and the quest for legitimizing one’s position within a 
system of social stratification, considering the power inequalities will always persist and 
that our ability to justify them will always be limited by value pluralism.
294
 
According to Weber, because all action is in final analysis culturally oriented and 
substantiated, it is necessary to transcend, in one sense, this conception of the 
irreducible value pluralism, and recreate –charismatically– political action based on a 
‘higher’ cause.  Despite his understanding of politics as a ‘life order’ within 
innumerable other spheres of action, Weber believes that amoralism –which is the 
natural outcome of the irreducible value pluralism– within politics can be destructive for 
humanity.  Even if the rules of conduct within politics are a relative thing, 
autonomously constituted and separate from other ethical considerations, politics has a 
particular characteristic which assigns to it a universal dimension.  This characteristic is 
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for Weber the ability to monopolize the use of violence.  Thus, we could argue, 
although we can have a variety of equally important questions about the ethical aims 
and principles of different societies in different times, there is usually only one question 
–however much it may be diversely abstracted and formulated in different contexts– 
regarding the relation between morality and power.  It is, I believe, this question and its 
consequences for the quality of human existence that Weber conceived as the definitive 
and exceptional feature of the ‘order of politics’, which in turn required a peculiar 
corresponding theory about the ‘political personality’.  It is of the utmost importance 
then when he refers to ‘the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power 
and uses power’ because it is the quality of this cause which will determine the quality 
of social and individual existence.  What was then the cause which was worth this 
passionate devotion in Weber’s political thought?  
 
We wish, so far as it is in our power, to constitute external relations in a manner not directed 
to the immediate happiness of men and women, but rather so that, exposed to the necessities 
of an unavoidable struggle for existence, the best in them is preserved, the qualities both 
physical and spiritual which we would like to preserve for the nation.
295
         
 
           The nation is for Weber the life order that provides what can be regarded as the 
greatest scope for the central theme as this has been analyzed so far, i.e. the options of 
the personality within this extreme variety of life conditions.  However, in line with his 
own conception of value pluralism, the nation does not represent a transcending 
universal purpose; it is not an ‘indubitable value’.296  The nation as a modern type can 
only be interpreted in combination to its necessary supplement, that is, the state.  The 
nation-state is a sociological type of the modern era which succinctly illustrates the 
current correlations between power and ethics.  Thus, ‘Sociologically, the state cannot 
be defined in terms of its ends [...]  Ultimately, one can define the modern state 
sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political 
association, namely, the use of physical force’.297  Thus Weber proceeds to the 
definition of the state as the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence:  
  
Hence, politics for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the 
distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state... when a 
cabinet minister or an official is said to be a ‘political’ official, or when a decision is 
                                                 
295
 Weber quoted in Hennis, Max Weber, 83.  
296
 Ibid., 83. 
297
 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, 77. 
126 
 
said to be politically determined, what is always meant is that interests in the 
distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power are decisive for answering the 
questions and determining the decision or the official’s sphere of activity.  He who 
is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or 
egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake,’ that is, in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling 
that power gives.  Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is 
a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. 
considered to be legitimate) violence.  If the state is to exist, the dominated must 
obey the authority claimed by the powers that be.
298 
 
We should repeat here that this definition of the state does not mean that 
Weber’s aim is to understand politics in a limited sense.  He remains true to his own 
‘scientific’ approach which requires an analysis clear of subjective evaluations and 
desires to avoid any teleological attributions to the sociological type of the state.  
Violence is all there is as a definitive feature.  The modern state is a compulsory 
association which organizes domination; this domination is categorized in different 
types according to the type of its maintenance and organization, the way it uses the 
administrative means and, of course, according to the way it is being ethically justified.  
The state ‘has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical 
force as a means of domination within a territory.’299  
Moral justification of the physical force means legitimate domination.  This 
conception is very important for understanding Weber’s political thought.  For him, if 
anything is ‘vulgar’, it is the result of the fashion of exploiting ethics as a means of 
‘being in the right’.300  Thus, even if the concept of the ‘state’ is another sociological 
type with no intrinsic value as such, it becomes ethically important because it is where 
the modern incarnation of the struggle between politics and ethics takes place.  Their 
relationship is now conceived as the relationship between power and legitimacy.  
Legitimacy, exactly because we now know of the relative value of ethical aims, is then a 
matter of charismatic persuasion.  The charismatic leader should be able to offer the 
necessary ethical substance, if only temporarily,
301
 upon which legitimate authority can 
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be created.  Hence, the charismatic leader is the political personality who can avoid the 
temptation for power politics.  ‘Power politics, impoverishes politics because it reduces 
it to a “convictionless cultivation of purely formal maintenance of the state without any 
substantive goal”.’302   
 ‘The state itself has no intrinsic value in that it is a purely technical instrument 
for the realization of other values from which alone it derives its value, and it can retain 
this value only as long as it does not seek to transcend this auxiliary status.’303  
Therefore, although the state does not constitute an autonomous value, it does have the 
highest ethical significance because it organizes and realizes all other values.  The form 
and essence of this organization will result into the quality of the nation.  ‘A nation’, 
Weber argues, ‘forgives if its interests have been damaged, but no nation forgives if its 
honour has been offended, especially by a bigoted self-righteousness.’304  This argument 
indicates how and why Weber attributed the highest ethical significance to the concept 
of the nation-state despite his instrumental definition of it.  The monopoly of physical 
force by the state determines and is determined in a reciprocal relationship with the 
specific values of the particular society.  If this monopoly of force effectively 
reorganizes and realizes those cultural values in a manner which will resolve their basic 
tensions and contradictions, then a national identity is created and further cultivated into 
integration.  This identity concentrates and integrates the national sentiments in a way 
that provides for the re-enchantment of the world.  It provides an overarching moral 
ideal for social unification.  
 
For us the nation state is not something vague which, as some believe, is elevated even 
higher, the more its nature is shrouded in mystical obscurity.  Rather, it is the worldly 
organization of the nation’s power.305   
 
The diptych of the nation-state reflects Weber’s attempt to synthesize the 
contradictory demands of the modern rationalized cosmos –wherein economic forces 
have become dominant and express themselves in the market– with the necessity of 
symbolic foundations for politics in such a ‘disenchanted’ world.  The concept of the 
state is clearly differentiated from that of the nation.  The nation is a cultural community 
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that is held together by the powerful bonds of language and the moral sentiments 
transmitted by the mother tongue.  However, although the nation and the state are two 
different and separate things they do require one another for mutual survival.  Nations 
need to become states in order to defend the boundaries of the cultural community 
against erosion or assault.  States need to become nations in order to lay the foundations 
of internal unity.
306
  This unity is a matter of legitimacy.  In a post-religious age, the 
search for meaning takes the specific form of the pursuit of political legitimacy.  Thus, 
the stability and continuity of the modern order of the nation-state depend on the 
enduring belief in its validity and normativity.
307
  This continuity and stability are 
fundamentally, existentially necessary for the moral self-reflection of the personality.  
The moral integrity of the human character is only possible when the unavoidable 
variety of ‘value-orders’ has been reconciled and overridden by a ‘higher’ cause.  This 
is why the term integrity presumes an understanding of moral attitude with consistency 
and constancy, which are nonetheless unlikely in a fragmented world that constantly 
poses contradictory demands to the human personality.      
This is the epitome of Weber’s political thought in relation to his scientifically 
grounded value pluralism: the universal and unchanging problem of political philosophy 
is raised when we conceive of politics without ethical substance, because we have 
beforehand rejected the universal validity of values.  The usual outcome of such a 
situation is political amoralism, which in more common terms means abuse and misuse 
of power.  According to Weber, since we accept the perennial nature of this problem we 
can resolve it using the resources at our disposal within the particular social paradigm 
we find ourselves.  However, before we are able to do such a thing it is also required 
that we examine and understand our particular social paradigm against universal history.  
This is necessary because ‘The behaviour of men in various societies is intelligible only 
in the context of their general conception of existence’.308  It is necessary in order to 
capture both the relativity of our social paradigm in terms of cultural values and the 
steps we need to take politically in relation to those values.  For Weber, the contextual 
and thus temporal solution to the universal problem of politics and ethics in the modern 
era is the nation-state when lead by a charismatic leadership.  ‘While aspiring to expose 
the normative deficit and moral arbitrariness of the existing order, charismatic 
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movements have to rationalize and systematize their alternative views of the world to 
make them more appealing to various needs of the ruled.’309 
 The state is the culmination of modern instrumental rationalization.  It was 
created in the first place in order to administrate the ‘ethically neutral’ market in an 
organized and efficient manner within a given territory and in competition with other 
states.  Its conception as an ethically neutral tool represents the modern inclination to 
scientific objectivity and efficacy.  The equivalent of this objectivity in social action is 
impartiality.  Thus, the quality of the personality of those who serve the state (public 
servants) must be related to those two terms: objectivity and impartiality.  The nation, 
on the other hand, reflects the human ontological need for an ethically substantive 
symbolic reference.  It is thus the moral supplement of the state and the field of conduct 
for charismatic leaders.  Without it the state is not only neutral, but it becomes pointless 
and dangerous, because organized violence without a moral basis leads to domination of 
power for power’s sake.  In this sense, the nation has ethical priority over the state.  The 
nation therefore by its nature poses subjective demands to the apparently impartial 
administration of the state.  The quality of those who pose these demands must be 
different from the quality of those who serve the state.  This is the difference between 
politicians and public servants.  The politicians must have the ability to calculate and 
promote the interests of the nation without having recourse to scientifically proven 
objective moral guides.  Impartiality is not an option as a general normative source 
because politicians de facto engage in arbitrary moral arguments.  Thus, they must be 
able to balance the subjective demands of the nation with the impartial attitudes of the 
state in order to achieve the symbolic re-orientation; and they must do this without 
reducing everything to utility.  Their virtue is therefore close to Aristotle’s practical 
wisdom although now devoid of any teleological points of reference.  
 
 
C) The first fundamental distinction between morality and politics: The ‘ethic of 
conviction’ and the ‘ethic of responsibility’ 
Weber is clearly more interested in the qualities and characteristics of the politician than 
in the moral character of the public servant; this also indicates the moral superiority of 
the nation over the state, the neutrality of which is conceived as potentially very 
dangerous.  The political personality is ethically a more complex case because the 
ability to calculate the nation’s interest without drifting to tactics of political amoralism 
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requires a very particular and exceptional set of abilities.  This set constitutes the 
essence of statesmanship, the charismatic domination which creates the conditions for 
social unification.  Thus, Weber, in order for us to understand what are the qualities that 
make for a good politician, reduces his value pluralism to a categorization of moral 
values with two fundamental types that mirror the general tension between politics and 
ethics.  These types represent the morality of responsibility and the morality of 
conviction, or the absolute ethic of ultimate ends.  According to Aron these two terms 
might be illustrated by referring to Machiavelli –or a particular interpretation of him– 
on the one hand, and Kant on the other.  The ethic of responsibility is one that the man 
of action cannot ignore.  It consists in placing one-self in a situation, imagining the 
consequences of possible decisions, and trying to introduce into the fabric of events an 
act that will lead to certain desired results or consequences.  This means, that an ‘ethic 
of responsibility governs a means-ends interpretation of action’310 and fits the account 
of republican ethics (as opposed to Christian ethics).  The ethic of conviction, on the 
other hand, is the morality that urges each of us to act according to his feelings, without 
explicit or implicit reference to the consequences.  This ethic fits the account of 
Christian ethics and its philosophical expressions.  According to the ethic of conviction, 
if someone ‘has no other goal than to act in conformity with his conscience and refuses 
to take a specific action because his conscience impedes him, if the refusal itself is the 
object of his decision, then sublime or ridiculous, it matters little –he becomes 
irrefutable.’311    
Within the endless variety of values and ‘orders of life’ politics, Weber admits, 
is a special one and cannot be dismissed with the simple observation that all values are 
equally valued.  In other words ethical realism does not and should not lead directly to a 
concept of unqualified political realism
312
 because in practice this is usually translated 
into political amoralism.  The personality or moral character of those who will engage 
in politics is, then, of greater importance than in other spheres of human activity.  The 
crucial feature is of course the use of power and its consequences.  The absolute ethic 
does not ask for consequences.  With regards to its ultimate ends ‘it is all or nothing’ 
and if one’s goal is to become a saint then one must be acting saintly in all occasions.  
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So the question that arises is how we can reconcile this reasoning with the necessities 
that the use of power imposes upon political action.  
 
We must be clear about the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by 
one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can 
be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility’.  This is 
not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an 
ethic of responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism [...] However, 
there is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of 
ultimate ends –that is, in religious terms, ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the 
results with the Lord’– and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of 
responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of foreseeable results of 
one’s action [...] a man who believes in an ethic of responsibility takes account of 
precisely the average deficiencies of people.
313
 
 
Clearly, in Weber’s view, there is no morality of responsibility which is not 
inspired by moral convictions, since in final analysis, the morality of responsibility is a 
search for effectiveness, and the question arises: effectiveness for what?  It is equally 
clear that the morality of conviction, or of the ultimate ends, cannot be the morality of 
the state and, certainly, a morality of conviction in its purer form –one must be saintly 
in everything– cannot be the morality of the man who enters into the game of politics.314  
For Weber, from no ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the 
ethically good purpose ‘justifies’ the ethically dangerous means and ramifications.315  
However there is one thing granted: that the decisive means for politics is violence.  
Therefore, a sense of responsibility acquires more gravity in the sphere of politics; 
power equals responsibility and from that we can infer the pre-eminent qualities of the 
politician i.e. passion, a feeling of responsibility, a sense of proportion and so on.  In 
addition, the ethic of responsibility allows us to identify the vices of the political 
character the major of which, according to Weber, is vanity that entails a misuse and 
abuse of power; for him the greatest irresponsibility is that one enjoys power merely for 
power’s sake.316  As we have already argued, ‘power politics’ for its own sake, without 
commitment to a cause, was for Weber empty and absurd.
317
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 For Weber, despite this exposition against the ‘ethic of conviction’ in politics as 
irresponsible, the abuse or misuse of power has been explained so far in terms of action 
that lacks ethical substance.  In addition, he clearly states that the ‘ethic of conviction’ 
does not necessarily mean irresponsibility.  The same goes for the ‘ethic of 
responsibility’ which can sometimes become sheer opportunism; there is a matter of 
degree.  Thus, it should be useful to avoid reducing all political action to either one of 
these two types of values.  The basic tension between the two ethics reflects the more 
general, complex and conflicting demands of morality upon the active, and in particular 
the political, personality.  The categorization between the two ethics is a necessary step 
to understanding the peculiar demands that the active, and in particular the political, life 
makes on the moral character.  It is necessary to understand that when other people may 
face the consequences of one’s choice –which is always the case in politics, thus its 
special nature– one must learn to discern where the principle of conscience meets the 
consequence of action.  Thus, even though, essentially, in all human conduct, 
responsibility requires a prior cause, principle or conviction upon which it can be 
realized and, vice versa, conviction requires responsibility in order to retain its moral 
value, in politics being responsible is ultimately more important than being devoted to a 
cause.  ‘It is’, Weber argues, ‘the specific means of legitimate violence as such in the 
hand of human associations which determines the peculiarity of all ethical problems in 
politics.  Whosoever contracts with violent means for whatever ends –and every 
politician does– is exposed to its specific consequences.’318      
Passion, a feeling of responsibility, a sense of proportion are all virtues 
reminiscent of Aristotle, and the way the politician must reconcile them reminds us the 
Platonic conception of the contradictory forces in the soul.  The fundamental difference 
is that, now, there is no universally acceptable normative guide for those virtues.  Thus, 
despite the distinctive ethical burden of politics (because of its relation to organized 
violence), there is no ethical authority, in Weber’s view, for the politician to consult.  
‘He must rely on his own judgements and, ultimately, seek to reconcile, as best as he 
can, the demands of principle and the likely consequences.’319  This combination is 
obviously more difficult in the modern ‘disenchanted’ world.  There is neither an ideal 
Form to be discovered nor a teleological conception of man as a political animal.  Even 
the Machiavellian-republican principle of liberty is a relative value.  Thus, a deep 
ethical self-reflection is required in addition to the understanding of the world as 
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ethically groundless.  Nevertheless, one must find a passionate conviction and guide it 
with sober realism.  The problem that no cause can be ‘proved’, simply by intellectual 
means, to be superior to any other is irrelevant.  All that seems to matter is that there 
must be a cause to supply the inner meaning essential for genuine political conduct.
320
  
‘What goes to make up the “genuine men and women” who can follow the “vocation of 
politics”?  It is once again at root the capacity of devotion to the matter at hand “if 
action is to have inner strength”.’ 321  
 
 
D) Weber’s solution: The responsible leader and the necessary ethical re-
orientation 
There is an ambiguity in Weber’s view of politics as an ethically special ‘life order’ 
because this would be against his own conception of value pluralism based on universal 
history.  The vocation of politics initially seems to be another profession amongst many 
others.  However, it is clear in his arguments that politics is an ethical sphere which is 
not suitable for every personality and therefore it should not be explained purely in 
terms of value pluralism.  If this is the case, it might mean that there is a higher 
morality, which is not the morality of the ordinary man, governing the action of the 
statesman –provided that the political man is guided by an overarching collective 
aim.
322
  Weber never said this directly, but it was the only solution he found to his 
existential concerns.  In any case, it is in the field of political action that a human being 
can demonstrate how to live a life worth living, even if this evaluation is merely 
subjective –besides it cannot be anything else.  The responsible leader is in this sense an 
amplified version of the responsible man in his daily affairs.  The responsible leader 
must be able to resolve conflicts and redefine values in order to give meaning to social 
life, sometimes knowing that social life is meaningless.  This kind of leaders must be 
willing to elevate national interests above sectional interests;
323
 they must be willing to 
overcome the material, political and cultural fragmentation of the political society; but 
most importantly they must be convinced themselves that it is worth fighting for a 
cause, even if they acknowledge the relativity of all causes.  This is the only way to 
ensure that leadership will not degenerate into power politics, which is in a way the only 
moral certainty universal history has taught us.   
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[Weber’s] main objection against power politics does not target its limitless and arbitrary 
character but its symbolic deficit and its inability to influence collective representations and 
to realize cultural values.  Power politics, by seeking power for the sake of power, consists 
of a waste of power as such.  The means of politics have become the goals of the politician.  
This overturning of the means-ends relationship involves a use of power that lacks the 
appropriate symbolic support and fails to influence value orientations.  In that sense, it lacks 
a “cultural mission” and suffers from a huge legitimation deficit.324         
 
The cultural mission in this modern era for Weber is, as mentioned previously, 
nationalistic in its essence.  In the ‘disenchanted’ conditions of the modern world, where 
the political community does not longer exist in its classical sense, the only alternative 
for symbolic reorientation at a mass level is the nation.  Thus, the general purpose for 
the statesman must be the creation of public citizenship in combination with a general 
national patriotism.  The ultimate end of politics seems then to be a political education 
which will infuse the virtues of the responsible leader to the rest of the citizens.  Hence, 
despite the irreducible variety of values and ‘life orders’, there will always be some 
personalities that can put the public interest above parochial, private and class interests.  
From this argument we can infer Weber’s conception of political science as an 
overriding science in the classical sense.  If everything else is relative, politics is still the 
only stable point of reference in terms of ethical organization that humanity can rely 
upon.  The carrier of power, i.e. the state, may be ethically neutral but the way we 
decide to use this power will never cease to have an intrinsic value. This organization 
may differ from time to time but the political mission in an abstract sense is always the 
same.     
 Weber’s attempt to connect political action to a clear set of ethical demands so 
as to avoid confusion and ineffectiveness is clearly outlined in the above arguments.  
Starting from the new –at his time– concepts of bureaucracy, modern democracy and 
the expert officialdom, he perceived this great and ineluctable process that lead to 
professional politics as the outcome of modern rationalization.  He thereafter had to 
reinstate the problem that classical political philosophy struggled with; that is, the 
tensions between politics and ethics and the demands of those tensions on the moral 
character of those who are involved in politics.  As analyzed above, the problem was 
now more difficult because Weber had to take into consideration two additional factors: 
first, an objective approach to universal history which reveals that there are no universal 
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values upon which we can pursue political goals; and second the right to use violence 
on a massive scale, which urgently required for a renewal of the symbolic foundations 
of politics.  This renewal was of course close to impossible exactly because of the 
rediscovered and now scientifically undoubted moral relativism. 
 The solution Weber suggests in this modern case of the problematic relationship 
between politics and morality concentrates all those features that will allow for the 
transition from the classical approaches to the problem to the more contemporary 
accounts of it.  Weber’s philosophical analysis of the relation between morality and 
politics is based upon the agenda of his time, namely, the debate between 
consequentialism and ethical absolutism considering the peculiar factor of the state’s 
right to organized violence.  Nevertheless, the essence of his argument is in continuity 
with the classical purposes of political philosophy.  He, like Plato, Aristotle and 
Machiavelli, also accepts the unavoidability of the corrupting effects of politics on the 
moral character and he attempts to prepare political candidates for the moral strength 
and readiness that the conduct of political power demands.  ‘The deepest core of the 
socio-political problem’ he argues ‘is not the question of the economic situation of the 
ruled but of the political qualifications of the ruling and rising classes.’325   
Nonetheless, Weber does indeed constitute the transitional point to 
contemporary political philosophy, especially in terms of understanding political 
morality in relation to our newly conceived account of ethics as permanently 
fragmented.  Machiavelli may have been the first who, even unintentionally or 
ironically, made the argument about the pluralism of values and the need to calculate 
action in terms of either consequence or principle.  Thus the transition from virtue ethics 
to modern accounts of moral action had already begun.  However, Machiavelli could 
not have conceived value pluralism in a similar manner to Weber.  Weber’s moral 
pluralism was a wider and more comprehensive notion based on the lessons of universal 
history; an academic resource which was not available to the same extent in 
Machiavelli’s time.  What Weber knew with certainty was that the variety of ‘life 
orders’, and thus ‘orders of value’, is endless.  It is not only politics versus Christianity.  
The contemporary background of moral and political philosophy is more complex 
including the concepts of pluralism, the modern state and modern science, all of which 
entail a tension between politics and ethics.
326
  Thus principle and utility can be used as 
general guides but they cannot be sufficient by themselves for the human personality.  
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Judgement becomes therefore more difficult and, accordingly, the concept of choosing 
without being ethically prepared and certain becomes more and more significant.  
Hence, Weber was one of the first modern theorists who rejected the debate between 
deontology and utilitarianism in politics as non-realistic.  Instead, his attempt is based 
on the reality that political responsibility demands a compromise between an absolutist 
and a consequentialist approach.  According to him, the power that is now available 
requires special philosophical attention, although the basic argument has not been 
changed radically since antiquity.  In politics it is sometimes necessary, in order to 
behave honourably, to use force.  The intrinsic logic of either consequentialist or 
deontological theories is not sufficient for the good politician and the statesman. 
 Principle and utility are the philosophical tools used to explain the modern 
rationalized world.  However, as Hennis argues about Weber’s understanding of 
politics, the real nobility of humans is not defined by ‘need’ and ‘interest’ or ‘right’, but 
rather by strength and capacity for dedication.  ‘This capacity can be misused; who 
would dispute it?’  But in Weber’s ancient sense of political thought there is always the 
question of unfolding the power of the soul, an unfolding that appeared to be possible 
not on an individual basis, but rather communally and associatively.  This ancient sense 
requires the forcing of the individual into the political order, allowing him to participate 
in its responsibilities and risks.
327
  Nevertheless, and despite his ancient sense of 
political thought, Weber conceived and explained what would constitute the basis of 
political conduct in the contemporary world.  The lack of a stable ethical set of guiding 
principles either in teleological, deontological or utilitarian terms has irrevocably 
transformed political action into a constant struggle of choices based upon arbitrary and 
dilemmatic situations.  It is this transformation that has rendered the ethical side of 
politics as ultimately incomprehensible nowadays, and has therefore made politics 
susceptible to what all classical thinkers were afraid of; the abuse of political power.  
The explication and understanding of the contemporary ethically dilemmatic conditions 
of political life is therefore a necessary task for political philosophy, and it is to this 
understanding to which we turn our attention in the second part of this thesis.     
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5. The Possibility of Moral Dilemmas and the Importance of Moral Judgment 
 
 
A) Modern moral philosophy: Monistic and pluralistic explanations of morality 
The short history of the relation between political and ethical philosophy should have 
been able to demonstrate that the problem between politics and morality is a recurrent 
theme amongst political philosophers of different epochs.  Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli 
and Weber are some of the major figures in the history of political philosophy who 
represent a conception of ethics as a core motivational and organizing power behind 
political practice.  Plato’s work represents an endless attempt to offer an undisputed 
way of ensuring rational self-sufficiency in the face of randomness and ‘fragility of 
goodness’.328  For him, when politics is combined with pure reason, we can override all 
the contradictions of the ordinary human condition and as a result the ‘good life’ 
becomes a tangible aim.  Aristotle’s work, on the other hand, developed the opposite 
concept that the best human life is one that necessarily includes activities which are 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of fortune.  Machiavelli reinstated in modern terms the 
problem of the variety of ethical values and he tried to interpret its significance in a 
world where the dominant values of human excellence derived from the Judeo/Christian 
tradition.  His philosophical aims remain ambiguous as to whether he attempted to 
either endorse or ironically criticize a politics devoid of any ‘ordinary’ ethical 
constrains.  Weber, finally, analyzed the same problem under the spectacles of modern 
moral theory and concluded that political life and the individual ideal of human 
excellence may not be reconcilable when they are strictly guided by deontological or 
utilitarian principles.
329
   
Thus, if there is a clear point to be derived from their ideas about what the 
ethical content of politics is, it is that throughout the centuries several philosophical, and 
correspondingly practical, approaches have been developed and proposed to societies as 
a way of resolving the tension between politics and morality.  Nevertheless, none of 
these approaches or traditions managed to offer a terminal solution to this problem, a 
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failure that may not be due to the limitations of the approaches themselves.  Weber’s 
understanding of the ethical substance of politics has been extremely useful because 
with its cold sociological logic, but also sincere political concern, reaffirmed that which 
has been difficult to admit within the classical normative tradition of political 
philosophy.  That the relationship between politics and morality will always pose 
existential problems to philosophy, and that those problems will only have temporal and 
contextual solutions.  This may be the case for two reasons: first, the complexity and 
plurality of human societies; and second, its combination with the human species’ 
limited capacity to achieve moral and intellectual perfection.  This is both an 
epistemological and an ontological argument which prompts someone not only to a 
specific conception about the essence of morality, but also to a specific understanding 
about the purpose and character of politics and the significance of the moral agent, 
within politics.    
Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Weber have been chosen for this short history 
of politics and morality because, despite their differences, they seem to have been 
engaged in a conversation which is based on some commonly accepted concerns.  These 
concerns constitute some of the core subjects of political philosophy until the present 
time and as we have thoroughly illustrated they include concepts such as the relation 
between universal justice and political justice; virtue and political judgement; moral 
appearances and political success; happiness, political legitimacy and so on and so 
forth.  All those concepts share a worry, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, that 
human activity, which is either expressed in action or in thought, is full of antinomies 
that are not easily resolved or overcome and more often than not produce catastrophic 
results at the political level.  This existential concern along with its natural political 
responses is the common basis in the philosophies of the thinkers whom we have been 
engaged with.  This is the tradition which we have previously referred to as the school 
of political science in the ancient sense.  Those thinkers, and many others who do not 
belong strictly in the field of political philosophy, attempted to offer normative 
solutions to the puzzle of how to lead a good life in the face of terrible moral 
predicaments, an inevitable and often tragic aspect of our moral reality.
330
  These 
attempts can be generally classified in contemporary political philosophy within the 
field of ‘dirty hands’ scenarios.  Stephen de Wijze is then right to argue that this shared 
interest and approval of ‘dirty hands’ situations can be found across political ideologies.  
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Because they all face the problem, sooner or later, according to which it is possible for 
an action to be justified, even morally obligatory, yet nevertheless somehow wrong.
331
   
However, the transition from ancient to modern philosophy has been made by 
the development of theories that rejected the idea that the complexity of human life 
raises an insurmountable problem to the achievement of a perfect moral theory.  This 
rejection was based on philosophical assumptions which purported to show the 
possibility for faultless moral and political action.  The transition has been made in the 
name of a moral progress which is conceived as the natural projection of the progress of 
natural sciences.  These –dominant at times– modern traditions could never accept the 
explicit tension between morality and politics as recognized by the classical school of 
thought.  The modern idea that moral theory has progressed far enough so as to be able 
to call it complete meant that there should be no tension between politics and morality 
in the first place, because there can be no real moral conflicts in general.  Hence, the 
necessity to re-establish practically a consistent relationship between political conduct 
and ethical aims –for example through the entity of the polis, the institution of education 
or the concept of the nation-state– is no longer there.  For those modern philosophical 
traditions of perfect moral explanations of the world, Machiavelli’s anxiety regarding 
the gap between ordinary ethics and successful political conduct, or Weber’s realist 
acknowledgement that responsible politicians and morally absolute behaviours cannot 
coexist, are disregarded as paradoxical. 
Roughly, these modern traditions insist on moral perfectibility either through a 
perfectly arranged system of prima facie moral principles and obligations that conceive 
as the primary moral cause the human being as an end in itself, or through a system of 
clear and coherent utilitarian constructs, for which the primary moral cause is utility.  
Thus modern ethics becomes a normative decision-procedure based either on deontic 
theories (codifiability) or utilitarianism (advantage).
332
  The perfectionist reasoning 
behind these theories usually leads to the misinterpretation of thinkers like Machiavelli 
and Weber who approached morality as an ambiguous subject of study.  Moral 
perfectionism should always attempt to reconstruct political philosophies clear of 
ethical ambiguities.  Thus it cannot account for arguments based on the assumptions 
that the complexity and plurality of our world and the morally defective human nature 
cannot be altered by comprehensive theory –this is still the offspring of imperfect 
human beings.  In addition, these traditions cannot account for the significance of the 
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political process in grasping the ethical substance of human action.  Thus they 
underestimate the significance of the moral character to understanding the ethical 
complexity and defectiveness of the world and his readiness to take the burden of 
conflicting action.  Aristotle, Machiavelli and Weber did not attempt to solve the moral 
predicament of the public man by suggesting a perfect system of moral principles –even 
Plato’s philosophical experiment can be understood more as an attempt to pose the 
problem than to resolve it.  Instead each of them suggested a way of life that would 
make for a certain understanding of the relationship between politics and morality and 
thus for the corresponding appropriate conduct.    
We have seen that the problematic relationship between politics and morality is 
usually conceived as a conflict between different kinds of principles and values, 
especially, in ancient times, in relation to the different demands of the private and public 
sphere of conduct, or in relation to the conflicting requirements of a plurality of ‘life 
orders’ in more modern terms.  These conflicting requirements, with their serious 
political connotations, pose the problem, essentially, as a moral dilemma.  If a 
comprehensive moral theory is possible, the distinction between private and public 
morality, or the differentiation of a variety of autonomous ethical orders, would only be 
apparent, not real, and political conduct could be faultlessly guided by basic moral 
claims.  If not, then the distinction would entail the need for a different approach, since 
the already established moral rules would not be sufficient as a moral guide for politics.  
In other words, sooner or later, the tension between morality and politics is going to 
take the more basic form of a moral dilemma; i.e. choosing between the peculiar moral 
demands of politics and the moral claims of ordinary morality (this choice can take 
different forms like choosing between obedience to a specific law and a universal law, 
or between the virtue of being a good citizen and the virtue of being a good man).  
Therefore, a reconstruction of philosophical traditions based on the concept of moral 
dilemmas would result in two basic categories: monistic philosophies and pluralistic 
philosophies.  Monistic philosophies, based upon the assumption that the source of 
morality is unitary and thus total moral coherency –theoretically and practically– is 
possible, would reject in principle the possibility that a real, i.e. morally insoluble, 
dilemma can ever exist.  Pluralistic philosophies, on the other hand, start from the 
assumption that both theory and experience teach us that there cannot be a unitary 
source of morality and thus coherent action is and will always be problematic.  
Accordingly to those two different conceptions of the essence of morality, we also have 
two different understandings of the moral agent or human personality.  In the first 
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monistic approach moral integrity is indeed conceived literally in terms of absolute 
consistency and continuity.  In the second pluralistic approach moral integrity is 
identified less with the success of following given moral guides and more with the 
ability to make appropriate judgements.  
Hence, if we wish to improve our understanding of the conflict between politics 
and morality (if there is such a conflict as the previous chapters suggested), we have to 
understand what a moral dilemma in itself is and whether it is right to argue that there 
really are moral dilemmas or not.  If there are (against the arguments that derive from 
monistic philosophies), then we should have to grapple with Weber’s existential 
problem, although now posed in a slightly different manner: that is, we should 
understand whether moral dilemmas arising in the political arena are different from 
more ordinary moral dilemmas that may arise in everyday life, that is, outside politics, 
and in what sense they are different.  The distinction of the moral rules of private and 
public conduct; the importance of having ethical causes and aims in politics; the 
concepts of moral integrity and virtue; and, related to all those problems, the practical 
options for the man of action in such conditions, all depend either on an understanding 
of the world as ethically fragmented and imperfect, or as morally comprehensible and 
consistent.  In a few words, one has to deliberate what would politics mean in a world 
where there are no moral dilemmas, and vice versa.   
 
 
B) Deontic and utilitarian theories: Moral conflicts are only apparent 
According to Christopher Gowans ‘A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent S 
morally ought to do A and morally ought to do B but cannot do both, either because B is 
just not-doing-A or because some contingent feature of the world prevents doing 
both.’333  Put in a simpler way: ‘a man both ought to do something and ought not to do 
that thing.’  Here is a simple example borrowed from Socrates’ discussion with 
Polemarchus: a good friend lends me his knife saying that he will be back for it 
tomorrow and I promise to return it when he is.  But, in the meantime, I found out that 
my friend intends to use the knife in order to kill another man.  I ought to return the 
knife, since I promised it and yet I ought not to return it to him, since to do so would be 
to be indirectly responsible for a murder which is forbidden by my moral principles.
334
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Now, theoretical scrutiny (weighing the consequences or prioritizing the involved 
principles) may not be necessary in order to reveal that this situation is in the end 
merely an apparent moral dilemma –essentially this was Socrates argument.  However, 
in addition to Weber’s theoretical conclusion that different ‘life orders’ will have 
different and equally valued moral commands, contemporary work in applied ethics has 
also shown that compelling arguments can be given for incompatible positions –of 
equal strength– on a variety of topics; abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, 
preferential treatment, and censorship are but a few examples.
335
   
Rights, duties, obligations and principles often conflict and it is not usually 
obvious in advance which of them should take precedence in given situations.
336
  The 
question then is ‘are there any real moral dilemmas, or are they only apparent?’  The 
history of the relationship between politics and morality, as already mentioned, is only a 
small part of the philosophical, literary and, generally, artistic discussion which 
attempts to answer this more general question.  The centrality of moral conflict to 
human life is expressed in Sophocles’ poetry, in Shakespeare’s works and in Melville’s 
stories.  ‘The substance of drama is the substance of life.’337  Hence, the collision of 
duties and moral principles is recognized throughout the centuries and within different 
social contexts.  Modern ‘progressive’ philosophies which constitute the core of the 
monistic understanding of moral theory attempted to demystify this collision and 
resolve moral dilemmas once and for all.  Marxism, Kantianism and Utilitarianism are 
the most prominent adherents of this proposition.  Their argument is not to be taken 
lightly; this problem is the quintessence of philosophy.  As Walzer argues, the question 
relates not only to the coherence and harmony of the moral universe, but also to the 
relative ease or difficulty –or impossibility– of living a moral life.  ‘It is not, therefore, 
merely a philosopher’s question.  If such dilemma can arise, whether frequently or very 
rarely, any of us might one day face it.’338   
As we have already mentioned, there are two main traditions with respect to the 
problem of moral dilemmas: one which proposes that moral dilemmas are an 
unavoidable feature of our everyday lives (that becomes even more acute in the world of 
politics which instantiates a sharper conflict); the other which has viewed moral 
dilemmas as mere appearances.  Both traditions have their origins in Platonic 
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philosophy.  Viewing moral dilemmas as mere appearances has been the case with the 
two predominant traditions of western modern moral philosophy –Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism.  ‘Both Kantians and Utilitarians have thought that, for any apparent 
conflict, either one of the conflicting ought statements is not true or the two statements 
do not really enjoin incompatible actions.  It is admitted that there are cases in which 
there may be uncertainty about the resolution of an apparent dilemma.  But it is thought 
to be impossible that morality could actually impose upon an agent two “oughts” when 
both cannot be fulfilled.’339  This impossibility is based upon the view that morality 
itself is progressing along with moral theory, making possible for us to prioritize 
successfully between the different ‘oughts’ and thus always to avoid or find a 
permanent solution to moral conflicts.   
Kant provides one of the standard arguments against the possibility of moral 
dilemmas.  He says, that ‘a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable’ on the 
grounds that the rules expressing moral duty declare certain actions to be ‘necessary’ 
and that two rules declaring actions necessary cannot conflict.  ‘Thus, if it is a duty, and 
hence a moral necessity, that a person do A, then it cannot also be a duty, and hence a 
moral necessity, that the person do something incompatible with A.  Kant acknowledges 
that there can be conflicting “grounds of obligation.”  But in such case one of the 
grounds is not a sufficient ground.  Hence, there are not two conflicting obligations, one 
of which prevails, but two conflicting grounds of obligations, one of which prevails; the 
result is that there is only one actual obligation.’340  Bernard William’s objection (which 
will be further discussed below) that the fact that there is a moral remainder in the form 
of ‘regret’ when someone has to choose between these conflicting obligations, and thus 
the conflict cannot only be apparent, is in turn rejected by Kantians with the argument 
that there is no need to attribute moral dilemmas in order to justify powerful negative 
sentiments in these cases.  In other words, regret or guilt from the agent’s part does not 
entail moral conflict.  Loyal to the rational and progressive spirit of the Enlightenment 
Kantians would argue that moral sentiments are irrelevant to moral understanding.
341
  In 
conclusion, the Kantian approach to moral theory cannot accept moral dilemmas 
because it is based on a very austere system of prioritizing moral principles and 
consequent obligations and duties: actions that are neither morally necessary nor 
morally impossible are “morally indifferent” or “permissible.”  ‘These three categories 
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–the necessary, the impossible, and the permissible– are taken to be exclusive and 
exhaustive: every action falls into one and only one.’342  
The Kantian rejection of moral dilemmas appears to be problematic and over-
simplistic.  This over-simplification can be more striking within the world of politics 
which usually raises the most acute cases of conflicting values.   The Kantian (deontic) 
reasoning will, sooner or later, have to confront Weber’s criticism against the ‘absolute 
ethic’.  In practical situations, in politics in particular, the attitude of deontology against 
irresolvable moral dilemmas will cause problems of moral consistency which can only 
be resolved by absolute means.  In addition, and maybe philosophically more important, 
deontic theories must face the ancient problem of moral arbitrariness.  On what 
epistemological basis can one assign moral priority to some ‘ground of obligation’ over 
another?  How do deontologists justify the rejection of moral conflicts?  If their 
assumptions derive from some religious ancestry then how do they justify the transition 
from theistic presuppositions to a rationality which is sufficient against moral 
dilemmas?
343
    
Utilitarian theories are more interesting than Kantian theories in this particular 
respect, because utilitarianism claims to have the only solution against moral 
arbitrariness.
344
  Because of this powerful claim against moral arbitrariness, 
utilitarianism (as a form of the wider concept of consequentialism) has been considered 
as the only viable unitary political solution against moral fragmentation.  As we have 
seen, in almost all ethical arguments in politics from Plato onwards, the calculation of 
consequences is considered to be both an indispensable ability for the political man, but 
also a dangerous political path if not otherwise morally restrained.  If in ordinary life 
morality is characterized by unavoidable conflict of principles of conduct, and not a 
harmony of purposes, then the question is whether it is reasonable to impose moral 
unity by allowing only one overriding principle of conduct.
345
  For this is what classical 
utilitarianism attempted to do: to suggest that utility is the moral principle that comes to 
fill in the gaps of a moral system that has not devised resolutions in cases of moral 
conflicts.  Mill says ‘If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be 
invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible.’346   
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Utility, thus, appears to be an overarching or primary principle according to 
which all moral conflicts can be perfectly resolved.  However, the most consistent 
criticism against this perception of utility has pointed out that it is virtually impossible 
to define and defend utility as a homogeneous value to which all morally relevant 
considerations may be reduced.  If some accepted this, they would end up with an 
implausible reductionism.  If some, on the other hand, accepted the heterogeneity of 
utility, they would forego its purported advantage in resolving conflicts.
347
  In other 
words, either the primacy of the utility principle over all other moral principles should 
make utilitarianism a monistic and ultimately reductionist theory –we shall see how this 
seems to be a paradox for utilitarianism in the field of politics at a later stage– or the 
utility principle will be one more principle, among others, with equal strength.  Thus, 
utilitarianism should not be able to claim an extra capacity to resolving moral conflicts 
–which is more or less what the pluralist argument is based upon. 
In the contemporary discussion, R. M. Hare has tried to elaborate the classical 
utilitarian position, by adopting an Aristotelian approach regarding the essence of moral 
theory and moral conduct in order to uphold the view that real moral dilemmas are 
impossible when there is a systematic way to face apparent conflicts of principle and 
obligations.  We shall see that despite these added Aristotelian features, which make for 
a more sophisticated utilitarian approach to the problem of moral dilemmas, Hare’s 
theory is still based upon the conception of utility as the definitive moral guide and thus 
susceptible to the same kind of criticism as exposed above.  Thus, the importance of 
Hare’s argument to the current inquiry is twofold: first, in relation to the Aristotelian 
characteristics of his utilitarian theory; and second, in relation to the philosophical 
assumptions of the utilitarian viewpoint.  Hare’s main theoretical tool is a distinction 
between two levels of moral thinking; a distinction that according to him is not original 
since it occurs already in Plato and Aristotle.  The seeds of this distinction are to be 
found in Plato’s distinction between knowledge and right opinion.  Then the same 
concept reappears in Aristotle’s distinction between right motivation and practical 
wisdom or, as we have seen, moral virtue and intellectual virtue.
348
  Hare argues that the 
importance of this distinction has not yet been realized.  However, as we are about to 
argue, his attempt to infuse it with the overriding utilitarian principle has failed to add to 
Aristotle’s theory something substantial in order to achieve this.   
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These two levels of moral thinking, as Hare names them, are the intuitive and the 
critical.  Both of them are concerned with moral questions of substance, but they handle 
them in a different way.  And in order to understand this difference it is necessary to 
compare them while discussing the problem of moral conflicts.  The argument goes like 
this: 
 
The views held by moral philosophers about conflicts of duties are an extremely good 
diagnostic of the comprehensiveness and penetration of their thought about morality; 
superficiality is perhaps more quickly revealed by what is said about this problem than in 
any other way.  Those who say, roundly, that there can just be irresoluble conflicts of duties 
are always those who have confined their thinking about morality to the intuitive level.  At 
this level the conflicts are indeed irresoluble; but at the critical level there is a requirement 
that we resolve the conflict, unless we are to confess that our thinking has been incomplete.  
We are not thinking critically if we just say ‘There is a conflict of duties; I ought to do A, 
and I ought to do B, and I can’t do both’.  But at the intuitive level it is perfectly permissible 
to say this.
349
   
 
Now, this may seem at first similar to the Kantian account against moral 
dilemmas as discussed above, since both traditions share the idea that moral theory and 
thus moral conduct is perfectible: if some persons’ moral thinking has not ‘progressed’ 
enough as to be able to create a systematic and comprehensive prioritization of moral 
principles and obligations they would inevitably face apparent moral conflicts.  
However, the similarities between Kantianism and Utilitarianism stop in their monistic 
approach.  For Kantian theorists a strict prioritization of prima facie principles some of 
which are just inviolable (and all of them are guided by the categorical imperative) 
would be enough, whereas for utilitarians only the principle of utility can be called 
definitive, since otherwise moral conflicts would be unavoidable.  In such cases, Hare 
argues, the problem arises from the fact that these persons have confined their moral 
education into only developing their moral characters: the Aristotelian moral 
habituation, or ethos.  This habituation only cultivates the intuitive level of moral 
thinking (which is based upon prima facie principles) and thus when a conflict of 
intuitions is faced, it is impossible to be resolved by recourse to moral thinking, because 
by moral habit these persons have learnt that most of those basic moral intuitions are of 
equal importance.   
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According to Hare, who in turn follows Aristotle, in such a conflict between 
intuitions, it is time to call in reason.
350
  Actually, it is necessary to ‘call in reason’, he 
says, because ‘No two situations and no two people are ever exactly like each other’.  
This means that, although the relatively simple principles that are used at the intuitive 
level are necessary for human moral thinking to exist in the first place (like Aristotle 
argued that moral habituation is the first kind of moral education that must be 
implemented), they are not sufficient.  New situations arise all the time and they must 
be morally evaluated and the principles we have learnt habitually in dealing with past 
situations may not be appropriate to or sufficient for the new one.  So, Hare continues, 
there is an additional question of how we are to decide whether they are appropriate or 
not; and whether we should create new principles in order to cover the new situations; 
this is why we develop our intellectual or critical thinking.  Therefore: 
 
The most fundamental objection to the one-level account of moral thinking called 
intuitionism is that it yields no way of answering such a question.  The intuitive level of 
moral thinking certainly exists and is (humanly speaking) an essential part of the whole 
structure; but however well equipped we are with these relatively simple, prima facie, 
intuitive principles or dispositions, we are bound to find ourselves in situations in which 
they conflict and in which, therefore, some other, nonintuitive kind of thinking is called for, 
to resolve the conflict.  The intuitions which give rise to the conflict are the product of our 
upbringings and past experience of decision-making [moral habituation].  They are not self-
justifying; we can always ask whether the upbringing was the best we could have, or 
whether the past decisions were the right ones [...] To use intuition itself to answer such 
questions is a viciously circular procedure[.]
351
 
 
However, if developing moral intuitions, or moral characters, through habituation 
is a necessary element of our moral thinking, it follows, according to Hare, that we ask 
how the intuitive is related to the critical level of moral thinking, since these two are not 
rival procedures but they are elements in a common structure, each with its part to play.  
Their interrelation can be understood, he says, by using Aristotle’s metaphor regarding 
the relation of the intellect to the character (both of which constitute the two levels of 
moral development as Hare explained above).  Aristotle argues that this relation has to 
be a paternal one: ‘in so far as a man’s motives and dispositions are rational, it is 
because they “listen to reason as to a father”.  Because intuitive moral thinking cannot 
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be self-supporting, whereas critical thinking can be and is, the latter is epistemologically 
prior.’352  
What Hare is trying to achieve here is of course a reconstruction of what Aristotle, 
and other philosophers of the classical period, suggested; i.e. that reason is 
epistemologically prior to intuitive thinking, based on a specific ontological conception 
of human nature.  Hare claims that at the end of critical thinking (i.e. at its perfect state) 
all questions on which moral argument is possible would be given a perfectly consistent 
answer which, by the way, would be the same in every place at every time.  For this 
reason the prima facie principles themselves have to be selected by critical thinking, 
provided, of course, that critical thinking has in turn been developed to its perfection 
based upon the ‘best’ prima facie principles (creating thus a causality problem: how 
could we choose the best prima facie principles since those are needed to develop 
critical thinking in the first place?).  In conclusion, Hare’s political argument is that if 
not all people are able in developing their critical thinking to its perfection (so as to be 
able to separate it from the intuitive level and command it accordingly), they should 
trust the selection of prima facie principles those who can do it.
353
  In platonic terms, we 
still need philosopher-kings to construct, non-intuitively, a political system of moral 
education for the rest of us.  Again, the major problem, recognized by Plato himself and 
later by Aristotle, is how we can initiate such a process without a leap of logic similar to 
the ‘discovery’ of Ideal Forms.  
How then can we justify Hare’s idealist conclusion about the character of moral 
theory and morality itself?  Someone might expect a more moderate view starting from 
Aristotelian premises.  The answer is to be found in the fact that Hare still wants to 
construct an argument about the overarching character of the utility principle which 
would simplify the moral conundrum and allow for a perfect moral theory.  Plato’s leap 
of logic is not necessary because we now have utility as the decisive factor.  ‘Critical 
thinking’, he says, ‘aims to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in 
intuitive thinking.  It can also be employed when principles from the set conflict per 
accidents.’  These accidents will arise only in ‘exceptional situations’ and they will be 
agonizing in proportion because they are deeply held due to proper moral habituation.
354
  
For utilitarians, and Hare, the ‘best set’ of prima facie principles should be selected 
according to the consequences of inculcating them in ourselves and others; ‘and, in 
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examining these consequences, we have to balance the size of the good and bad effects 
in cases which we consider against the probability or improbability of such cases 
occurring in our actual experience.’355  Nevertheless, following this kind of reasoning, 
choosing the ‘best set’ of prima facie principles becomes both a highly experimental 
and arbitrary process.  
It should be obvious then that Hare’s intention was to take advantage of the 
Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom and, without its ontological and teleological 
assumptions, to construct a moral theory based on the utility principle.  In his 
interpretation ‘critical thinking’ is fundamentally determined by a calculative capacity 
which makes ‘practical decisions’ morally indisputable and the whole process of moral 
systematization simpler.  This allowed him to accept the interrelation between the 
intuitive and the critical levels of moral thinking, but at the same time it permitted him 
to claim the epistemological priority of the critical level –which in this case is based 
upon the calculative capacity and not upon a specific ontological conception of human 
nature, as in Aristotelian ethics.   
The utilitarian attempt is not without its merits.  Firstly, it tries to disconnect 
morality from the question of how one should live a life, making thus moral theory 
tantamount to scientific method, through abstraction.  Secondly, utilitarianism poses a 
serious problem by inserting calculation into our habitual responses and internalized 
dispositions.
356
  Prudence, a fundamental political and moral virtue is based upon this 
careful weighing of intuitions and their consequences, and by inserting calculation in 
the equation Hare seeks to extinguish the Aristotelian ambiguity regarding the 
relationship between the moral and the intellectual parts of our characters.  However, it 
is this attempt to abolish all ambiguity which constitutes the problem of the utilitarian 
theory, even after Hare’s endeavour to reconstruct it on Aristotelian premises: the 
calculation of consequences as the definitive principle of moral thinking underestimates 
the complexity of the world in relation to the complexity of moral agency; something 
that both Plato and Aristotle acknowledged as a major philosophical problem which 
required radical political solutions.  If this complexity is reduced to an ability to foresee 
outcomes the Aristotelian practical wisdom is reduced to mere prudence, which does 
not, by itself, entail that there cannot be moral conflicts.  ‘The good general’, Hare says 
in a concluding political observation that summarizes his whole point, ‘is one who wins 
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his battles, not one who has the best prima facie principles; but the best prima facie 
principles are those which, on the whole, win battles.’357   
Hare’s example is a forceful attempt to reveal the interdependence between 
principle and utility and to show how in final analysis their reconciliation can be 
achieved.  His conclusion, however, seems to be a circular argument, where the priority 
of the overarching principle is not clear since it is based upon another set of necessary 
principles.  Hare’s argument is reminiscent of the debate in relation to Machiavelli’s 
virtú as a skill that brings temporal results based on the calculation of consequences and 
‘virtue’ which is the ability to redefine political success in the long term based on stable 
moral principles.  It is essentially Hare’s answer to the problem of whether ‘the end 
justifies the means’.  But as we have already argued neither Plato nor Aristotle were 
ready to make such concessions.  The path towards moral perfectionism, if based upon 
the concept of utility, has always been regarded with great political concern and 
philosophical suspicion.  Plato and Aristotle’s legacy to political thought in the 
‘classical sense’ is that an interest-based morality will sooner or later abolish any moral 
restraints.  Sooner or later, Hampshire agrees, the error of absolutism made by the 
optimistic utilitarian leads to the exploitation of man by man.
358
   
 
 
C) The pluralist argument: the incommensurability of moral values and the 
political danger from absolutism 
Practical wisdom, which is the outcome of perfect moral habituation (of a specific social 
type) and rigorous intellectual education (again, with a specific moral and political aim), 
was for Aristotle only a possibility depending on man’s moral capacities, and within 
specific moral and political contexts.  It was never a way of forever resolving all moral 
debates.  Thus, it is possible to criticize Hare’s utilitarian argument not only from an 
intuitionist perspective, according to which our fundamental intuitions cannot be 
overridden by utility, but also from an Aristotelian and a pluralist perspective.  Aristotle 
himself suggested a strong interrelation between the development of moral and 
intellectual virtues.  For Aristotle moral habituation (which is strongly connected to the 
life of the polis) is chronically prior whereas intellectual habituation (which an 
individual’s affair) is epistemologically prior.  In this respect, Hare’s interpretation of 
Aristotle, and thus his own argument are correct.  However, Aristotle implied that 
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human nature imposes some certain limits onto our intellectual capacities, something 
that Hare seems to neglect when he refers to the equivalent ‘critical level of thinking’.  
He is of course ambiguous on this point, but it may be through this ambiguity that we 
infer the conclusion of his argument, as we have already seen: that is, that intellectual 
activity can never be perfected up to the point of being self-supporting because man is 
by nature a political-dependent animal.  This is the reason man created the polis in the 
first place; because consequences of human actions greatly depend upon external –to 
human abilities– factors.  Thus, if due to such a factor a practically wise general lost a 
battle –to return to Hare’s own example– this does not mean he is no longer wise.  
External conditions and natural necessities had their significant role to play within a 
man’s struggle towards eudaimonia but they did not define his moral and intellectual 
character; that was totally depended upon his human powers, which are nevertheless 
insufficient.  To argue that one’s miscalculation of a course of action (moral and 
practical at the same time) makes one’s moral character culpable, would be, for 
Aristotle, the abandonment of the significance of moral agency towards the achievement 
of the ideal life; or better, the life that the ancients aspired to.   
The pluralist criticism against utilitarianism, and Hare’s theory in particular, is 
similar, if not derived from, this Aristotelian interpretation.  According to Hampshire, 
utilitarians, who consider utility as the ultimate criterion for resolving moral problems, 
think that men have the possibility of indefinite improvement in their moral thinking.  
And that thus far they were confined and confused by their innate endowments of moral 
repugnances and emotional admirations.  An opposite way of thinking about morality, 
according to him, is outlined by Aristotelian ethics which might appear, as we have 
already discussed in detail, as a recognition of a plurality of prohibitions –absolute and 
non-absolute– and elementary decencies which do not all derive from a united source 
and do not all serve a single purpose: the only definite element behind them is a 
particular way of life.
359
  This is a good way to observe how the transition from 
monistic explanations of morality to the school of thought which accepts moral 
dilemmas is made.  For pluralists, moral conflicts constitute the essence of morality 
exactly because the plurality of values in human life is irreducible: 
 
The phrase ‘way of life’ is vague and is chosen for its vagueness.  The unity of a single way 
of life, and the compatibility in practice of different habits and dispositions, are learnt from 
observation, direct experience and from psychology and history; we know that human 
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nature naturally varies, and is deliberately variable, only within limits; and that not all 
theoretically compatible achievements and enjoyments are compatible in normal 
circumstances [...] The moral prohibitions constitute a kind of grammar of conduct, showing 
the elements out of which any fully respectworthy conduct, as one conceives it, must be 
built.  The plurality of absolute prohibitions, and the looseness of their association with any 
way of life, which stresses a certain set of virtues, is to be contrasted with the unity and the 
simplicity of utilitarian ethics.
360
   
 
Plurality of values due to the ‘way of life’ is not the only way to explain the 
possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, but it is the most relevant, at least, in relation to 
politics.  There is also the argument from single-value conflicts, which suggests that, for 
example, considering the principle that innocent lives are to be saved, there might be an 
occasion in which it is possible to save one life or another but not both.  In each case, a 
single principle enjoins incompatible actions.  It is not possible to analyze in detail this 
last argument about single-value conflicts, but it should suffice for our purposes (which 
are mainly related to the political) to say that in relation to practical difficulties which 
derive from an uneasiness in applying a single moral principle, monistic reasoning 
appears to be insurmountable.
361
  In such cases, there is not a moral dilemma but only 
an anguished practical matter, a tragic situation: we do not have to override a moral 
principle based on a higher moral demand, because there is no other moral demand.  
Thus, by deciding according to a calculation of actual consequences, we do not at the 
same time override one of two moral oughts; we only decide which is the best practical 
way of applying one and single moral principle.    
The serious problem arises when there is a clear conflict between different and 
equally strong moral principles which cannot be reduced to the utility principle at the 
theoretical level.  In such a case the practical application becomes simply impossible, or 
impossible without a moral ‘remainder.’  Thus, within the concept of ‘moral conflicts’ 
there is also the argument from moral sentiment –which is nevertheless not clearly 
separated from value pluralism.  This is based on a claim about the explanation of the 
sentiments of regret (or remorse or guilt) that are meant to occur in the wake of practical 
resolutions of moral conflict and it is developed, as we have already mentioned, in 
Williams’ theory about moral conflicts.362  Because of this, Williams’ argument with 
regard to moral sentiment can be connected with the pluralist tradition.  Like pluralists 
have done, he has tended to be sceptical of resolutions, or methods of resolving, 
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conflicting values.  Pluralists’ general idea is that a conflict between moral claims is 
natural to us, and that there are contrary dispositions and many things that are 
immediately admirable and desirable in themselves, and for which the price is 
sometimes too high and prioritization impossible.
363
  If this were not so, human 
existence would not be tragic and politics would not be such a disputed field of social 
conduct. 
De Wijze has taken the argument about the moral remainder even further in order 
to stress the importance of the acceptance of moral dilemmas for the agents involved: 
 
The prime reason is to restore balance in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition where 
emotions are very often seen as standing in opposition to rationality and consequently of no 
use in our search for ethical principles […] Yet despite this, emotions do play an important 
part in our moral evaluations and do so for two important reasons.  Firstly, by focusing on 
moral emotions, at least in their non-corrupted forms, this helps us towards understanding 
the parameters of moral violation and directs the philosophical analyses needed to develop 
clear and coherent ethical principles […] Secondly, even if moral emotions are only the 
starting point for a proper and rational ethical judgment, given the speed and complexity of 
some human interaction, our properly honed and cultivated moral emotions can serve as a 
substitute for moral deliberation, and act as a careful guide to those involved in weighty 
moral decisions.
364
   
    
Gowans has made a distinction between two main schools of thought among pluralists, 
that might already have been inferred by the analysis of the basic elements of pluralism: 
either someone accepts that in cases of moral conflicts there is a resolution to be 
discovered, and is simply a comment on our epistemic inadequacies that we are unable 
to discover it; or someone claims that some values are “incommensurable” and thus it is 
impossible in principle to resolve conflicts among them (it is not simply that we cannot 
discover the resolution: there is no resolution to be discovered).
365
  The problem at 
hand, is how these morally dilemmatic situations translate into politics where no 
‘resolution’ is possible.  For Hare, and utilitarians in general, ‘resolution’ of a moral 
conflict means elimination of the conflict altogether.  For pluralists who accept the 
existence of genuine moral dilemmas ‘resolution’ does not mean elimination of the 
dilemma, but a necessary practical overcoming of it, which nevertheless leaves a moral 
remainder in recognition of the fact that the conflict was real and it will remain 
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unsolved.
366
   In other words they recognize the necessity for a political ‘resolution’ but 
at the same time the impossibility of a moral ‘resolution.’ 
 
[I]t is surely falsifying of moral thought to represent its logic that in a conflict situation one 
of the conflicting ought’s must be totally rejected.  One must, certainly, be rejected in the 
sense that not both can be acted upon; and this gives a (fairly weak) sense to saying that 
they are incompatible.  But this does not mean they do not both (actually) apply to the 
situation; or that I was in some way mistaken in thinking that these were both things that I 
ought to do.  I may continue to think this retrospectively, and hence have regrets; and I may 
even do this when I have found some moral reason for acting on one in preference to the 
other [...] but this is not the same as to revise or reconsider the reasons for the original 
ought’s[.]367  
 
What should logically follow from this argument is that in political matters the 
argument of ‘incommensurability,’ as mainly suggested by Thomas Nagel and is to be 
analyzed presently, should unavoidably come to terms with Williams’ position about 
the ‘moral remainder.’  Williams’ argument thus is complementary to the pluralistic 
approach in both worlds of politics and morality, but especially in politics where a ‘non-
resolution’ situation is out of the question.  In other words, if we, like Gowans, accept a 
distinction between pluralist theories which claim that there are moral dilemmas which 
are resolvable (but with a “remainder”) and those which claim that they are not 
resolvable (because of “incommensurability”), we should concede that in politics this 
distinction is more irrelevant.  Even if the pluralism of moral values is recognized, it is 
also recognized that sometimes politics necessitates overriding these values, even if 
momentarily.  This process is not the outcome of simple utilitarian reasoning (although 
it contains strong elements of it).  How and why this is happening we are going to 
discuss later on.  The important thing for now is to make clear that pluralism of values 
does not entail impossibility of political action, though it does entail a different 
understanding of it, of which the ‘moral remainder’ is an important feature. 
The main features of the pluralist approach are expressed by Nagel’s strong claim 
that moral values are simply “incommensurable” and therefore the resulting moral 
conflicts are definitely not resolvable, at least at the moral level; and if they are 
resolvable at the practical level then they are so only with massive effects to the way 
politics works and the way we should judge politics.  The main implication of this 
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argument is that systematic moral theory cannot constitute the sole basis for moral 
conduct.  However, irreducible moral conflicts create a moral framework within which 
political resolutions must be limited.  The fact that in politics a practical resolution is 
necessary does not make the initial moral conflict of secondary importance.  Instead, it 
is the knowledge of the conflict itself that should impose some limits on how the 
practical resolution is conceived and realized.  This should be the guide to judging when 
the ‘end justifies the means’ and when it does not; calculative reasoning is not 
sufficient.  How are we to decide whether the good of justice is higher than the good of 
peace?  There is no obvious common ground for such comparative judgments, and this 
suggests that these values are incommensurable.  If this is the case, pluralists argue, that 
there are irresoluble moral conflicts and cases where an action cannot be incontestably 
considered as the best.  For this reason, whenever an action is undertaken, it should be 
severely checked and maybe restrained.  For example, how should one act when to 
preserve peace one may need to violate justice, and vice versa?  According to Gowans, 
when in a given situation it is not clear that one action is the best, it does not follow that 
in that situation any action is as good or as bad as any other.
368
  The obvious outcome of 
this argument is ontological in nature; i.e., and without implying a pure relativism, there 
are limits to the objectivity of our moral capacities, but these do not reduce the 
significance of moral judgment; something that, as we are about to see, makes even 
clearer the importance of the relationship between the moral agent and the ‘moral 
remainder.’ 
Nagel’s pluralism derives from exactly this problem of the incommensurability of 
values and the necessity for resolution of moral dilemmas.  Nagel argues that the 
problem derives from the disparity between the fragmentation of value and the 
singleness of decision.    The conflict at the moral level gives rise to the conflict at the 
practical level, which is not the same as merely having a practical difficulty.  The 
necessity of practical resolution entails neither a permanent overriding of one of the 
moral principles, nor a reduction of the importance of the moral conflict itself –as 
monistic approaches may suggest.  A practical difficulty, when faced, will not test the 
moral capacity of the agent because it is usually the outcome of external factors and not 
of a moral conflict –following, again, Aristotle’s philosophy and the criticism we made 
against the reductive tendencies of utilitarianism.  Nagel argues, corroborating what has 
been said so far that: 
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The strongest cases of conflict are genuine dilemmas, where there is a decisive support for 
two or more incompatible courses of action or inaction.  In that case a decision will still be 
necessary, but it will seem necessarily arbitrary.  When two choices are very evenly 
balanced [in terms of comparable moral values], it does not matter which choice one makes, 
and arbitrariness is no problem.  But when each seems right for reasons that appear decisive 
and sufficient, arbitrariness means the lack of reasons where reasons are needed, since either 
choice will mean acting against some reasons without being able to claim that they are 
outweighed.
369
   
 
According to Nagel there are five fundamental types of moral values that give rise 
to basic conflict and create practical dilemmas along with moral dilemmas.  First, there 
are specific obligations to other people or institutions.  Second, there are constraints on 
action deriving from general rights that everyone has, either to do certain things or not 
to be treated in certain ways.  Third there is that which is technically called utility 
(which includes all aspects of benefit and harm to all people).  Fourth there is the type 
which refers to perfectionist ends or values and by this Nagel means the intrinsic value 
of certain achievements or creations, apart from their value to individuals who 
experience or use them.  Finally, there is the type of commitments to one’s own projects 
or undertakings (not to be confused with self-interest), which is a value in addition to 
whatever reasons may have led to them in the first place.
370
  According to Nagel, 
obligations, rights, utility, perfectionist ends, and private commitments enter into our 
decisions constantly.  Conflicts amongst those types of values, and within them, arise in 
medical research, in personal life, and of course –in exaggerated form– in politics.  Now 
the crux of his argument is basically a summary of the criticism against Kantian 
absolutism and utilitarianism as developed above– that criticism may be applied to 
every monistic explanation of morality and politics.  What would it mean to give a 
system of priorities among all those conflicting values?  What would it mean to 
construct a moral system based upon a monistic philosophical explanation?  According 
to Nagel the answer would be further theoretical and practical confusion and a 
predicament for the moral agent accordingly.  
The simpler moral conception which follows the Kantian tradition might permit a 
solution in terms of a short list of clear prohibitions and injunctions, with the balance of 
decision left to personal preference or discretion, but that will not work with such a 
mixed collection of moral values (because, as we have analyzed, this would 
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underestimate the complexity of life and the world).  Such a method of decision is 
absurd, according to Nagel, not because of the particular order in which the prohibitions 
might have been chosen, but because of its absoluteness.  It is absurd, he says, to hold 
that obligations can never outweigh rights, or that utility, however justified, can never 
outweigh obligation.  We have already discussed the difficulties of this tradition 
particularly in relation to politics where the calculation of consequences, and thus the 
idea of utility, is of special importance.  Nagel does not neglect the peculiar character of 
politics and for this reason turns his attention to the idea of outweighing, or, in more 
familiar terms, the principle of utility.  Utilitarianism, he argues, is the best example of a 
theory which tries to rationalize a decision in conditions of conflict, based on a single 
scale on which all these apparently disparate considerations can be measured, added, 
and balanced.  And the interesting thing, he finds, is that attempts have been made not 
only in order to show the priority of the utility principle over rights and obligations, but 
also in order to prove the priority of rights and obligations over utility in utilitarian 
terms.  ‘The same might be tried for perfectionist goals and personal commitments.’371        
Thus, regarding the essence of morality, the absurdity of Kantian absolutism 
reappears in utilitarian reasoning.  This absurdity can be explained in theoretical terms, 
because, Nagel claims, if we study the classification of values into the above different 
types, we should realize that the source of value is not unitary ‘displaying apparent 
multiplicity only in its application to the world.’  His argument is in essence almost 
identical to Weber’s concept of ‘plurality of values’ as a consequence of the variety of 
‘life orders’.  Value, in Nagel’s view, has different kinds of sources, which correspond 
to the above classification and can be reduced to two categories: the personal (or “agent-
centred”) and the impersonal (or “outcome-centred”).  Again this classification of value 
pluralism under two central categories of values seems to be a contemporary version of 
Weber’s distinction between the ‘ethic of conviction’ and the ‘ethic of responsibility’.     
The first category, which can also be described as ‘subjective’, entails moral 
reasons that in each case apply primarily to the individual involved, as reasons 
particularly for him (for example to fulfil his obligations or to defend his rights).  This 
does not mean that it is not objectively (or ‘impersonally’) a morally valued thing that 
people’s right should not be violated, but it means that for an individual this is a 
secondary motive, i.e. not so powerful as the reason one has not to violate anyone’s 
rights directly.  (That is why Nagel’s own example is illuminating here: it is reasonable 
for defenders of civil liberties to object to police and judicial practices that violate the 
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rights of criminal suspects, even when the aim of those policies is to prevent greater 
violations by criminals of the rights of their victims).  The second, ‘outcome-centred’ 
category claims (which include the claims of utility and perfectionist ends) have to do 
with what happens, and not, in the first instance, with what one does.  It is the 
contribution of what one does to what happens or what is achieved that matters.
372
  The 
overarching principle of utility becomes, therefore, one simple type of values among 
others, which is classified under the more general category of ‘impersonal’ claims.   
 
This great division between personal and impersonal, or between agent-centered and 
outcome-centered, or subjective and objective reasons, is so basic that it renders implausible 
any reductive unification of ethics –let alone of practical reasoning in general.  The formal 
differences among these types of reasons correspond to deep differences in their sources.  
We appreciate the force of impersonal reasons when we detach from our personal situation 
and our special relations to others [...] But when conflict occurs between them, the problem 
is still more difficult.  Conflicts between personal and impersonal claims are ubiquitous.  
They cannot, in my view, be resolved by subsuming either of the points of view under the 
other, or both under a third.  Nor can we simply abandon any of them.  There is no reason 
why we should.  The capacity to view the world simultaneously from the point of view of 
one’s relations to others, from the point of view of one’s life extended through time, from 
the point of view of everyone at once, and finally from the detached viewpoint often 
described as the view sub specie aeternitatis is one of the marks of humanity.  This complex 
capacity is an obstacle to unification.
373
 
  
There are striking similarities between Nagel and Hare’s arguments which 
nevertheless derive from a fundamentally different understanding regarding the essence 
and the purpose of morality.  Both thinkers demand that we recognize a basic distinction 
between two levels of moral thinking: one concerned with the importance of action for 
the agents themselves; and one concerned with the importance of an action’s 
consequences overall.  In both theories the conclusion is that a practical resolution will 
be necessary whether or not we accept the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.  
However, because Hare argues for the imperfectability of the intuitive level and the 
perfectibility of the critical level, he assigns epistemological priority to the latter which 
literally means that whatever insoluble conflicts arise from the intuitive level should 
necessarily be resolved at the critical level.  Nevertheless, at this point Nagel poses two 
questions: first, why we should presume the perfectibility of the critical –as opposed to 
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the imperfectability of the intuitive level; and second, why we should presume its 
epistemological priority.  The distinction between the moral and the rational, made here 
by Hare, following Aristotle, is not rejected by pluralism.  But pluralism derives from 
the claim (implied again by Aristotle and from the realist arguments of Plato) that 
rationalism is a limited human capacity, something utilitarians seem to overlook.  
Naturally, the outcome is a different understanding of what moral judgement is and thus 
of what morality itself is. 
Hare claims that at the end of critical thinking (i.e. at the perfect intellectual state 
when practical wisdom is achieved) all moral arguments would be given a perfectly 
consistent answer which, by the way, would be the same in every place at every time.  
Nagel, on the other hand, claims that Aristotle described as practical wisdom the faculty 
‘which reveals over time in individual decisions rather than in the enunciation of 
general principles.  It will not always yield a solution: there are true practical dilemmas 
that have no solution, and there are also conflicts so complex that judgment cannot 
operate confidently.’374  This different interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of practical 
wisdom derives from his ambiguity with regard to the relation between moral and 
intellectual virtues.  However, we have already argued that from an overall reading of 
Aristotle’s political philosophy there is a clear implication that intellectual virtue is not 
perfectible in reality and for the same reason practical wisdom is not the end of all 
moral problems.  This is why politics is a necessary feature of human life and is so 
strongly connected to phronesis.   
Against what Hare suggested, there cannot be a comprehensive solution to the 
problem of conflicting moral claims and practical resolutions, by inserting the principle 
of utility as a moral catalyst.  Pluralism is in principle against ‘abstract and 
computational’ moral theories because their monistic character suggests the end of 
moral problems.  Hampshire argues that absolute in ‘absolute moral claims’ and 
‘Overriding’ in utilitarian terms need explanation375 and Nagel is right in saying that 
monistic philosophical views have failed to offer a satisfying theoretical explanation.  
There is no reason why someone should argue that we have witnessed substantial moral 
progress in a general sense.  Indeed, we might have witnessed some progress in the 
contextual understanding of moral attitudes, but the intellectual and moral complexity 
of things (in an Aristotelian and Weberian sense) appears to be always the same.  The 
complexity of social organization is the one that has changed and all moral theory can 
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do is to understand this change and explain the moral confusion derived from it; but it 
cannot change the essence of morality.  Pluralism of moral values implies a clear 
distinction between natural knowledge, which can and should progress, and moral 
knowledge that can only progress in terms of understanding (a progress not to be 
underestimated though).     
 
 
D) Modern moral philosophy: Relativistic and pluralistic explanations of morality 
We have examined the basic features of the modern debate between philosophical 
monism and pluralism and, so far, we have argued in favour of a pluralist understanding 
of morality.  Pluralists argue that the Weberian ‘fragmentation of morality’ is a real 
problem based on the conflict among different and incommensurable values.  These 
values can be generally classified with reference to the dichotomy between ‘agent-
centred’ and ‘outcome-centred’ moral standpoints.  According to Michael Stocker, it is 
necessary to clarify and understand those conflicts and their categorisations, but the 
starting point and the simplest argument in favour of moral pluralism is that ‘value, 
taken quite generally, is plural’.  Thus, ‘Quite generally, if plurality entrains difficulties 
for sound judgement, we are faced with those difficulties.’376  Necessarily then, we have 
been arguing, such an approach to the nature of morality entails an argument against 
monism.  From the pluralist perspective, monism seems ‘incapable of allowing us to 
make sense of our moral life, and more generally our evaluative life’ because ‘many, if 
not most, ordinary choices involve plural values’, rendering moral decisions 
problematic and sometimes simply impossible.
377
  Monism has always been attractive 
precisely because it promises always possible and unproblematic moral judgments, in a 
scientific and provable moral theory.  A pluralistic conception of morality, instead, 
rejects ‘the moral importance of what is impossible’.378  In short, the problem with 
monism is that it promises a morally coherent evaluating system, which can only apply 
to a morally good world; but the reality is that our world is not a good world: hence 
monism is an impossibility.
379
 
Let us now turn briefly to another modern philosophical approach to the nature 
of morality which is the exact opposite of monism.  This is what in contemporary 
political philosophy we call moral relativism and some aspect of it has already been 
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indicated in Thrasymachus’ first amoral or cynical response to Plato’s questions about 
morality.  It is also implied (but not defended) in Aristotle’s contextualist understanding 
of political constitutions and in Weber’s idea of ‘moral disenchantment’ in the modern 
world.  Whether moral relativism as a philosophical approach is viable and what are its 
political implications are questions that cannot be examined in depth in this thesis.  
However, it is important to review its main features and juxtapose them to monistic and 
pluralistic approaches to morality in order to acquire a fuller understanding of the 
concept of conflicting values and the possibility for sound moral and political judgment.  
It is also useful in corroborating the pluralist argument that the monistic perspective is 
not feasible.  This section, therefore, is a kind of parenthesis, in which I also wish to 
distinguish pluralism from a symmetric position of that of monism.  When it is clear 
that pluralism and relativism should not be confused it will be easier to resume the main 
argument in favour of pluralism and against monism.  Thus, according to John Kekes, if 
we accept that there is, even if only apparently, a ‘plurality of modes of reflection’380 in 
relation to moral affairs, due to the fragmentation of values and the division of the 
moral standpoints, the absolutist would solve the apparent philosophical problem by 
giving precedence to one of the modes of reflection whose conflict causes the 
problems.
381
  As analysed previously, this evaluative monism is based on a conception 
of moral reasoning that understands that some values are generally better in all contexts 
and thus we can assign them overriding priority. 
Moral relativism, on the other hand, accepts that diversity of values and their 
conflicting nature are not only apparent but very real and insuperable.  From this, for a 
relativist, we can infer that there is no such thing as the Truth.
382
  Hence, according to 
Steven Lukes, relativists argue that anyone’s moral views and practices are historically 
formed and local.  They believe ‘that we cannot step outside our moral world, which is 
only one among others, and that our judgements of those inhabiting other such worlds 
can therefore have no special claim on them, and can only appear to them as 
ethnocentrism or moral imperialism on our part, or both’.383  Thus, ultimately, for the 
relativist all values seem to be conventional and, Kekes argues, ‘what values people 
accept depends on the context in which they were born, on their genetic inheritance and 
subsequent experiences, on the political, cultural, economic, and religious influences on 
                                                 
380
 John Kekes, Pluralism in Philosophy: Changing the Subject, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London (2000), 49.  
381
 Ibid., 49. 
382
 Simon Blackburn, The Big Questions: Philosophy, Quercus Publishing, London (2009), 104. 
383
 Steven Lukes, Moral Relativism, Profile Books, London (2008), x. 
163 
 
them; in short, what they value depends on their subjective attitudes and not on 
objective features’.384  Therefore, precisely because there is no unique and objective 
system of values we face intractable conflicts of values.  We have seen how Plato was 
afraid that these conflicts entailed cynicism and an attitude according to which 
everything is questionable, since everything is conventional.  In short, on the question 
of whether we possess morality beyond our social context, the relativist’s answer would 
be strongly negative.  The authority of all moral norms, which help people evaluate 
situations and distinguish between what is right and wrong, is relative to time and 
place.
385
  And moral reasoning does not and cannot reach beyond the bounds of 
whatever our morality is relative to.
386
 
Naturally, in this movement from one extreme, monism or absolutism, to 
another, relativism, we need to examine whether pluralism can offer a solution which 
stands in the middle.  In addition, it must be made clear in what sense moral pluralism is 
different from relativism, since the transition from a plural (diverse, fragmented, 
‘disenchanted’) conception of morality to a relativistic one has been a perennial subject 
of debate in our genealogy.  Thus, for Kekes, ‘If pluralists are right in rejecting the 
monistic view that there is one and only one reasonable system of values whose 
realization would lead to the good human life, then they must provide some other 
ground for regarding some limits as reasonable and some other justification for 
imposing these limits on possibilities that individuals may legitimately pursue’.387  
Hence, according to him, there is a logical peculiarity that informs the argument 
between pluralism, relativism and monism.  ‘The stronger the pluralistic case is against 
one of its opponents’, Kekes says, ‘the closer pluralism appears to move toward the 
other […] For monists may endorse everything pluralists adduce against relativism, and 
so they may justifiably wonder whether there is anything distinctive left of pluralism.  If 
there is a context-independent standard by which we can evaluate the reasons offered in 
reaching various moral decisions, then have we not subscribed to just the sort of claim 
that monists wish to defend?’388   
Answering this question from the pluralist perspective is not an easy task, 
especially because the skepticism on the possibility of an objective morality is 
nowadays widespread.  This skepticism, according to Charles Larmore, is demonstrated 
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by Jean-François Lyotard, who argued that ‘Once we have seen through the grand 
modern stories about finding outside history or in the movement of history itself an 
objective we are left […] only with our various language games themselves, each with 
its own rules, but without any impartial standpoint to settle the conflicts between 
them’.389   This is a strong contextualist and embedded in historical conventions 
understanding of morality which leads to the relativist’s attitude.  However, pluralists 
argue, the fact that ‘travel broadens the mind’ does not justify this rapid generalization 
that all moral matters are radically relative.
390
  In short, we should not confuse 
multiculturalism with relativism.  Therefore, the problem for the pluralist is to answer 
how can we reconcile a conception of objective reasons in resolving moral conflicts 
with historicity, or, in other words, how ‘can we guide ourselves by the timeless reasons 
that principles embody if our reason itself is a creature of time?’391   
As we mentioned above, resolving this contradiction requires a clearer 
explication of the differences between pluralism and relativism and of the relation of 
both to monism.  Hence, from a pluralist perspective there is something right and 
something wrong in the relativist’s conception of morality.  What is right, Kekes argues, 
is the criticism of monism or absolutism.  What is wrong is the supposition that if 
absolutism were abandoned, then the philosophical problems that concern us would 
disappear.  Beginning from what is right, the relativist solution to the philosophical 
problem of conflicting values seems to be (against monism but in line with relativism) a 
stance of acceptance; i.e. we should accept that moral conflict is natural.  Thus, 
 
What reflective agents should do is recognize that the conflicting accounts of [moral] 
significance derived from different modes of reflection are equally convincing and that 
neither takes precedence over the other. They should acknowledge that this is so and 
stop trying to resolve the conflict be reducing one mode of reflection to another. The 
intellectual agitation produced by the conflict will then be replaced by the peace of mind 
that comes from understanding that it is in the nature of modes of reflection to conflict in 
this manner.
 392
  
 
 So, the relativist and the pluralist generally agree upon the conflicting nature of 
morality.  However, for a pluralist, acknowledging that there is a variety of modes of 
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moral reflection, which is irreducible, does not entail, as a relativist would argue, that 
there is no philosophical problem of moral conflict in the first place.  According to the 
relativist’s reasoning, the disruptions of everyday life, which derive from the conflict 
between different modes of reflection, do not constitute a philosophical problem 
precisely because they can be resolved by following basic human nature and given 
conventions as guides.
393
  Thus, where relativism goes wrong is the belief that 
philosophical reflection has nothing to add to the fact that there are and there will 
always be conflicting sets of values relative to their context.  This is where the 
fundamental difference between pluralism and relativism lies.  For, according to the 
pluralist reasoning, the guides of everyday life, i.e. customs, conventions etc. are 
sometimes useless.  As moral agents we realize that we must go beyond conventions 
and reflect on the significance of some problems exactly because conventions cannot 
help us overcome the problems as we understand them.  These problems are real, that is 
they truly disrupt our everyday lives and thus they cannot be ignored.  Therefore, real 
problems become philosophical problems when we start to reflect upon them.
394
  They 
become questions that need answers within the specific mode of reflection and about it.   
Therefore, although pluralism and relativism generally agree (against monism) 
that we should adopt a stance of acceptance against the conflicting nature of morality, 
they strongly disagree in relation to what should be our attitude after this acceptance.  
The relativist essentially suggests abstention from resolving the problems deriving from 
moral conflicts, because there should not be any such problems.  This view is an 
expression of the idea that there is no one true body of doctrine in ethics and that what 
is ‘true’ for some people is not true for others, so there is no reason to conceive the 
conflict between different truths as a problem that requires resolution.  This is why 
relativism can be seen as a disturbing challenge to monistic explanations of moral 
authority,
395
 but, also, this is why relativism cannot be confused with pluralism.  For the 
pluralist would argue that the solution is not to stop reflecting about problems altogether 
because we should suppose there are none.  This would be useless for someone who is 
already gripped in such a problem.  In this view, ‘The recommendation of sceptical 
relativists can be followed only by unreflective people, who do not need it; and it is 
useless for those who have lost their peace of mind as a result of their reflections’.396    
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 It seems, then, that pluralists partly agree and partly disagree with both monists 
and relativists.  ‘In agreement with monists and in disagreement with relativists’, Kekes 
argues, ‘pluralists claim that a conception of a good life must be reasonable if it is 
actually to yield a good life […] In agreement with relativists and in disagreement with 
monists, however, pluralists deny that there is a uniquely reasonable conception of a 
good life embodying something like the one true system of values’.397  It seems, then, 
that the problem with relativism lies in an unsuccessful attempt to deny that there is a 
debate on the philosophical implications of the plurality of morality.  The relativist 
move is not a move within the debate, it is a move to close the debate altogether: a 
conception of a good life cannot be reasonable based on objective reasons and it is 
pointless to ponder about it.  However, this is not helpful when struggling with moral 
issues at hand, because the problem is the issue itself, not a philosophical theory about 
the nature of the issue (according to which there is no issue).
398
  There are radical 
conflicts in our morality, but the nature of those conflicts is not such as to force us to 
embrace the relativistic view that all values are ultimately subjective preferences 
derived from our social context and that we cannot find good reasons to lead one life 
over another.
399
 
 Based on these agreements and disagreements between pluralism and relativism 
we need to return to our main objective; that is, understanding the implications of the 
conflicting nature of morality for the moral and political agent.  Lukes makes a 
distinction between the internal and external senses of morality.  The former is related 
to the participant’s perspective; the moral agent’s conscious reflection about moral 
affairs and decisions.  The latter is related to the observer’s standpoint.  The observer is 
not a moral agent per se; instead he adopts a descriptive view of morality, according to 
which moral diversity is a fact.
400
  Based on this distinction we can compare the 
pluralist and the relativist attitudes in relation to moral dilemmas.  For the pluralist, 
when faced with a moral dilemma, the moral agent should weigh competing 
considerations, assess the costs of each moral decision and figure out which are relevant 
and which have priority.  Acknowledging the irreducible conflict between sorts of 
values, the moral agent should decide upon reflection what is the right thing to do.  On 
the other hand, moral relativists will very likely concede that this is indeed the way 
things look from the inside (the internal sense of morality), but will go on to suggest 
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that our judgments are formulated in ways calculated to give moral values an objectivity 
they do not possess.  ‘And they may well add that what looks, from the inside, like 
reasoned deliberation and reflection aiming at the right answer, exhibits from the 
outside, different and conflicting styles of reasoning’.401   
 Essentially, every argument or decision regarding moral affairs, dilemmas and 
conflicts is bound to be stopped by the relativist’s remark ‘That is just your opinion’.402  
Thus, moral relativism seems to reach a similar conclusion to that of moral monism in 
relation to moral agency; that is, they both severely degrade the importance of making 
moral choices and developing moral characters through the resolution of moral 
conflicts.  This is either because there are no conflicts (monism) or, even if there are, 
they should not constitute a field of moral reflection (relativism).  Consequently, the 
relativistic arguments according to which relativism presents itself as the philosophy 
that best respects difference, and that stands opposed to imperial and colonial attitudes 
to others cannot withstand the pluralist criticism.  ‘The conversation-stopping remark 
“That is just your opinion” is not only beside the point, but more importantly 
dehumanizing.  It signals that my words do not deserve to be taken seriously, but only 
taken as symptoms, like signs of a disease’.403  Thus, one example of how relativism 
goes wrong is in its connection with multiculturalism and the respect and toleration for 
‘other’ societies that the latter involves:  
 
What respect for culture, or for other people who accept a culture, can possibly reside in 
the relativist’s conception of culture as principally a shield against criticism. To view 
those who accept another culture as so fundamentally “other” that they cannot engage in 
reasonable moral inquiry is to see them as less than fully human.  In short, the notion 
that subjecting unfamiliar practices to external criticism fails to respect unfamiliar 
cultures simply will not stand up to careful scrutiny.
404
 
 
 In the pluralist argument contextualism does not necessarily entail that the only 
source of moral norms is social (cultural, economic, political etc.).  Following the 
implications of Aristotle’s philosophy, ‘the contextualist outlook coheres well enough 
with the general thought that, despite the manifest differences in the ways in which 
different peoples (and different people) are introduced to morality ad participate in it, 
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there is a common core of morality, which finds expression in a whole variety of 
different acts in a variety of different contexts’.405  This variety does of course set the 
limits of moral intelligibility.  Thus, when we face intractable conflicts and ponder on 
sorts of ultimate moral commitments which are at odds with the way the world is, ‘we 
cannot entertain revising their authority or suspending judgment’406.  The variety and 
sometimes incommensurability of values is not and should not be an obstacle to 
practical and moral reasoning.  The plurality of values does not necessarily have the 
destructive implications for the operation of reason
407
 according to the relativist 
argument.  Facing moral dilemmas, then, is the central feature of moral agency in the 
pluralist perspective, whereas it is a non-issue for both the relativists and monists.  
Pluralists 
 
[…] should recognize that many philosophical problems have the same general form: a 
conflict between the incompatible accounts of the significance of facts that follow from 
different modes of reflection.  But they should not assume that their solutions must also 
have a general form.  That assumption is held not only by absolutists but also by 
relativists.  They all believe that the solution depends on finding the general reason 
establishing the superiority of one mode of reflection. Relativists give up on rationality 
and truth because they think that the general reason cannot be found; absolutists think 
that rationality and truth guarantee that a general reason can be found, even if they have 
not found it.
408
  
 
In conclusion, moral relativism may be the opposite extreme to monism, but the 
final attitude toward moral agency is the same: it is derogatory.  Either one accepts that 
moral agency means blindly following a single type of value without reflection 
(essentially annulling the significance of moral agency) or one accepts that reflection is 
pointless anyway and it leads nowhere because of its radically contextualist dimension 
(again, with the same degrading effect on the importance of moral agency).  Hence, it 
seems that pluralism is indeed the best alternative to both, and the middle way between 
monism and relativism.  On the one hand, accepting the diverse and conflicting nature 
of morality should inform us that moral and political agency cannot simply be a form of 
applied moral philosophy.  This is because the coherency of moral theory (although still 
useful in setting moral goals and ideals) does not represent the coherency of our moral 
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universe.  On the other hand, pluralism also avoids the worst consequences of 
relativism.  The plurality of values does not entail that there is no space for moral 
reflection in political matters.  From the relativistic perspective politics should not be 
occupied with irrelevant moral arguments (the classical Thrasymachean response to 
Plato).  Ignoring or avoiding topics and concerns of morality is the cynical amoral 
political attitude.  Attempting to resolve those moral problems that ‘disrupt’ our 
everyday lives is the political attitude that informs and forms moral characters.  ‘If a 
problem is resolved’, Kekes argues, ‘it is defused, but it does not disappear […] The 
balance will hold for a while, but the context will change, the conflict will recur, and it 
will have to be settled again.  If a problem is dissolved, it ceases to exist; if it is 
resolved, it ceases to press.  The first solution [monistic and relativistic] is general and 
reached once and for all; the second [the pluralistic] is temporary’.409   
 
 
 
E) Moral conflict: the ‘agent-‘ and ‘outcome-centred’ standpoints and the ‘moral 
remainder’ 
In continuation of the previous argument, the importance of the concept of moral 
dilemmas for political philosophy becomes obvious when we attempt to understand 
what the fragmentation of value means in terms of practical solutions.  This should have 
been sufficiently evidenced in the short history of the relationship between politics and 
ethics and especially in Weber’s political thought.  His concerns were revolving around 
the symbolic deficit of politics due to the fragmentation of value.  In general terms, the 
question is whether moral pluralism should entail a disordered or confounded practical 
conduct.  Thus, after the short parenthesis where we argued that pluralism does not 
entail abstention from resolving, practically, moral conflicts (like relativists would 
suggest), we return to the main argument on how pluralism proposes to tackle those 
conflicts, especially in juxtaposition to monism.  As it is already indicated, the 
difference between pluralistic and monistic theories derives from a different 
understanding of the relationship between moral theory and moral judgment.  Judgment 
in a monistic conception is de facto less important –in moral, not practical terms– 
because it depends on the correct application of an already given comprehensive system 
of rules.  For the normative ethics of deontology and utilitarianism exercising judgment 
is a matter of applying the ‘algorithm of life’ into our decision procedure.  Such a 
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conception of action-guidance seriously underestimates the importance of moral agency 
and is, of course, against any conceptions of the ‘moral remainder’.410    
On the contrary, moral judgment in a pluralistic conception is by definition an 
assessment of action, that is, the practical decision is the mere outcome of a much 
deeper intellectual and intuitive process in which conflicting values and dilemmatic 
situations must be reconciled or overcome.  Hence, for pluralistic theories, moral 
judgment cannot be understood simply as the outcome of a practical calculative decision 
–regardless of the theoretical complexity of the system of values behind this decision.  
Thus, if Nagel is right to argue that systematic theory succeeds only if we accept a 
fragmentary approach, the role of judgment in resolving conflicts and applying disparate 
claims and considerations to real life is indispensable.  If we recognize that the 
legitimate grounds of decision are extremely various and understood to different 
degrees, then it lies with the moral character to make the best possible decision, 
knowing that the dilemma is what it is.
411
  Because our predicament is here so described 
that, whatever the moral agent does, if he does nothing at all, he does something which 
he ought not to do, and so can be called upon to justify either his activity or his 
inactivity.
412
  In other words, it is the very essence of being a moral agent that one must 
necessarily make a decision which is morally both right and wrong.  Hampshire thus 
summarizes the argument of moral pluralism: 
 
We not only find these conflicts in our unreflective intuitions and in common place 
morality; we may also find, after reflection on the source and nature of our moral intuitions, 
that these conflicts are unavoidable and not to be softened or glozed over.  It seems an 
unavoidable feature of our moral experience that men should be torn between the moral 
claims entailed by effectiveness in action, and particularly in politics, and the moral claims 
derived from the ideals of scrupulous honesty and integrity [...] because morality appears in 
our experience as a conflict of claims and a division of purpose.
413
     
  
Williams’ ‘moral remainder’, which signifies the agent’s realization and regret 
that a moral violation must take place, constitutes an important part of such an 
understanding of moral conflicts.  Similarly important in this respect is the concept of 
moral emotions, which refers to agent-regret or tragic remorse for an unavoidable moral 
violation.  We have analyzed why deontologists and consequentialists reject the idea 
                                                 
410
 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 48, 53-54. 
411
 Nagel, ‘The Fragmentation of Value’, 182. 
412
 Lemmon, ‘Moral Dilemmas’, 108.  
413
 Hampshire, ‘Public and Private Morality’, 43-44. 
171 
 
that moral emotions are irrelevant to moral theory and consequently why they reject the 
concept of moral dilemmas.    Pluralists, on the other hand, find any such reductive 
program unrealistic: ‘such program cannot do justice to what they take to be manifest 
diversity of human values and hence inevitably loses or distorts something essential’.414  
Pluralism, therefore, has nothing to lose if supplemented with an account of moral 
emotions as a way to explicating and clarifying the tensions and paradoxes that derive 
from moral conflicts.  ‘The sense of unease that arises when we feel guilt’, De Wijze 
says, ‘is not simply a vestige of a primitive moral sensibility or social manipulation but 
can also serve to focus on crucial evaluative information which is at the basis of the 
standard moral theories’.415  
The conception of moral dilemmas based on value pluralism and the ‘moral 
remainder’ acquires a special character when one attempts to translate its importance 
into the world of politics.  The reason behind this is that utilitarianism is especially 
related to politics because in politics there is no place for the impossibility of action.  
This poses a paradox for utilitarian theory and a difficulty for pluralist theories.  
Political realism is strongly affiliated to utilitarianism through the concept of political 
responsibility, because responsibility by definition presumes that there is a concern for 
consequences, even if one’s decision is based upon the calculation of those 
consequences.  However, for pluralistic conceptions of political morality, if there is 
concern then there also is moral conflict.  In other words, political responsibility is a 
concept related to the ‘moral remainder’ and it means that if there were no philosophical 
or moral doubts for one’s action, then responsibility would be a redundant concept.  
Thus, the paradox becomes apparent, when one desires to apply utilitarianism into 
politics as an overall –monistic– philosophical solution.  In such a case the concept of 
responsibility would lose its essence, since the responsible moral agent would not be 
needed anymore.  Responsibility would be exhausted in the correct application of the 
moral rules and irrespective of the collateral consequences of such application.  As 
Pitkin says, ‘As soon as I know what I will do, no decision remains to be made.’416  In 
other words, political realism may not be the appropriate description for political 
decisions which are based on a pure utilitarian reasoning.  In order for an agent to feel 
responsible he would first have to feel the emotional burden that follows a morally 
conflicting situation.  
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As Hampshire and other critics of utilitarianism argue, there is a danger that when 
this paradox is being neglected we face the ruthless character of politics: ‘The utilitarian 
habit of mind has brought with it a new abstract cruelty in politics, a dull, destructive 
political righteousness: mechanical, quantitative thinking, leaden academic minds 
setting out their moral calculations in leaden abstract prose, and more civilised and more 
superstitious people destroyed because of enlightened calculations that have proved 
wrong’.417  The abandonment of the moral agent in monistic utilitarian approaches 
reveals a major gap of utilitarian thinking apropos of the relation between politics and 
morality, because there is no consideration about the peculiar way politics works.  
Resolving moral conflicts by calculation, even within already firmly established 
utilitarian rules, presupposes not only the perfectibility of those rules but also the 
perfectibility of the agents (in terms of calculating consequences) who act under them.  
These presuppositions are based on an idealistic ontological conception of human nature 
and they logically result into absolutist practical approaches; far from being realist 
merely because they calculate utility.        
The utilitarian argument underestimates the power of politics as a thick formative 
ethical concept because it underestimates the concept of moral agency in the way Weber 
described it.  Moral assessment of action is important for the agent who thinks and acts.  
And this dynamic process is only possible in a world where moral values are 
innumerable and always changing.  If moral conflicts cannot be systematically 
avoidable and soluble, as pluralists and the argument from the ‘moral remainder’ argue, 
then the moral character appears always to be undergoing a process of formation; both 
of himself and of others through the decisions he makes.  Moral dilemmas cultivate 
moral characters and the resolutions made by them cultivate morality in general: ‘It 
does not seem to have been much observed by ethical philosophers that, speaking 
psychologically, the adoption of a new morality by an agent is frequently associated 
with the confrontation of a moral dilemma.  Indeed, it is hard to see what else would be 
likely to bring about a change of moral outlook other than the having to make a difficult 
moral decision.’418  This is an Aristotelian argument in its essence. 
However, the so called special character of politics raises not only a paradox for 
monistic theories such as utilitarianism, but also a difficulty for pluralist theories.  The 
moral outlook of the agent seems to be, overall, the outcome of the balance between the 
‘agent-centered’ and the ‘outcome-centered’ standpoints, or between the intuitive and 
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the critical levels of moral thinking.  In different spheres of social and private life this 
balance will necessarily be different.  Thus the weighing of consequences is not always 
rejected by pluralism.  Instead it is recognized as an important type of moral thinking, 
which is especially related to politics.  The problem then is how to set the limits on 
utilitarian reasoning within politics; how it can be checked and controlled by the other 
equally measured types of moral values.  In other words, pluralistic approaches may 
recognize the problem of conflicting moral values or ethical principles, but there still is 
a difficulty in offering normative guidance as to what the agents involved should 
actually do in such political scenarios.      
This question takes us back to the fundamental concern that not only Weber but 
also Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli had: how do we set the limits on political conduct 
that commences from equivocal moral grounds?  This is where the importance of the 
moral agent becomes clear, since, as analyzed before, it is judgment that will fill in the 
gaps of imperfect systematic theory.  Deontologists and utilitarians see no moral 
dilemma and thus the overriding of moral principles becomes a matter of calculation 
which might end up into a cruel way of moral thinking as Hampshire argued.  The 
moral character instead, sees the dilemma, recognizes the need to override it and is 
burdened by the ‘moral remainder’ and the responsibility of doing so.  Utilitarianism 
underestimates moral agency because it rejects the morally formative capacity of feeling 
like that.  However, it is this same capacity which will make certain that a political 
decision is not alienated from the rest of the ‘value orders’ within a society; it is this 
capacity, pluralists say, that will set the limits to the autonomy of political reasoning 
and the dangers of utilitarian reductionism. 
 
Attempts by consequentialists to explain away moral conflict as merely incoherence or 
remnant of primitive moral sensibilities, are not persuasive.  Similarly, the careful 
manoeuvres by deontologists who either evoke ‘the doctrine of double effect’ or insist that 
given a proper understanding  of the hierarchy of values moral conflicts dissolve, are also 
unconvincing.  Both positions fail to engage with the powerful intuition that even when we 
do what is right in consequentialist or deontological terms, the clash of disparate 
responsibilities or duties faced by agents results in a moral remainder […] The existence of 
real moral conflict, the incommensurability of cherished values, the conflicting personal and 
role-based moral claims, necessitates that in some situations, moral persons who seek to do 
the right thing will have their ethical purity violated.
419
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Monistic philosophies might implicitly recognize the basic distinction between 
‘agent-centered’ and ‘outcome-centered’ standpoints, but they assign absolute moral 
priority to one of them by means of accepting as definitive or primary only one of the 
types of moral value included within them.  This type of moral value might be 
categorized under the names of utility, perfectionist ends, absolute rights etc.  Pluralism 
rejects this assignment of primacy to any type of moral values although it recognizes 
that in different circumstances some type of value might appear more dominant, such as 
utility in the world of politics.  The perennial philosophical and political problem 
derives from the necessity to limit this domination due to its practical results, i.e. abuse 
or misuse of power.  The only viable non-monistic solution to this problem is to depend 
on moral judgment.  But in order to do this one needs a concept that can explain the 
paradoxes of political and moral life without denying their existence.   Unavoidable 
wrongdoing is part of our pluralist reality.  However, in politics we need some further 
explication of what this unavoidable wrongdoing is and what it means for the agents 
involved.  This is where the concept of ‘dirty hands’ offers some useful insights, despite 
the fact that ‘[t]here are different understandings of what constitutes dirty hands where 
some see it as essentially the ‘means-ends’ problem in politics and others as the clash 
between public and private moral values.
420
   
The ‘dirty hands’ problem, as an explication of unavoidable wrongdoing should 
include all cases of insoluble moral conflicts and conflicts which leave a moral 
remainder.   This means that it will also involve dilemmatic cases which are worse than 
insoluble conflicts in theory; i.e. cases wherein the agent will find it possible to resolve 
a moral conflict, but only by un-virtuous action or by death.  This kind of resolution 
implies the tragic tone of the dilemma because the agent is under such a kind of attack 
that he or she will not emerge unblemished or will not emerge at all.  Thus the central 
question is, if there are tragic dilemmas, can there be such a thing as virtuous agents?
421
  
In order to identify such cases the only analytical tool at our disposal is William’s moral 
remainder.  De Wijze argues that the moral sentiment in ‘dirty hands’ situations is 
peculiar in recognizing that the agent is moved by moral considerations to further the 
immoral projects of others, destroying thus his or her own moral innocence.  In such a 
case, the moral sentiment is ‘tragic-remorse’422 which signifies the recognition of the 
moral violation and its morally formative consequences.    
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Therefore, the ‘dirty hands’ concept, along with the moral remainder specified as 
‘tragic-remorse’, provide us with the necessary normative tools to clarifying the 
perennial problem of moral conflicts and in particular dilemmas of political morality.  
These concepts accept the complexity of the moral universe and consider the –morally 
formative– feelings of the agent as a significant part of the solution to this complexity.  
This is why ‘dirty hands’ is a problem which can be harmoniously symbiotic with a 
theory of value pluralism as long as the paradox of moral conflicts instead of being 
avoided is used to enrich our understanding of morality.  However, before we delve into 
a detailed analysis of the ‘dirty hands’ concept, it is necessary to narrow down the 
political problem in relation to morality.  The philosophical history of this relationship 
has shown that there is a peculiar clash of values which undermines the harmony 
between politics and morality.  This clash is the one between private and public moral 
values. 
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6. The Central Conflict Between Politics and Morality:                                           
The Private and ‘Ordinary’ vs. the Public and Political 
 
 
 
A) Notions of the public, the private and the political: overcoming the conceptual 
confusion 
We have seen how the plurality of moral principles, in combination with the complexity 
of human affairs, renders impossible the systematization of morality (by means of 
assigning absolute priority to a specific type of moral values over others).  Monistic 
explanations of morality would suggest that this systematization is theoretically possible 
if we are ready to accept critically that one type of values is agreed to be overarching 
when facing moral conflicts.  In modern times these explanations are typically based on 
either deontic or utilitarian approaches to morality.  Theorists of value pluralism, on the 
other hand, would respond that neither theoretically nor practically is it possible to 
achieve such a thing, because it would lead to an arbitrary understanding of morality 
and thus to a reductionist kind of both moral and political conduct.  The pluralistic 
argument, however, creates some further problems.  It leads to inevitable moral 
impasses because different types of equally valued moral principles will conflict in 
different spheres of life.  This difficulty is the necessary outcome of a particular 
situation in which the moral agent has to choose which of the equivalent –in every 
respect– moral principles should be applied and which should be unjustifiably 
overridden or outweighed, considering the moral and practical cost of the choice.  
According to Nagel’s terminology, the basic –irreducible– dichotomy of moral values 
between the ‘agent-centred’ and the ‘outcome-centred’ moral standpoints will always 
require a kind of moral compromise by the agent who faces a moral dilemma. 
These two distinguished, but also interrelated, standpoints constitute the ground 
of the arguments according to which the tension between politics and morality is 
complex, conflicting, and thus of great interest.
423
  As we have illustrated in the short 
history of politics and ethics, there is a central theme (though not the only one) which 
has perennially determined their relationship.  This central theme is a conflict; a conflict 
between private-personal, public, and political moral imperatives, with private 
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imperatives being mainly concerned with the ‘agent-centred’ standpoint and public and 
political imperatives being permeated by ‘outcome-centred’ biased principles.  It is 
necessary therefore to clarify the difference between the concepts of the public, the 
political and the private.  A preliminary analysis would define public morality as not 
identical with political morality despite the fact that they are, obviously, strongly 
related.  On the other hand, public and political moral principles are both fundamentally 
distinguished from private moral principles because public and political positions 
cannot be isolated positions.  Instead they are constituted in the first place in order to 
promote the social interest –however this may be defined– and to set the rules for 
general social conduct.  Private morality is in turn identified with an agent’s own ethical 
preconceptions, which, even if strongly affected by their social context, are understood 
as an agent’s own reflection of his personality, separate from the ‘life orders’ within and 
by which is otherwise defined.     
The conventional view of public morality poses itself in juxtaposition to 
personal morality with regard to their difference in origin, function and content.  
Schematically, they differ in origin because personal morality refers to relations, or non-
relations, between individuals, whereas public morality refers to institutional 
circumstances.  They differ in function because the end of personal morality is morally 
the moral ‘progression’ of individuals, whereas public morality is preoccupied with the 
ethical achievements of individuals only in their institutional roles and with the moral 
characteristics of politics in a particular community.  Finally, they differ in content due 
to the complex circumstances that moral agents find themselves in when they are 
politically active.
424
  Therefore, it seems easier to define the limits that separate a 
private sphere of ethical conduct from the public and political ‘orders of life’.  It is time 
to recall Bosanquet’s argument that those two fundamental spheres of moral values 
derive from the basic distinction between ‘acts that are essentially private and acts 
essentially public.’ 
 
To steal or murder, to lie, or to commit personal immorality, for instance, as we said 
cannot be a public act.  Such acts cannot embody a general interest willed by the public 
will.
425
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Bosanquet’s argument is revealing of the moral significance that authors have 
perennially attributed to the distinction between private and public actions.  However, 
the distinction between the public and the political is not so clear; instead the concepts 
are often confused and as a result the moral grounds of public and political action are 
obscured.  From a modern perspective the public sphere could be assumed to 
incorporate the political since the meaning of the term refers to all the positions in 
relation to promoting the general interests of society, whereas the political refers only to 
a specific set of organizing, or executive, positions within the public.  Therefore, it is 
not unusual when discussing about the tension between public and private morality to 
imply or take as given the inclusion of the political in the relationship.  Thus instead of 
three different sets of values we only have two and this creates some conceptual 
difficulties.  The reason why the concept of the public tends to have a wider logical 
bearing than the political may lie in the fact that in the modern perspective politics has 
become a narrower field of conduct dominated by the ascendancy of technocratic 
policies in every sphere of public life.  In Weber’s terminology, we could say that 
bureaucracy, based on the ever-increasing importance of economics, has absorbed and 
completely dominated politics.  Thus, nowadays, in a continually diminishing political 
attitude, the public sphere of conduct is conceived to incorporate a range of important 
connections with notions of social, communal and international policies, whereas 
politics is the vocation of the technocrats who organize these policies.   
Nevertheless, we should not be ready to accept the disappearance of politics in a 
classical sense both for theoretical and practical or ethical reasons.  Following Weber’s 
theory of politics, both the public and political spheres are guided by ‘outcome-centred’ 
principles which have, however, a different focal point and intensity.  As already 
mentioned public officials are mainly concerned with applying rules of impartiality, 
whereas politicians usually have to calculate the consequences of a policy in terms of 
overall utility.  However, the principle of utility strongly discloses the conflict of ‘agent-
centred’ against ‘outcome-centred’ types of values, because its application presupposes 
overriding all other moral concerns.  Thus, politicians must confront and transcend the 
conflicting values of a variety of ‘life orders’.  In terms of collective life the wise 
application of utilitarian or, according to Hare, critical thinking is crucial for the 
promotion of social integration.  This is where Weber’s argument in favour of 
nationalistic politics was grounded upon: the political virtue to create a substantive 
symbolic reference for the collectivity.  Calculating consequences is an essential –not 
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overriding– feature of such a conception of virtue, but not in a reduced to efficiency 
economic sense.   
On the other hand, the meaning of impartiality in the public sphere –although 
this is ultimately and on the whole concerned with social consequences– is that of an 
objective realization of the political executive decisions –and in ethical terms more 
formative and thus higher decisions.  Objectivity and impartiality in public life are 
necessary, both in order to cultivate a sense of respect for conflicting sets of values 
(supplementing thus politics in their quest for social integration) and to grow a culture 
of scientific efficiency when managing the affairs of the state.  From this point of view, 
the political, and not the public, is of primary concern in relation to the problem of 
moral conflicts.  Politics re-organizes values and dictates their newly conceived 
application.  Also, the inescapable utilitarian reasoning behind this re-organization of 
values generates moral and practical dilemmas.  These will also have to be resolved by 
politics itself.  Following the Weberian line of reasoning, the politicians’ purpose is to 
re-define the problematic relationship between private, public and political morality 
(and between the different ‘life orders’ in general), whereas the public officials’ role is 
usually limited to executing political decisions.   
Therefore, the assumption that the political is only an element within the wider 
public sphere may be explained by the modern narrow and procedural understanding of 
politics.  The reason for this can be found in the ascendancy of the state upon which 
public and political life are concentrated.  However, politics never ceases being the 
defining point of social moral conduct, including general public practices.  This is why 
a conception of politics reduced to amoral calculation of power relations creates more 
problems than its apparently realistic approach was meant to resolve.  Plato and 
Aristotle struggled with the idea that politics should not be connected with a deeply 
philosophical and ontological conception of social life.  In antiquity there was no 
separation between the political and the public.  The debate always had to be between 
one’s political conduct and one’s ethical purposes.  The end was to reconcile collective 
aims with private pursuits under a unitary conception of the goof life.  Similarly, 
Machiavelli and Weber, despite their acknowledgement of the fragmentation of values 
and of the variety of spheres of conduct, conceived politics as a fundamentally ethical 
‘order of action’, which in some sense overrides or should override all orders.  This 
moral primacy of politics is due to its peculiar characteristics and effects on other 
peoples’ lives.  And we have analyzed that this conception of politics was not in 
Machiavelli and Weber’s case based upon a teleological explanation of human life, but 
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upon the ‘ancient’ concern that politics without ethical substance, even in an ethically 
fragmented world, can be the most dangerous human invention.  
Notwithstanding the question of ethical superiority between the concept of the 
political and the concept of the public, these can and often are in conflict with each 
other.  According to Arthur Applbaum unless there is a widespread agreement between 
elected politicians and public officials (as civil servants) about the correct specification 
or execution of public morality, this kind of conflict will not be rare.
426
  In particular, as 
mentioned above, public morality mainly refers to official positions, the character of 
which is based in promoting impartial policies, whereas political positions should 
usually be biased toward morally consequential demands (i.e. with regard to political 
effectiveness or the ability to preserve the power which comes from the political 
position), which might undermine impartial rules that are more ‘agent-centred’ biased.  
In general though, ‘the role of the public official is intimately connected to a political 
morality outside the role, from where it draws its substantive justification, its legitimate 
authority to command, and its force of obligation’.427   
 
 
B) The fundamental moral conflict: private vs. public and political morality 
The clarification of the distinction between the public and the political is necessary 
because the argument made in this thesis essentially suggests that the tension between 
politics and ethics derives from the perennial conflict between the private and the 
political.  Hence, the concepts of public and political morality may be both 
distinguished from private morality, because the central reasons for this distinction are 
mainly of the same character; that is, the types of values that are dominant in the private 
sphere may conflict with the types of values that guide the other two spheres.  What it 
would be still useful to analyze further is the manner in which this tension is created and 
why the necessity to use utility as an overriding principle aggravates the conflict of 
values in politics.  This reveals the peculiar position of the moral character that has to 
make politically compromising decisions, which entail great moral costs and thus urge 
for a re-evaluation of the meaning of moral integrity.  
 The basic idea is summarized in the Socratic maxim, according to which politics 
makes adherence to private moral principles extremely difficult, if not impossible.  
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Plato maintains that politics requires deceit even in a morally ideal society; Aristotle 
argues that rulers will usually promote their own interests instead of the interests of the 
community; Machiavelli suggests that politics or politicians may seem to be morally 
worse, or that they act morally ambiguously in comparison to the rest of us.  Weber 
corroborates the view that the political vocation is a normative matrix for personal 
tragic situations.  All of them agree that politicians are considered to be morally worse 
when they act in order to secure their own interests instead of the community’s interests 
and, at best, morally ambiguous when they try to advance desirable social and political 
ends by morally disputable acts.
428
   
The first case seems to be theoretically easier and it corresponds to cases of 
corruption, in which politicians and public officials do not fulfil the role’s 
predetermined moral rules, while instead they try to gain personal benefits.  In modern 
democratic regimes where the people and the politicians share responsibility for the 
moral rules of social conduct there is a shift toward the problem of corruption, which is 
easier to identify, and is more often disclosed in general public practices than in 
political decisions.  This is only natural because the violation of rules of impartiality for 
one’s own interest is a clear case of corruption against the standards set by society (by 
both public officials and politicians).  On the contrary, reconciling morally conflicting 
values by compromise, in order to promote the general interest of a society which 
sometimes consents and shares responsibility for this compromise, constitutes a 
different level of political and moral discourse altogether.  In her own discussion of 
politics and morality Susan Mendus commences her analysis from the study of different 
approaches to morality (such as consequentialism versus deontology) and then by 
understanding concepts such as integrity, moral virtues, value pluralism and the moral 
demands of social roles within those philosophical traditions.
429
  Her intention is to 
understand the case of moral conflicts within the context we analyzed in the previous 
chapter.         
The case of moral conflicts powerfully brings to the forth the tension between 
private and political morality.  How do we reconcile what is politically necessary with 
what is morally forbidden outside politics and who should be responsible for this 
reconciliation?  Machiavelli and Weber have set the context of the problem and have 
given the limited options for its solution: we can either separate politics from morality 
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altogether and conceive politics as an autonomous ethical sphere with its own rules of 
conduct; or, oppositely, we can consider morality as overriding all political matters and 
offer a monistic explanation of social action.  Finally we can search for their common 
place and use them as supplementing each other.  The answer, as the short history of 
politics and ethics has illustrated, depends on specific understandings of ethics which in 
turn lead to specific political attitudes.  In other words, behind every political decision 
there is an ontological and epistemological conception of ethics; an existential exegesis 
regarding the purposes of humanity. 
 What we know for certain is that the moral and political agent, whether starting 
from a monistic explanation of moral ends or from a pluralistic perspective, will have to 
reflect seriously on this interrelation between politics and ethics.  Sophocles conceived 
the problem eloquently when he said that ‘nothing tests moral character better than “the 
practice of authority and rule’.430  According to Reinhold Niebuhr’s vivid description, 
the most important problems of political philosophy reveal a constant and irreconcilable 
conflict between the needs of society and the imperatives of a sensitive conscience.  
‘This conflict or tension, between politics and morality is made inevitable by the double 
focus of the moral life: one focus is on the inner life of the individual, and the other on 
the necessities of man’s social life.  These two moral perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive and the contradiction between them is not absolute.  But neither are they 
easily harmonised.’431 
We have argued that the distinction between political and private morality 
constitutes a parallel to the conflict between the ‘agent-centred’ and the ‘outcome-
centred’ perspectives.  The way someone understands the interrelation and inter-
determination of those perspectives sets the philosophical basis for a specific 
understanding of the relationship between politics and ethics in general.  In William’s 
words, the problem of politics and morality starts from the more specific question of 
‘What sorts of persons do we want and need to be politicians?’ which is then followed 
by the broader question of ‘what we morally want from politics?.’432  This could in turn 
be followed by the even more general problem of how we should conceive ethics in the 
first place.  These three questions illustrate the predicament of the moral character that 
will face certain practical and theoretical difficulties and will have to reconcile 
conflicting moral values when engaged in politics.   
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Socrates’ case may again be helpful in this respect.  His understanding of 
morality contains a strong intellectual element despite the fact that he was very much 
aware of the dilemmas generated by political morality.
433
  Socrates spent his entire life 
theorizing upon the tension between private and political virtue and in many cases he 
chose to give priority to the values of contemplative life over the values of political life.  
His choice has all the more importance exactly because he well understood the meaning 
of political imperatives.  It was impossible not to do so in an age and a place where the 
individual was always considered to be inferior to the polis.  This raises the important 
questions about where private morality and political morality meet each other; how we 
set the priority –if there is any– between them; and, following the argument from the 
moral remainder, what is the importance and integrity of the agent in doing so.  
 
 
C) From private ‘ordinary’ morality to political conduct: the discontinuities 
which constitute the philosophical problem 
The main argument for the priority of political morality over private morality is based 
upon the consequentialist notion that in political life actions are not just of significance 
for the agent who performs them,
434
 and thus they cannot rely on a prior private moral 
set of guidelines.  This means that politics has to be separated from other more general 
and ordinary moral considerations.  Thus private morality is identified with the rest of 
the ‘life orders’ and acquires the meaning of the ‘ordinary’ against the ‘extraordinary’ 
of political ethics.  On the other hand, there is the view which presupposes a conception 
of private morality as something overarching with intrinsic, universal and absolute 
value.  From this standpoint moral actions are not performed for the sake of advantage 
but for their inherent value, independently of large scale consequences.  In this sense 
nothing can override basic or ‘ordinary’ moral principles because morality is itself 
overriding,
435
 and it establishes the set of values that should externally predetermine 
political action.  In both cases, as we have previously explained, assigning overriding 
priority to a set of values might be supported by a monistic philosophical attitude, either 
guided by utilitarianism in case of politics or by deontic theories in case of absolute 
principles.     
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 There is a tendency to identify the tradition of political realism with the moral 
attitude which is based upon the calculation of consequences (which in the end, 
regarding politics, will include some kind of utilitarianism) and to oppose this tradition 
against those who conceive general moral principles as inviolable independently of the 
circumstances.  In politics this tradition might be referred to as political idealism.  
Johnson summarizes the main arguments of the latter tradition which conceives the 
moral as prior to the political:  
 
Those who claim that moral considerations have a bearing on politics have often seen 
morality as a way of establishing the boundaries of politics [...] Thus, acts which are 
regarded as permissible and desirable in politics are regarded as impermissible and 
undesirable by morality [...] It is from morality that we derive the sustenance to condemn 
acts such as deceit, corruption, cruelty, torture, and exploitation [...] In morality the 
emphasis is on human autonomy, equality of respect and consideration and, as applied to 
politics, the primary virtues of justice and fairness.
436
           
 
Political realists, on the other hand, warn us against bringing irrelevant moral principles 
to bear upon political questions.  They insist that political morality is not the same as 
private morality and may often contradict it.  Two basic features of this argument refer 
firstly to the distinction between normal political situations, in which political agents 
can act in ways that converge toward private morality, and extreme situations that 
require other forms of conduct (the classical Machiavellian argument); and secondly to 
the contention that the basic point and structure of politics creates a qualitatively 
different set of challenges to which private morality offers an inadequate guide.
437
   
Political realism argues that there is an autonomous political sphere of ethics 
simply because ordinary moral dispositions would not work (in terms of efficiency or 
consequences) within politics.  It is necessary, then, to make clear whether the 
autonomy of political morality is based upon the notion that the utility principle is 
overriding in general, or that it only has to be given priority in political matters, but not 
outside politics.  In the first case, political realism might be an expression of 
philosophical monism which, as we have seen, reduces politics to technical calculations.  
In the second case, we might have a mild form of political realism which does not 
assign absolute priority to political demands of utility, but it does recognize an 
irreducible plurality of values and the need for compromise between the demands of 
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politics and those of private or ‘ordinary’ morality.  Political idealism, on the contrary, 
starting from deontic absolute principles cannot leave any margin for consequentialist 
justifications in political conduct because any kind of utilitarian reasoning would annul 
the essence of the overriding morality itself. 
We have seen this debate previously, within the wider context of moral 
dilemmas and argued that absolute deontic theories and all-inclusive utilitarianism may 
prioritize moral principles in a fundamentally different way, but for both traditions there 
can be no moral conflicts.  From both perspectives, the relationship between politics and 
morality appears over-simplistic. 
 
What can I say to critics, such as Anscombe, Hare, Kant, amongst others, who argue that 
there is no need for the distinction between a political and a personal ethic?  
Utilitarianism, for example, which is a sophisticated and subtle moral doctrine, could 
provide the appropriate limits to moral behaviour without making a distinction between 
a personal and political morality […] A Kantian (or for that matter any other 
deontological personal moral theory) fares no better.  Here too the generic demands of a 
personal morality conflict with the ethical requirements of political office.
438
 
  
Moral absolutism (or moralism)
439
 condemns some political actions as 
essentially opposed to its predetermined imperatives and for this reason might ask for 
two things: first, the replacement of morally unworthy politicians by individuals who 
have proved to be morally impeccable.  Second, if the first process is impossible, and 
since we have recognized that politicians will necessarily face moral reasons that are 
external to their role (the absolute imperatives of private morality), they should 
withdraw from political life and keep their moral integrities unblemished.  On the other 
hand, utilitarianism faces all moral conflicts with the same attitude: if everything else 
fails utility is the moral principle that will resolve all moral conflicts; the same goes for 
politics.  Ordinary moral intuitions, in this case, are an obstacle, or at best irrelevant if 
they do not support the ‘outcome-centred’ solution in all moral conflicts.  In conclusion, 
in both respects morality determines the understanding and the conduct of politics.  The 
difference is that utilitarian theories cultivate pretences of political realism, while, as 
analyzed in the previous chapter, realism based on a form of utilitarianism is a moral 
paradox.  
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This is why the relationship between politics and morality has been considered 
such a moral conundrum; because monistic explanations over-simplify a problem that is 
by its very nature highly complex.  On the one hand, there is an explanation that 
conceives politics as an undermining element against the purity of morality.  On the 
other, there is an explanation that conceives the purity of morality as an undermining 
element against sheer effectiveness in politics.  Both explanations fail to understand 
how moral values interact in order to integrate politics with morality, but also in order 
to create tension between them.  Moral discourse and political success should be 
measured and judged as interrelated elements, not as mutually exclusive or irrelevant.  
This approach presupposes a pluralist understanding of morality and a baseless 
ontological conception of human beings. This is nevertheless in a difficult position to 
hold, specifically against utilitarian arguments, exactly because political morality is ipso 
facto dominated by the overriding ‘outcome-centred’ principles of conduct: in politics 
we need practical results, not theoretical discourse.    
  
This means that the problem of political morality is both complex and intractable.  Immoral 
acts are performed for political ends not only by political gangsters but by individuals 
whom we might otherwise describe as morally admirable.  Sometimes the good have to 
behave badly or at least less than well if effective political action is to take place.  The gap 
between morality and politics is not simply between those who are predisposed to act well 
and those who are not.  This may prompt withdrawal to a life of private virtue.
440
   
 
According to the pluralistic argument, the relationship between private and 
political morality perfectly illustrates the conflict of moral values within and between 
the different ‘life orders’.  Thus, the political agent is the issue which must draw our 
attention if we wish to acquire a better understanding of moral dilemmas in political 
life.  This is firstly because there are no standard solutions for dilemmatic situations, 
given the pluralist approach, and secondly because politics demands practical results.  
Thus, moral and political agency re-acquires its normative significance based on the 
pluralist assumption that moral wisdom, or virtue, is necessary in order to perceive a 
possible moral dilemma.
441
  The genuinely virtuous agents do not therefore easily say 
‘nothing else is open to me’ because virtue is exactly this ability to understanding the 
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complex nature of morality and correspondingly acting in non-absolute or non-
reductionist ways.
442
  
According to Philp’s account of political conduct, political virtues should be 
distinguished from moral virtues.  Thus, a true realistic approach of politics would 
accept that, what each particular politician can and should do, will vary.  ‘That is, that it 
is not possible to move directly from the prescriptions of ideal theory to an account of 
what, in any particular case, should be done.’443  This argument from political realism is 
in accord with the pluralist view of morality in both its interpretation of morality and its 
inability to propose specific solutions (because there might not be any) for conflicting 
situations.  Aristotle suggested that practical wisdom is the result of combining 
philosophical knowledge of general principles of morality with a well-cultivated ability 
to apply this knowledge into particular situations, especially when these principles 
might be conflicting; and even then the outcome is not guaranteed.  The transition from 
‘ordinary’ morality to particular political decisions, especially when we know that the 
transition itself might entail a violation of ‘ordinary’ morality, is the crucial point for 
political philosophy.  How are we to set the limits on the interaction between the private 
and political moral standpoints, while being in danger to end up either with an isolated 
and absolute utilitarian political ethics or with politics of moralism where efficiency is 
condemned as in principle immoral?   
Political arguments should make clear whether they accept that the utility 
principle is overriding in general, or only within politics; in the first case, we have a 
monistic explanation of morality and all political solutions are predetermined; in the 
second case, there is an acceptance of the plurality of different types of values in 
different spheres of life, and a recognition of the inevitable moral tensions that will arise 
when these spheres are intertwined –and ordinary life is always intertwined with 
politics.  Here, an explanation of how utilitarian reasoning is to be limited –so as to 
avoid ending up with the dangerous ‘the ends justify the means’ i.e. the cruel face of 
politics– is needed.  This explanation requires a thorough analysis of the ways politics 
and morality are related, aiming at the moral character that will be qualified to strike a 
balance between them and efficiently limit the peculiar moral demands of both of them.    
 The borderline, therefore, between politics and morality is defined by the 
relationship between the moral agent and the political or public role.  This relationship 
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should be interactive.  Political and public roles carry with them certain duties to be 
fulfilled.  This fact gives rise to multiple problems which derive from the pluralist 
nature of morality itself: first, there is the potential conflict between the ‘agent-centred’ 
values against the duties derived from public roles; second, the same kind of values will 
be against the duties derived from the qualitatively different political roles; and third, 
there is the potential conflict between the duties derived from public roles against those 
derived from political roles.  Therefore, exactly because of the conflicting nature of 
moral values in different spheres of life, the political agents should have a certain ability 
in order to fulfil the corresponding roles and successfully face their conflicting 
demands.  This ability is what we call political or public virtue and does not require a 
rejection of ‘ordinary’ morality, but a deep understanding of it and a readiness for 
difficult moral compromises.  
 
 
D) The conflicting nature of morality: impartiality against integrity 
So far we have seen how the more general subject of moral conflicts is related to the 
problematic relationship between politics and morality and how the moral disposition of 
the agents is involved in this relationship.  Monistic theories should have a standard 
solution for every moral conflict which might be the outcome of engagement in politics.  
Idealistic prescriptions, which are based on deontic theories and make for absolute 
attitudes, would either reject or severely compromise the efficiency of politics, 
disregarding thus large-scale consequences and the meaning of politics itself.  
 
Opposed to a goal seeking argument, an absolute judgement of value involves the 
recognition of the purity of goodness –that an act is performed not for the sake of advantage 
or the avoidance of pain, or even out of duty.  The value of such an act is intrinsic and does 
not allow evaluation or comparison.  Understanding actions and judgements as having an 
absolute ethical significance means rejecting reductionist accounts of morality.
444
 
 
Consequentialist accounts which are based on utilitarian reasoning, on the other 
hand, would reduce all moral problems to utility as the overriding moral principle, 
neglecting the importance of moral values as such for the moral agents themselves.  
This moral basis for political conduct has been proved to be neither successful nor 
morally justified.  All monistic explanations underestimate the importance of the moral 
                                                 
444
 Johnson, Politics, Innocence, 102-103. 
189 
 
agents when fulfilling their social roles because it is only demanded from them to 
follow a very specific and assumingly impeccable set of moral principles. The only 
things they might face are cases of corruption, but never morally dilemmatic situations, 
limiting, thus, the significance of the concept of responsibility into being responsible for 
their imperfect human nature.  Pluralistic accounts, on the contrary, accept that the 
distinction between private and political moral principles belongs to a wider distinction 
between different set of values which are of equivalent importance, interrelated but 
irreducible to each other.  That necessarily entails a level of autonomy for political 
moral considerations.  This in turn means that there is also the difficult task of 
connecting politics with ‘ordinary’ morality, or else of compromising the seemingly 
uncompromised.       
Utilitarianism and idealism would simplify the problem by focusing, 
respectively, on how to achieve political outcomes regardless of moral costs for the 
agents involved, and on how to achieve the salvation of moral integrities regardless of 
practical costs for the collectivity.  They both underestimate the importance of the 
mediating agent’s moral decisions; the political figure who personifies the conflict 
between political, public and private morality and understands and endures the moral 
predicament, notwithstanding the absence of a philosophical solution.  It is this outcome 
from the union of the political role with the moral character which best represents the 
seriousness of the problem and reveals the insufficiency of monistic explanations of 
morality.  As we have already mentioned, the existence of widespread lying and 
deception in politics is not, in itself, enough to justify the conclusion that there is a 
conflict between morality and politics, or that politicians are morally worse than us.  
This latter view is an over-simplification, and one reason for this is that, when 
politicians lie, it may not be in order to further their own ends; it may be in order to 
secure important and desirable political ends.
445
  ‘In order to do the right thing, one has 
to do the wrong thing; in order to be or do good, one must also be or do evil’.446  On the 
other hand, doing the wrong thing in order to do good does not wipe out the moral 
wrongness of the action.  This is the kind of moral dilemma politicians usually have to 
face and this is why the problem of the moral character is so pressing.  How a political 
figure is going to respond to a moral conflict and what would be the outcome of this 
response depends on their moral disposition and their understanding of ethics.   
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In the face of such moral dilemmas, politicians themselves may feel both that 
they have sacrificed their integrities and that it is politics that has demanded that 
sacrifice of them.  Alternatively, politicians may act as there is no moral dilemma at all, 
either because they do not accept the peculiar moral demands of politics (a case of 
moral absolutism), or because they believe moral integrity is irrelevant (a case of 
unlimited utilitarianism).  In this latter case political morality is overridden by general 
overarching moral principles.  But in the first case, where the loss of integrity is 
considered to be the result of the peculiar demands of politics, political morality should 
claim an autonomous realm of existence and one serious problem is the extent of this 
autonomy.  Mendus argues that in order to establish whether this is something desirable 
or not, we have to understand in what ways politics undermines integrity.
447
  In 
addition, we have to understand what is the role of integrity amidst the conflict between 
private and political or public morality, given the argument, that ‘the basic point and 
structure of politics creates a qualitatively different set of challenges to which individual 
morality offers an inadequate guide.’       
 However, before we concentrate on the question of ‘what we morally want from 
our politicians?’ we should still insist on the general understanding of morality and of 
moral conflicts in relation to moral integrity.  It will not be difficult to set some basic 
features of the latter concept based on the views of the ‘classical’ thinkers mentioned 
above.  To begin with, integrity should not be considered as equal to moral goodness or 
perfectibility.  There are people who may exhibit consistent integrity in their action, but 
may nevertheless be morally bad.  In this sense, integrity differs from moral innocence 
because integrity is realized in action whereas innocence is irreconcilable with human 
action.
448
  To have moral integrity is not to follow blindly a series of moral guidelines.  
Thus, it is a misconception to argue that the attempt to maintain one’s moral integrity 
can only be achieved by morally monistic attitudes.  Integrity is a moral disposition 
which is going to be realized in social life where the conflict of different sets of moral 
values is most evident, making thus absolute moral attitudes very difficult to be 
sustained.  
Williams defines integrity as ‘a matter of standing by what one believes to be 
ethically necessary.’  According to Mendus’ analysis on this approach the word 
‘ethically’ is important because it points to a distinction between different kinds of 
value; the distinction which constitutes the basis for the more general conflict between 
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private and public or political morality.  This distinction, as we have analyzed, suggests 
that there may not be simply one distinctively moral value, but different kinds of 
broadly ethical values, some of which reflect the values of society and are associated 
with social or conventional morality and some of which reflect the values of personal 
integrity.
449
   
Mendus’ aim is to understand how the tension between different sets of values 
translates into ethically dilemmatic political situations.  According to her, this 
understanding requires an analysis of the challenges of value pluralism and the all 
important context within which the politician’s role and duties must be evaluated.450  
Therefore, the concept of integrity may incorporate both sets of those conflicting ethical 
values and this is how it introduces us to the conflict between private and political 
morality.  We can recall here Niebuhr’s description according to which the ‘conflict or 
tension, between politics and morality is made inevitable by the double focus of the 
moral life: one focus is on the inner life of the individual, and the other on the 
necessities of man’s social life.  These two moral perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive and the contradiction between them is not absolute.  But neither are they 
easily harmonised.’451  The perspective of the personal life of the individual reflects 
private moral integrity and the perspective of the necessities of man’s social life reflects 
the rules that work as the grounds of public and political morality.   
 Following the same line of reasoning, and Mendus’ analysis of William’s 
definition of integrity, we may claim that integrity, understood as sticking by what one 
believes to be ethically necessary and refusing to engage in  evil, is in conflict with 
morality understood as taking account of the consequences of our actions and of our 
responsibilities to them: 
 
It may seem that in this case the tension between integrity and morality is created by 
adopting a conception of morality that places great weight on consequences, but in fact the 
problem is wider than that and is generated not merely by consequentialist understandings 
of morality, but by impartialist understandings of morality – that is to say, by conceptions 
of morality that insist on the importance of treating all equally or of showing equal respect 
for everyone.  This tension is not an accident.  Impartialist morality, whether 
consequentialist or not, is a very important way of restricting a person’s ability to act on his 
or her personal commitments [integrity], or on what he or she believes to be ethically 
necessary, so the tension between integrity (understood as a matter of sticking by what one 
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believes to be ethically necessary) and morality (understood as acting impartially towards 
all who are affected by one’s actions) is both predictable and unavoidable [...]452      
 
 As De Wijze argues, for Mendus the tension between integrity and impartial 
morality arises because the former demands that we act on our own cherished 
commitments, while the later properly constrains our actions in the world so that we do 
not harm or treat others with disrespect.  So there is always the potential for integrity 
and morality to conflict.  But it is in the domain of politics that this problem becomes 
frequent and far more acute.
453
  This is an explanation regarding how public morality 
can be threatening to private morality, despite the fact that impartial moral principles 
can be generally derived from both the ‘agent-centred’ and the ‘outcome-centred’ moral 
perspectives.  Lynn McFall offers another helpful view of the above tension that 
eventually produces the distinction between private and public morality: ‘Say that a 
personal morality is that set of moral principles or commitments that I adhere to that I 
do not expect everyone to adhere to and that need not be characterized by impartiality.  
A social morality is the set of principles that we adhere to that we expect everyone to 
adhere to and that are characterized by impartiality.  The difference between them is 
clearly seen in a case of conflict.’454   
Morality (impartial morality) then, is at odds with integrity (partial morality) 
and, at least in principle, has a tendency to undermine it.  This argument is 
corresponding to the conflict between the ‘agent-centred’ against the ‘outcome-centred’ 
moral values which are both constitutive of our moral dispositions.  McFall’s example 
of a case in which a captain of a sinking ship is called to save the people from drowning 
and has time to save either two complete strangers or her relatives illustrates this 
tendency clearly.  She says: 
 
Suppose, in my role as ship captain, that I am charged to take the safety of everyone 
equally into account. This would be true for anyone in my position, so the principle, "Guard 
the safety of all passengers equally" is both universal and impartial. Now suppose I see that 
my husband and two other passengers are drowning. My husband weighs what the two 
others weigh put together. He is drowning on starboard, they are drowning at port. If I save 
my husband, the two will drown, and vice versa. As a wife I should save my husband; as 
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ship captain I should save the two strangers. The demands of personal morality conflict 
with those of social morality. What does moral integrity require?
455
   
 
According to William’s definition of integrity the answer should be based upon 
one’s most fundamental ethical commitments: when those commitments give priority to 
the demands of impartial morality then they should not decide to make the choice 
according to their personal standpoint and they should save the strangers first.  Instead, 
when the commitments of the personal standpoint are stronger and lie, for example, 
with one’s values of the family, then to abandon them would constitute a serious loss of 
integrity.  The agent’s moral disposition is a decisive factor with regards to how we 
achieve a moral and practical outcome notwithstanding already prescribed rules of 
conduct in specific social spheres.  Is there a conclusion then?  McFall writes: 
 
What makes such conflicts possible? For most of us, both relations of personal affection 
and social moral commitments have great if not identity-conferring importance. If they did 
not, we would recognize no dilemma. A general argument either way -for the claims of 
social or personal morality at the expense of the other-would do violence to our intuitions. 
If we were to grant supreme importance to social morality, we could honor no personal 
moral commitments. (Can a utilitarian have friends? Yes, but not of his own). And 
conversely.  A dilemma, by definition, presupposes a commitment to both sides [… ] My 
own view is this. Whatever choice I make (further extraordinary complications excluded), I 
would not be morally blameworthy. (Praise we save for those who would do as we do or 
better.) If I save the two strangers, I am right from the social-moral point of view; if I save 
my husband, I am right from the personal-moral point of view. And whatever choice I 
make I am wrong from some point of view. Since both are moral requirements of 
comparable importance, I am free to choose, based on commitments particular to myself, 
what I could or could not "live with" (or without).
456
 
 
This is in confirmation of the pluralistic logic.  In theory, and even more in cases 
of everyday life, the dilemma of choosing between personal integrity and impartial 
morality is insoluble; not only because it is not perceived as such by individuals who 
have not cultivated their critical level of thinking, and thus are unable to think clearly 
and make the necessary calculations (as Hare would like us to think), but mainly 
because some basic moral values conflict and are irreducible to each other.  Eventually, 
it comes down to how the moral character is constituted in the first place, given the fact 
that there will always be a degree of discontinuity between different sets of moral 
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intuitions.  In other words, ordinary persons, when they face a moral dilemma, cannot 
philosophically make the distinction between moral integrity and impartial morality, but 
can only act according to their moral disposition, or, according to Hare, follow their 
inculcated moral intuitions.  And this would mean that their fundamental ethical 
commitments would always determine their action whether they are conducting their 
social roles or their private lives’ plans.  The importance of this point cannot be over-
emphasized, because it essentially proposes that in cases of moral dilemmas and 
practical predicaments the moral disposition of the political agent might be far more 
significant than any prior role-related moral rules or prescriptions.    
In addition, there is the argument that it is not necessarily a bad thing to follow 
our moral intuitions when there is not a clearly preferred moral path.  Weber made this 
argument in the form of the mutually supporting ‘ethic of responsibility’ and ‘ethic of 
conviction’.  In his view, every responsible politician must have a symbolic reference 
for their political action, otherwise this is destined to be meaningless and eventually to 
fail.  Hence, it is inevitable that, especially for ordinary people and ordinary cases, 
integrity or the commitments and values that constitute integrity are an indispensable 
element toward recognizing impartial morality.  Rules of impartiality share in an 
interactive relationship between both the ‘agent-centred’ and the ‘outcome-centred’ 
moral perspectives.  Social morality and in extension social justice cannot exist if there 
is absolutely no conception of personal moral values, meaning that the ‘agent-centred’ 
perspective is vital for the cultivation of the ‘outcome-centred’ standpoint.   
According to Mendus and McFall, this may happen for two reasons: first, the 
values and commitments that constitute integrity usually work as motivating factors in 
order for someone to act in accordance with the dictates of morality; thus they are 
needed for the recognition and cultivation of it:  ‘Without integrity, and the identity-
conferring commitments it assumes, there would be nothing to fear the loss of, not 
because we are safe but because we have nothing to lose.’457  Second, these personal 
commitments may usually be ethically important themselves.  So important in fact, that 
we cannot separate them from impartial morality even if we consider them as partial 
values: ‘they can be both constitutive of integrity and a demand of impartial morality 
[…] To the extent that this is so, a demand to sacrifice integrity to morality should be 
treated with caution […] And it may also be that any attack on integrity is an attack on 
the motivational foundation of impartial morality.’458   
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Thus, our ethical commitments (personal integrity), which apparently derive 
from a plurality of general moral values, constitute the necessary moral element for the 
critique and operation of social roles, in general, and of political and public roles in 
particular.  Public and political morality may be based upon a different set of moral 
values, acquiring thus a level of moral autonomy, but they are not altogether separated 
from private morality because this would make them meaningless and dysfunctional.  
Therefore, even though the tension between personal integrity and impartial morality is 
again recognized, the blunt distinction between private and public morality appears to 
be too simplistic.  The tension between them is caused by our inability to define in exact 
terms the extent to which personal commitments are constitutive of impartial morality.  
How we recognize whether the personal values and ethical commitments can be 
reconciled or even constitute the demands of impartial demands that are ‘outcome-
centred’ biased, is the problem at hand.  In ‘ordinary’ life integrity (private morality) 
might undermine impartial (public) morality and vice versa; and the limits between 
them are left to be decided by moral agents in particular situations according to their 
ethical commitments or moral characters.   
 
 
E) Assigning priority to the moral standpoint: The derivability problem 
We saw that public and political roles carry with them peculiar duties which might be in 
conflict with private or ‘ordinary’ morality, but we also argued that to try to separate 
them altogether would be neither feasible nor desirable. We are left thus with the 
problem of finding the extents of their inter-determination.  The central purpose is still 
to analyze the general relationship between politics and morality, and the fragmentation 
of values requires a clearer understanding of both the public and the political spheres as 
defined above and the importance of the moral character in relation to them.  Thus, in 
order to be able to have a full account of how personal integrity is related to all the 
‘outcome-centred’ types of values, it needs to be cross-examined separately, first with 
the basic values of what is considered to be public morality, and secondly, with those of 
political morality.     
We have already extensively argued that public morality is fundamentally 
defined by moral principles of impartiality.  This type of principles can be either of a 
consequentialist or of an ‘agent-centred’ nature.  In the public sphere there is usually an 
attempt to strike a balance between them because the general interest of society is best 
served when treating its moral agents impartially.  Therefore, it is clear that there is or 
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should be an interconnection and inter-determination between private morality and 
public morality.  Nevertheless, as we have previously seen, there still is a high 
probability of conflict between them.  This is a conflict that sometimes gives rise to 
arguments according to which it would be best to try and disconnect them as much as 
possible.   
In his discussion on ‘dirty hands’ Martin Hollis makes a widely accepted point 
when he argues that the difference between private and public persons could be 
expressed by saying that private individuals acquire new moral duties with office: the 
specific moral demands of the role take priority over the ‘ordinary’ moral demands of 
private life.  According to him, the example that corroborates this claim is that if I were 
a fireman sent to put out a fire in the school, then I should treat my children exactly like 
all others, because it is morally corrupt to use the powers of office to further personal 
relationships.  And from this logically follows that the attempt to place universal moral 
requirements on everyone, whether in office or not, fails to resolve the moral dilemmas 
of office; and that, secondly, it is fallacious to argue that, where roles conflict, there 
must be a place to stand, which is prior to all roles, in order to umpire the conflict, 
exactly because there is no true human situation other than the web of social roles.
459
  
This is similar to McFall’s example of ship’s captain but with somewhat different 
conclusions.  What we have, here, is a recognition of the plurality of values that define 
different spheres of life, but also a complete rejection of private morality as a 
constituting and motivating factor when acting in the public sphere.  We have argued 
that this might not be entirely correct or even desirable, but Hollis’ example makes 
evident that office brings with it impartial moral duties which in some extreme cases 
will conflict with partial commitments of one’s integrity.  Thus, if some desire to 
execute their public duty they should not allow for private moral considerations to 
interfere.      
In a similar line of reasoning, Thomas Nagel’s article Ruthlessness in Public Life 
is an account of how we should tackle the tension between personal integrity and public 
morality when it comes to public action.  His question is the natural outcome of his 
pluralist understanding of morality: is there a discontinuity between private and public 
morality and if there is what its nature is and what are its consequences?  Nagel’s main 
response to this question is articulated like this:  
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[E]thics, and the ethical basis of political theory, have to be understood as arising from a 
division in each individual between two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal.  The 
latter represents the claims of the collectivity and gives them their force for each individual.  
If it did not exist, there would be no morality, only the clash, compromise, and occasional 
convergence of individual perspectives.  It is because a human being does not occupy only 
his own point of view that each of us is susceptible to the claims of others through private 
and public morality.  Any social arrangement governing the relations among individuals, or 
between the individual and the collective, depends on a corresponding balance of forces 
within the self – its image in microcosm.  That image is the relation, for each individual, 
between the personal and the impersonal standpoints, on which the social arrangement 
depends and which it requires of us... [Thus] the hardest problems of political theory are 
conflicts within the individual, and no external solution will be adequate which does not 
deal with them at their source.
460
 
 
This is a repetition of his own position that the insoluble problems of the 
relationship between politics and morality have their root in the irreducible plurality of 
values that permeates morality as a whole and is personified in individual moral agents 
by the basic dichotomy between ‘agent-centred’ vs. ‘outcome-centred’ moral 
standpoints.  Nagel argues that political institutions and their theoretical justifications 
try to externalize the demands of the impersonal standpoint.  However, they still have to 
be supported and brought to life by individuals for whom the impersonal standpoint 
coexists with the personal, and this brings us in front of the dead-end wherein 
institutions must promote impartiality without making unacceptable demands on 
individuals.
461
  This dichotomy is of course a common view in political philosophy and 
its analysis started with Plato who suggested that the eradication of the conflicts within 
our souls should also eradicate any moral dilemmas and conflicts in our social and 
political life.  However, there is also another commonly accepted argument –influenced 
by Aristotle’s response to Plato– that the moral capacities of human beings are limited 
and in combination with the plurality of values we could never live in a world with no 
moral conflicts at all.
462
  In Nagel’s argument moral integrity is constituted by the 
personal and impersonal standpoints which correspond to the partial ethical 
commitments and the impartial (public) moral imperatives.  The proportion of those 
commitments and imperatives determine the moral dispositions of the agents and 
consequently their public and political decisions.      
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  Furthermore, Nagel believes that the question of the nature of the discontinuity 
between private and public morality and the assignment of priority to either the first or 
the latter must take one of two forms: either public morality will be derivable from 
private (conventional or ordinary) morality or it will not.  And he proceeds to saying 
more about the derivability problem in order to give the question some content: 
 
The interesting question is whether the special features of public morality can be explained 
in terms of principles already present at the individual level, which yield apparent moral 
discontinuities when applied to the special circumstances of public life.  If so, then public 
morality is in a substantive and not merely trivial sense derivable from private morality.  It 
emerges naturally from individual [general] morality under the conditions that define the 
individual’s public role.  This could still yield different moral requirements in two ways.  
Either the general principles could imply additional constraints on public action; or the 
principles could be such that certain requirements would cease to apply once one assumed a 
public role, because the conditions for their application would have disappeared... The 
alternative to derivability is that public morality is not grounded on individual morality, and 
that therefore people acting in certain official roles or capacities are required or permitted to 
do things that cannot be accounted for on that basis... [Thus] both derivability and non-
derivability are formally suited to explain either the addition or the removal of restrictions 
in public morality; both can therefore explain the appearance of discontinuity.
463
    
 
Nagel’s own reply to the derivability problem as he conceives it is that neither 
private nor public morality is ultimate and that there is no reason to assume, that one 
would have to reach the private principles from general constraints of morality, and the 
public principles only from private constraints, as applied to public circumstances.  In 
other words, he argues that there is non-derivability, but then he hastens to add that this 
does not mean that there is not a common place between private and public morality.
464
  
Nagel explains this position with the theory about the two standpoints within the 
individual.  The impersonal standpoint, he claims, produces in each of us a powerful 
demand for universal impartiality and equality (impartial morality), while the personal 
standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements which present 
obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.  Therefore, the conflict within the 
individual translates into a situation where reconciliation between acceptable political 
ideals and acceptable personal moral principles seems practically impossible.
465
  His 
conclusion is that public morality may be underivable from private not because they 
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come from different sources, but because each of them contains elements derived 
independently from a common source.
466
   
The derivability problem is another title for the problem of whether it is correct 
to assign overriding priority to a specific set of moral values over all others; and the 
answer is again a negative-one.  When a sphere of social conduct, which is dominated 
by a specific set of moral values, comes in contact with another sphere which is in turn 
dominated by a different set of moral values, there is going to be some kind of 
interaction.  However, this interaction will not necessarily mean the overriding of one of 
the moral codes.  For this reason, private morality neither overrides nor derives from 
public or political morality. Conversely public morality and political morality neither 
override nor derive from private morality.  The only possible outcome of their 
interaction is either conflict or reconciliation of moral values upon common grounds.  
Following the Weberian reasoning, the ethical substance and the origins of these 
grounds do not matter in themselves insofar as they are sufficient for the creation of a 
stable symbolic reference for the existence of both the collectivity and its individual 
members.  
 
 
F) The conflicting nature of morality: utility against integrity 
The last element which must be made clearer in the triptych of the private, the public 
and the political is with regard to how public is different than political morality in 
relation to private morality.  In principle public morality is dominated by values of 
impartiality, whereas political morality is dominated by the principle of utility.  
However, both spheres exist in relation to the social and their ultimate aim is to serve 
and promote the interests of society and not the self, being thus fundamentally of a 
consequentialist nature.  This means that, de facto, public morality also draws on the 
principle of utility.  Thus, the distinction between public and political morality can 
sometimes seem hazy or ambiguous.  Nevertheless, or maybe because of this 
uncertainty, it is very important to understand why and how impartiality and 
utilitarianism undermine moral integrity in a different way.  Impartial rules of public 
conduct are closer to deontic principles and thus closer to people’s basic moral 
intuitions, making concepts such as fairness in public action more easily understandable 
and less prone to end up in dilemmatic situations.  This is why, in Hollis’ example, 
society might demand from the fireman to fulfil the duties of his assigned public role 
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and stay impartial during the difficult situation.  Because everyone would wish that if 
they found themselves in the same unfortunate position they would be treated by the 
public official in a fair manner.  In such a case, the impersonal standpoint can and will 
interact with the personal in order to reach an agreement regarding practical action, 
because impartial principles –in the form of basic moral intuitions– dominate both 
perspectives.   
 Politicians, as well as citizens in relation to politics, may find themselves in an 
infinitely more complex situation, in comparison to simple public officials, because 
political positions are especially problematic in relation to moral integrity.  Politics adds 
a second threat to moral character which is the increased political attention to 
consequences,
467
 now in terms of utility, not impartiality.  In addition, in the world of 
political action confusion about the limits between private and political morality can 
have destructive results, something that makes for extra psychological pressure on the 
agents involved.  It may be that the agent’s ethical commitments are in favour of 
impartial morality, making thus a suitable moral character for the public section, but it 
may also be that the agent’s impartial morality constitutes an obstacle to efficient 
political action.  Finally, an agent whose ethical commitments do not recognize other 
moral principles than that of utility may create a character potentially dangerous for 
politics and thus society as a whole.   
Consequently, the argument is that politicians place greater stress on 
consequentialist moral reasoning and downplay the usually strong deontological 
prohibitions against acting in certain ways.  When they do this, the public see them as 
lacking in moral integrity, as morally compromised and corrupt.
468
  Thus, C. A. J. 
Coady argues that in politics we should not allow operating at a level that is morally too 
abstract.  If we want to avoid confusion we have to stick to the particular (moral) 
demands of political life without disconnecting ourselves from the contradicting 
demands of private or ‘ordinary’ morality.   
 
The usual points about how the role of statesman makes a difference to what one is obliged 
and entitled to do, can also be made about such roles as parent or friend which are clearly 
on the private side of the divide, or about the role of teacher which straddles the distinction 
[…] There is an obvious truth in the idea that roles make a moral difference […] But that 
truth is not something that somehow negates broad moral assessments since we need an 
overarching moral rationale for the existence of roles and the special permissions and duties 
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that they involve […] If the imperatives and permissions associated with roles were not 
under moral control, then those related to embezzler and burglar would have the same 
status as those of doctor and lawyer.
469
 
 
All this takes us back to Nagel’s basic dichotomy of moral values between the 
concerns with what will happen and the concerns with what one is doing.  The first is a 
consequentialist concern (a concern for the outcomes of our actions) whereas the second 
is an action-centred concern (a concern for our lives as our own and with absolute 
claims of our moral integrity amongst others).  The latter will obviously be setting 
restraints to the first, without nonetheless knowing exactly the extent of those restraints.  
This uncertainty makes the relationship between private and political morality so 
problematic as to render politics and morality a perennial theme of debate.   
Thus, we should not only be concerned with the impartial demands of public 
morality, but also with the great danger for private morality that comes from the 
utilitarian demands of political morality.  For Nagel, the interaction and conflict 
between these two aspects of morality (general moral principles and consequentialist 
imperatives) are familiar in private life, but when we apply the same dual conception to 
political institutions and activities the results are different; and the discontinuity 
between private and political morality mainly derives from that.  He offers several 
reasons for this but the most generally acknowledged between theorists are the facts that 
‘institutions are not persons and do not have private lives, nor do institutional roles 
usually absorb completely the lives of their occupants [and that] public institutions are 
designed to serve purposes larger than those of particular individuals or families.  They 
tend to pursue the interests of masses of people’.  All this results in a different balance 
between the morality of outcomes and the morality of actions: ‘Within the appropriate 
limits, public [and political] decisions will be justifiably more consequentialist than 
private ones.  They will also have larger consequences to take into account.’470 
In summary, this argument recapitulates what we have seen so far and makes a 
few more clear distinctions; i.e. that morality is a complicated subject and it becomes 
even more complex when we attempt to theorize it at different levels, that is, the private, 
public, and political levels.  We should accept that there is a conflict between private 
and public morality and that the cause of this conflict lies in the tension between the 
partial demands of personal integrity (the personal standpoint) and the impartial 
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demands of social morality (which are recognized by the impersonal standpoint), that 
are further intensified and complicated by the more specifically utilitarian demands of 
politics.  All this is in agreement with the tradition that suggests how ordinary morality 
can be in tension with politics and why moral character takes a different meaning when 
discussing about public and political action.  Nagel’s basic claim is that the impersonal 
aspects of morality are or should be more prominent in the assessment of institutions 
than in the assessment of individual actions: 
 
[A]s a result, the design of institutions may include roles whose occupants must determine 
what to do by principles different from those that govern private individuals.  This will be 
morally justified, however, by ultimate considerations that underlie individual morality as 
well [...] My main contention is that the degree to which ruthlessness is acceptable in public 
life –the ways in which public actors may have to get their hands dirty– depends on moral 
features of the institutions through which public actions is carried out.
471
   
 
The importance that Weber attributed to private moral convictions as a 
constituting factor of public morality and as a necessary feature of a society able 
morally to criticize or justify public decisions and political action is not denied.  Private 
morality will and should, in the end, set strong constraints to the consequentialist 
character of politics being either of impartial or utilitarian nature; and the limits of those 
constraints depend on the moral disposition of the agents involved in political situations.  
‘In these ways, we all live, as Taylor puts it “between the one and the many”, though of 
course the stakes may be very much higher for the politician, the temptations greater, 
and the costs of error more public.’472  This is essentially an acceptance of the 
discontinuity between private and public morality with the wish that the cases of 
ruthlessness in politics should be confined to the absolutely necessary by the pressures 
of private morality, due to the large scale of their consequences.  On the other hand, 
given this discontinuity, we should also accept that personal integrity however positive 
may it be for our private lives, it can easily become a public vice when transferred to the 
world of politics without some prior qualifications.  The point is that the different 
characteristics of public and political action, as described previously, entail a 
transvaluation of moral rules, when moving from the private to the public and political 
spheres, which should always be considered by the public officials, the politicians and 
those who should judge and criticize them.           
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Nagel’s observation that ‘Within the appropriate limits, public decisions will be 
justifiably more consequentialist than private ones’, is an attempt to limit the scope of 
this transvaluation because, otherwise, we might get to knowing the cruel face of 
politics.  As we have already mentioned, if this happened, there may be a lack of 
motivational moral principles for the constitution and moral verification of the public 
and political spheres in the first place.  The scope of the transvaluation is not something 
stable or universally acceptable and thus it is a difficult and dangerous process.  On the 
other hand, the transvaluation must be justified because, as we have also seen, politics 
does require, structurally, different moral behaviours.  And this is exactly why the 
importance of moral disposition is so great within the political.  Johnson stresses the 
point that certain moral dispositions exclude politics, are deeply incompatible with it, 
and in fact endanger it.
473
  But the conflict between politics and morality can also be 
alleviated by the moral disposition.  In this sense, he is right to argue that the standard 
distinction between morality and politics has to be supplemented by a sharper 
recognition of the priority of moral dispositions; but this should not entail a denial to the 
logical importance of offices as opposed to office holders.
474
  This is because otherwise 
admirable moral integrities can always produce political disasters if not checked against 
a given set of socially recognizably values.   
 In front of the insurmountable discontinuity between morality and politics, then, 
we have to rely upon the moral disposition of those who are not socially restrained; i.e. 
political figures that will mediate the tension and can be relied to overcome the ethical 
dilemmas by justifiable ways.  And this is why politics is so important morally.  It is not 
only that partial morality cultivates the ground for the existence of public and political 
morality; it is also that political morality has normative importance.  Philp explicates 
this importance by arguing about the huge impact of politicians’ actions upon others; 
about the significance of their task toward ordering the society; and about the feature of 
politics which is concerned with the exercise of sovereign authority; i.e. the setting of 
the rules within which people act.
475
  Philp’s argument is similar to Weber’s argument 
as discussed previously: politics deserves a distinct moral position and a peculiar kind 
of judgment from everyone involved.   
However, political morality should not be totally disconnected from private 
morality because those two distinct sets of values will inevitably meet each other in the 
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practice of the political figure.  Maybe this is why we should not desire a public figure 
that does not recognize moral dilemmas in politics.  We should wish for politicians and 
public officials who have realized that the conduct of their official roles is a matter of 
great ethical importance, and their misconduct is a moral behaviour with normative 
significance.  As Nagel notes ‘the opinion that in certain conditions a certain type of 
conduct is permissible has to be criticized and defended by moral argument.’476  When 
political conduct is judged to be permissible through the interaction of private moral 
considerations and public or political reasons we essentially achieve to connect politics 
and morality by focusing on the moral dispositions of the agents involved in a particular 
moral-political situation.  In this sense, Williams is right to argue that politics, when 
conducted wisely, is a solution to the moral problem and not the cause of it.  Political 
decisions are also moral decisions and this means that politics does not exclude 
‘principle’; it includes it, but many other things as well.477  
 Nevertheless, despite the efforts that have been made towards a better 
understanding of all the interacting elements in the problematic relationship between 
politics and morality, their reconciliation still constitutes a paradox.  Mendus’ 
understanding of this tension, from a pluralist perspective, is that in order to reconcile 
politics and morality we have to conceive the duties of the public and political roles, 
and the politicians’ relationship to them, as different from one cultural and historical 
context to another.  Thus, the differences are not merely due to individual conscience 
but rather to the permanence of social pluralism.
478
  It is true that in this case the 
distinction between private and public or political moral demands seems to be an 
insufficient conception in relation to the tension between politics and morality.  This 
tension has no simple general answer, because there is no simple context-free way to 
decide how private conscience and official political/social roles are properly weighed 
against each other.  Thus, there always remains a considerable latitude of interpretation 
by the office holder which is guided by the mores and expectations of time and place 
and the specific demands of the particular problem that is to be faced.
479
  
 Of course, the considerable latitude of interpretation is what monistic moral 
traditions have struggled to eject from moral and political philosophy.  In addition, 
pluralistic conceptions of morality have also made a warning about the relativistic 
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consequences of such a reliance on contextual interpretation.  In other words, the 
tradition of value pluralism, although an improvement in comparison to monistic 
explanations of the relationship politics and morality, has not yet managed to offer a 
satisfying account regarding their conflict.  Mendus, Nagel and Coady, among other 
pluralists, have therefore set the contemporary context of a classical problem, without 
nevertheless offering a normative solution.  According to De Wijze, this mainly 
happens because they leave no room for the view that the tension between morality and 
politics cannot be resolved without the acceptance of the paradoxical possibility that an 
agent can do both moral wrong and right at the same time; something which the 
standard moral theories reject as confused and incoherent.
480
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7. Moral Agency, Political Agency and The ‘Dirty Hands’ Paradox 
 
 
A) Moral dilemmas: The philosophical problem of ‘dirty hands’ 
The analysis of the moral dilemmas debate along with the more particular case of 
ethical conflicts between private, public and political spheres of action should have 
indicated that the problem of politics and morality is a deep philosophical one.  The 
famous ‘dirty hands’ concept is often used, but not exclusively, in order to explicate 
moral conflicts within politics.  However, based on the previous discussion regarding 
how different philosophical traditions generally conceive the possibility of moral 
conflicts, there are some misunderstandings that must be addressed in relation to 
political conduct and judgment when we refer to ‘dirty hands’ cases.  Stephen de Wijze 
and Tom Goodwin argue that ‘dirty hands’ scenarios involve the following necessary 
and sufficient conditions: 
 
a) A justifiable betrayal of persons, values or principles. 
b) The agent is moved by moral considerations to commit moral violations. 
c) The agent participates in or is part of the causal link which furthers the evil 
projects of others.  
 
Thus, ‘ “dirty hands” acts involve elements of both right and wrong.  Put it differently, 
they require an agent to do wrong in order in to do right.  This concept, while politically 
coherent, is deeply problematic, philosophically speaking.’481 
   I would like to argue that there is a central connection between suggesting that 
moral dilemmas are central to the understanding of the relationship between politics and 
morality, and that ‘dirty hands’ are inevitable in moral actions in politics.  In other 
words, the analysis of the historical accounts of the relationship between politics and 
morality revealed the perennial character of moral conflicts, and the ‘dirty hands’ 
concept is the political expression of those conflicts.  John Parrish’s argument that ‘dirty 
hands’ is a concept which can help us understand the relationship between politics and 
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morality as a historically and theoretically traceable problem is then helpful and 
justified.
482
  In both classical and modern times there were attempts either to resolve or 
accept the insolubility of moral conflicts and thus the tension between politics and 
morality.  Schematically, those attempts can be understood in a similar manner we 
understand the distinction between contemplation (in the sense of theoretical 
knowledge) and action (in the sense of practical knowledge).  The relation between 
contemplation and action can explain the move from the argument on moral dilemmas 
(as the central philosophical problem that defines politics and morality) to the argument 
of ‘dirty hands’ (as the practical expression of moral dilemmas).   
We have discussed that the transition from classical to modern times can be 
explained by two factors; one related to the philosophical problem of morality; the other 
related to the distinction between the public and the political.  Thus, first, we have the 
realization of the insoluble fragmentation of moral values, and second, we have the 
conflict between public and political moral values as an additional feature to the 
classical conflict between private and political moral values.  Both factors, which 
signify the transition to modernity, are integral to the philosophy of moral pluralism, 
which conceives the tension in the relationship between politics and morality as 
unavoidable.  However, deontic and utilitarian theories have dominated modern moral 
philosophy and have proposed holistic and simplified solutions to the problem of moral 
conflicts and, consequently, to the problem of political morality.  In this sense, classical 
and modern attempts to resolve finally the problem of politics and morality are not so 
different.  Where they are different is in their approach to the problem.  In classical 
times, the interrelation of politics and morality was never completely overridden or 
overlooked (even in Plato’s, most comprehensive, solution).  In modern moral theories, 
politics seems to be irrelevant if we have resolved the problem of moral conflicts in the 
first place.            
The simplification of the problem is mainly the outcome of a monistic 
understanding of moral and, consequently, political activity.  Through the critical lens 
of deontological and consequentialist moral theory, it becomes clear that when facing a 
moral conflict ‘there is a right choice to be made and no wrongdoing occurs when 
acting in this way.  To maintain therefore (in the light of this critical assessment) that it 
is possible to have an action that is morally justified yet nevertheless also morally 
wrong is at best conceptual confusion.’483 We have seen how deontologists and 
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consequentialists attempt to explain this confusion based on the rejection of the ‘moral 
remainder’.  Feeling guilty for an apparently wrong act does not necessarily mean that 
this act is indeed morally wrong.  Hare, Ross, Nielsen and other moral theorists of those 
dominant modern philosophical traditions insist on the irrelevance of the moral 
dilemmas concept.  Their arguments are based on the assumption that a critical 
prioritization of prima facie principles or the application of the principle of utility 
should resolve apparent moral conflicts only generating feelings such as 
compunction,
484
 but never generating any ‘moral remainder’.       
   We have seen that the response to this monistic understanding of morality comes 
from the generally defined philosophy of value pluralism.  Although there are different 
accounts of value pluralism, the central argument of this tradition is that solutions to 
certain moral conflicts between different types of values are impossible.  However, 
because in politics action is necessary, there will be cases where resolving the –
philosophically insoluble– moral conflict by practical means would leave a moral 
remainder.  This means that we can categorize moral conflicts under two basic types: 
those that are philosophically irresolvable and remain as such without any serious 
consequences for the moral agents; and those that are resolvable but tragic because they 
their solution entails the permanent moral corruption or death of the moral agent.
485
  
The latter case is what we typically find in political conduct and is essentially what we 
call ‘dirty hands’.  The ‘dirty hands’ concept refers to an immoral action perpetrated in 
order to promote or achieve a moral end which is assumingly of higher importance.  It is 
not a theoretical concept of corruption.  It is an ethical problem related to political 
conduct.  It refers to the dilemma caused by ethical considerations in the search for a 
desirable political end which de facto includes ontological aims, but also it entails 
violation of opposing moral principles.  Therefore, within the pluralist tradition, the 
‘dirty hands’ concept is a necessary analytical tool towards understanding why the 
proposed (by the dominant moral theories) conceptual confusion regarding moral 
conflicts is mistaken.   
   Following the line of reasoning that has been established so far, the ‘dirty hands’ 
concept should be contrasted to the monistic failure to acknowledge the existence of 
‘impossible oughts’: 
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These are oughts we are unable to obey because they violate our deep sense of integrity and 
moral worth.  In the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, for example, although the torture is 
‘justifiable’, even obligatory, given the duties of the politician, the act of torturing 
nonetheless leaves the agent morally polluted for so acting.  Therefore, cases [of dirty 
hands] involve more than just the issue of how are we to act in such circumstances.  Those 
values that have been overridden retain their moral relevance even if they are not action-
guiding […] The standard moral theories neglect this possibility because they are focused 
entirely on the action-guiding aspect of moral claims.  As a result, they fail to realise that 
when a much-cherished moral value does not guide our practical reason, this does not 
entirely eliminate its influence on what we are, or have become, by acting as we did.
486
 
 
This means that the ‘dirty hands’ concept also refers to the practical solution of such a 
moral dilemma not as a way of permanently overriding the value of the moral principle, 
i.e. as a way of resolving the problem in theory, but as a way of accepting the moral 
consequences for its circumstantial solution.   
 Although, as we have already discussed, the philosophical problem of moral 
conflicts and consequently that of ‘dirty hands’ cases is not limited to the tension 
between morality and politics as two different ethical spheres, it is the distinction 
between public and private moral norms that systematically creates such insoluble 
conflicts with tragic consequences for the agents involved.  In public and political life it 
is more likely to face the predicament as posed by Thrasymachus and then 
Machiavelli’s Prince; that is, those who wield political power should be wise enough to 
act immorally only to survive the immorality of those whom they rule.  Both Plato and 
Machiavelli grappled with this problem within their respective political contexts and 
attempted to resolve the paradox which is essentially what constitutes the ‘dirty hands’ 
problem: when ‘good persons faced with the evil projects or actions of others, are 
forced to act in ways that are justified, even morally obligatory, yet nevertheless 
somehow wrong’.487  However, facing the ‘evil acts of others’ is not the only scenario 
of moral conflict because the definition of ‘universal evil’ within a pluralist world is a 
peculiar case which needs not be discussed here.  Conflicts arise, as we have seen, 
because moral agency might be predicated on different meanings of moral value.  What 
is of importance is the public and politically formative character of the interaction 
between conflicting sets of values.   
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We have reviewed how Nagel’s argument explains the discontinuity between 
private and public morality as an expression of the division of the self, which is 
produced by the coexistence of the personal standpoint with the values deriving from 
the initial judgment of the impersonal standpoint.  Nagel says that ‘[t]he special features 
of public morality can be explained in terms of principles already present at the 
individual level, which yield apparent moral discontinuities when applied to the special 
circumstances of public life’.488  We have also referred to the crucial distinction 
between the public and the political nature of these circumstances.  The distinction is 
based on the fact that within the political ‘order’ these circumstances are related to the 
consequentialist character of politics, which are expressed through utilitarian policies, 
whereas the public ‘order’ is organized around values of impartiality.  In the end, we 
argued that, whether we speak of the public or the political, there is a fundamental 
tension that separates both from private or ‘ordinary’ morality.   The analysis of this 
tension is indispensable regarding the problematic relationship between politics and 
morality in general.  According to Nagel ‘We must ask not only what type and degree of 
contribution to impersonal aims can reasonably be asked of divided creatures like 
ourselves, but also how we or our circumstances might reasonably hope to be 
transformed so that a life which better meets both sets of demands would become 
possible for us.  This shows the connection between the ethics of individual conduct and 
political theory.’489 
Hence, we have outlined why moral dilemmas of a tragic nature seem to arise 
more frequently in politics than anywhere else and, starting from that premise, we have 
to investigate what features of politics have historically been recognized as giving rise 
to such moral dilemmas.
490
  What we have assumed so far is that the conflict between 
different moral claims is an inescapable characteristic of human action.  Moral 
dilemmas and paradoxes are a general and not an exclusively political phenomenon.  
However, the nature of the conflicting principles in politics makes moral dilemmas 
(which might otherwise be considered ordinary) more acute.  To try and resolve these 
dilemmatic situations by proposing comprehensive ethical guidelines often proves to be 
not only unrealistic but also counterproductive.  This is why the ‘dirty hands’ problem 
should not be reduced to cases of political corruption and ordinarily understood 
immoral practices.  On the contrary it should be conceived as the political expression of 
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value pluralism; i.e. ‘dirty hands’ are the political outcome of an otherwise insoluble 
moral conflict.  They are the, the politically identified, moral remainder and they must 
be judged as such. 
 
Two core claims underlie their paradoxical and special quality.  The first is that dirty hands 
scenarios are those situations where an agent is forced to do wrong in order to do right 
because the ‘complex of immorality in which she finds herself  makes it impossible to do 
good and only good […] Secondly, no matter how the agent decides to act in such 
circumstances, she will be guilty of a moral violation with the attendant moral opprobrium 
or pollution that adheres to so acting […] In dirty hands scenarios, even if it is clear how we 
should act, this does not negate the non-action-guiding values which will be violated.  Our 
ethical lives are more complex than the practical reason issue of how we ought to act in a 
given situation, especially in situations of irresolvable conflict.
491
  
 
Monistic approaches to complex philosophical problems may suggest simplified, 
holistic and, thus, reductive theoretical solutions.  These approaches are 
counterproductive because, in reality, they make the paradoxes more difficult than they 
were in the first place.  These approaches typically conceive politics as a field to be 
dominated by morality, only to exacerbate their conflict when the time for a real 
decision comes.  What they fail to understand is that it is by means of this domination 
that most problems become accentuated and that moral situations which involve 
political action become more paradoxical.  One of the purposes of the short history of 
politics and ethics as interrelated fields was to illustrate that most attempts to apply a 
perfect political theory as an extension of a perfect moral theory are essentially 
unrealistic. 
 The more realistic state of affairs with regards to moral conflicts and political 
conduct would be to adopt a specific understanding of morality which accepts the 
existence of moral dilemmas as an inescapable feature of a variety of human societies.  
The tradition of value pluralism argues that there are different but equivalent and 
irreducible types of values and principles which derive from our very complex way of 
life.  The complexity of our way of life is ultimately intractable which means that it is 
impossible for morality to be perfectly systematized –when this is attempted it results in 
aggravating the inherent contradictions within ethics.  Thus, as a reaction to 
philosophical monism there is the view that politics should be considered as totally 
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separated from morality so we can avoid confusions and achieve a satisfactory level of 
efficiency.  In other words, this view suggests, political values, which include moral 
claims of impartiality and utility, form a seemingly autonomous sphere within our moral 
universe.     
Nevertheless, as we have argued in the preceding chapters, public and political 
action is where moral dilemmas become more prominent, because the dominating 
principle of action in politics makes the basic dichotomy of moral values more effective 
than in any other sphere of social action.  Several theorists have referred to this basic 
dichotomy as between the ‘agent-centred’ and ‘outcome-centred’ moral values; between 
the personal and impersonal moral standpoints; between partial and impartial integrity; 
or between conscience and efficiency in action etc.  The common point of this basic 
dichotomy of values is that the conflicting nature of morality cannot be reduced to 
single and overriding principles because these two categories of values are 
autonomously constituted.  Therefore, we either end up with an understanding of 
politics as irrelevant to morality or with an understanding of politics as dominated by 
morality.  In the first case political conduct, in order to be successful, must be 
characterized by an amoralist attitude, whereas in the second case political conduct is 
judged to be unsuccessful if characterized by an immoral attitude.  Hence moral agency 
is an already controversial concept, which nevertheless tends to be even more 
problematic when it must translate into political agency.  The outcome of this 
conceptual confusion is to have concepts such as ‘immoral politics’ equated to ‘dirty 
hands’, or ‘amoral politics’ as being the only viable solution of political realism.    
 
 
B) Moral and political integrity: What is to have ‘dirty hands’? 
Philosophical monism on the one hand, and pluralism on the other are fundamentally 
distinguished in their perspectives regarding the significance and purpose of moral 
agency and, as a consequence, of political agency.  This distinction leads to different 
approaches regarding the character of politics and the role of politicians.  For monistic 
approaches the purpose of agency usually refers to the moral progression of the agent 
(either individually or collectively), whereas for value pluralism the ethical aim is an 
improved understanding of the world of moral values.  Thus, in the first case, the 
significance of moral agency is limited to the success or failure of applying a strict and 
all-inclusive moral programme (for both politicians and common citizens).  In the 
second case the quality of moral agency is judged by the ability to act and live morally 
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in a consistent manner, knowing that this may sometimes be impossible (especially 
within politics for all the reasons mentioned previously).  In the preceding chapters we 
attempted to locate how these two different philosophical approaches conceive the 
problem of moral dilemmas in general and, by extension, the tension between private 
and public or political moral demands.  The aim was to offer an explanation of how 
private morality may clash with public and political morality within the frame of moral 
dilemmas.  This explanation should yield a better understanding with regard to how 
moral agency may remain consistent when it has to translate into political agency.  The 
last problem to be answered concerns the possibility of moral consistency or integrity of 
political agents.  When this integrity is impossible both in philosophical and practical 
terms, despite the efforts of the agents to understand and the resolve the moral 
predicament as best as possible, then there is quite possibly a case of ‘dirty hands’.   
The assumption, in respect to the tension between private and public moral 
principles, is that it may not be proper to resolve the conflict by means of imposing 
morality upon politics altogether (the monistic view which would make political action 
either impossible or cruel), or by means of distinguishing between two different and 
altogether autonomous worlds: that of morality and that of politics (an extreme form of 
political realism, an expression of relativism, which would dissolve any universal moral 
criteria for politics and make thus political judgment and criticism impossible).  How 
should we then approach the ‘necessity of dirty hands’ in politics? 
Morality should be conceived as one system, which includes several types of 
values, distinguished but also interrelated, including those that dominate politics, 
according to the pluralist view.  Thus ‘ordinary’, conventional or general morality is the 
outcome of the interaction of all these different types of values.  Of course, ‘ordinary’ 
morality is contextually defined.  However, this interaction cannot be identical for every 
person, making, therefore, personal integrity a highly subjective matter which illustrates 
the variable nature of morality itself.  In this sense, ‘ordinary’ morality is depicted in the 
pluralism of personal integrities and their interaction with the socially established moral 
rules.  ‘Ordinary’ morality derives from the relation of the ‘value orders’ within a social 
context.  This is why it is difficult for ‘ordinary’ morality to be systematized 
theoretically (in terms of prioritizing values), even in a contextualized manner.  Still, 
‘ordinary’ morality is maintained and cultivated through social and private institutions 
in socially conventional ways.  This is also why in some pluralist views ‘ordinary’ 
morality is sometimes considered to be separated from the more exclusive, and thus 
more easily codified, public and political morality.  Philosophical monism, on the other 
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hand, claims that this codification, or ‘scientification’, is possible for ethics as a whole 
and therefore there is no need to separate ‘ordinary’ morality from politics.   
 ‘Ordinary’ morality, as constituted by the pluralism of private ethical 
commitments, is usually distinguished from public and political morality because these 
two moral subsystems have been found to threaten personal integrities in some 
particular ways, and vice versa.  However, we have argued that this does not generally 
mean that political morality is always in conflict with the other types of morality; it may 
mean that integrity as a concept illustrates how the irreducible pluralism of values 
makes moral conflict very probable within the self and, in extension, between the self 
and the social roles that the self must fulfill.  We have also argued, more significantly, 
that personal integrity, as a depiction of ‘ordinary’ morality, is a necessary motivating 
element for the existence of a morally well-functioning public and political sphere in the 
first place.  This understanding of morality may be against both those who very easily 
separate the concepts of moral and political integrity and, thus, between moral and 
political agency (traditions of relativism or amoralism); and those who claim that there 
is only moral virtue and that political virtue should simply be in accordance with it 
(philosophical monism).   
Political integrity should be considered as an autonomously constituted element 
of moral integrity in the same way as political virtue is an element of moral virtue.  
There is a direct inter-determination between them, even if sometimes they can 
undermine each other.  This means that an understanding of ‘dirty hands’ as a version of 
the problem between private and public morality may be wrong.  The balance of the 
different types of moral values in each of the personal integrities is the result of the 
characters’ moral and intellectual habituation.  This carries us back to the constitution of 
the moral self and its realization through the conduct of social, and in particular public 
and political roles.  According to MacIntyre, if moral agents wish to achieve this self-
realization, they will occasionally have to deliberate responsibly about the established 
moral standards, whatever verdict they may arrive at in the end.  ‘Disagreements about 
what these evaluative and normative standards prescribe and what awareness of their 
authority consists in have not precluded widespread agreement in ascribing to normal 
adult human beings as such a capacity that makes them responsible as individuals for 
not putting their established social and cultural order to the question’.492  This indicates 
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that moral agency includes the ability to recognize and criticize the imperfections of a 
given moral system in its social and political context.        
MacIntyre’s conception of moral agency is based on a similar, to what we have 
seen so far, understanding of the self in relation to social roles, but results into a 
different, contextualized –however not relativistic– understanding of morality.  
According to him, there are two basic elements that define the moral character; first, it 
is integrity, and second, it is constancy: 
 
To have integrity is to refuse to be, to have educated oneself so that one is no longer able to 
be, one kind of person in one social context, while quite another in other contexts.  It is to 
have inflexible limits to one’s adaptability to the roles that one may be called upon to play. 
Constancy, like integrity, sets the limits to flexibility of character […] constancy requires 
that those who possess it pursue the same goods through extended periods of time, not 
allowing requirements of changing social context to distract them from their commitments 
or to redirect them […] So individuals [will] be inhabitants of not just one, but of two moral 
systems, that of the established social order with its assignment of roles and responsibilities 
and that developed within those milieus in which the assignment has been put to the 
question.  The degree to which these two systems are at odds with each other varies in 
different social and cultural orders.
493
               
 
MacIntyre’s definition of integrity is based upon the concept of inflexible adaptability 
of our ethical commitments in terms of place and time.  For him, the moral dichotomy 
between the personal and the impersonal standpoints (here called the moral system of 
social roles and the moral system that criticizes those roles from an individual point of 
view) is again recognized as the most basic feature of morality.  Moral agency is 
defined by principles which derive from everyday practices in combination with the 
ability to integrate the principles that permeate the public and political sphere of social 
life, without making actual moral agency impossible.  
 Mendus’ central argument offers a similar approach to resolving the moral 
paradoxes that derive from the inconsistency between moral and political agency.
494
  
Understanding the social role of a politician in the particular and cultural context should 
thus be sufficient in order to explain away the potential conflict.  Therefore, paradoxical 
situations, where we may do wrong in order to do right are not paradoxical anymore.  
They have been paradoxical in the first place because we have failed to understand 
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correctly the context in which the politician’s social role is carried out.495  However, the 
history of the relationship between politics and ethics is meant to show exactly this; i.e. 
that moral conflicts seem to persist, notwithstanding our attempts to understand them as 
a result of a contextual tension between social roles and individual conscience.  In a way 
the problem between politics and morality reflects the general problem of moral 
conflicts, but its solution does not lie in a simple understanding of its contextual 
characteristics, as Mendus argues.
496
  In this respect, MacIntyre, even if not 
commencing from a value pluralism perspective, is correct to indicate that moral agency 
is the ability to criticize the imperfections of a given moral context and maybe go into 
conflict with it.        
 Value pluralism must therefore include in its philosophical understanding of 
moral conflicts the idea that we cannot assign priority to either moral agency or political 
agency, because they are irreducible to each other, and they very often are in conflict.  
However, they are strongly interrelated, or they should be for their betterment.  On the 
contrary, monistic explanations of morality conceive integrity as the outcome of 
assigning absolute priority to one standpoint over the other.  It is obvious that from 
these two different perspectives about the basic dichotomy of moral values we would 
not only arrive at different definitions of integrity, but as a consequence we would get 
different definitions of what political agency should be and how political and public 
roles should be fulfilled.  Nevertheless, it is in the very nature of personal integrity to be 
undermined firstly by the impartial demands and, more importantly, by the utilitarian 
demands of political consequentialism. This makes any prioritization of values 
impossible, hence the urge to separate politics from morality altogether as a response to 
monistic approaches. 
 The moral conflict will always take place within the individual and, by 
extension, between private moral principles, on the one hand, and political or 
consequentialist demands, on the other.  ‘So to be a moral agent is to have the 
potentiality for living and acting in tension or, if need be, conflict between two moral 
points of view.  And this is never simply or mainly a tension or conflict between points 
of view at the level of abstract and general theory.  It is always primarily a tension or a 
conflict between socially embodied points of view, between modes of practice.’497  
MacIntyre is right to argue that the key moral question is how best to find our way 
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through this conflict, which is directly related to the problem of ‘dirty hands’ and moral 
character in politics.  Therefore, understanding the conflicting and simultaneously 
interactive nature of values is a necessary premise upon which one can pursue their 
reconciliation.   
Thus, in an Aristotelian sense, the good man and the good politician coincide 
when they are characterized by this deep understanding of ethics in combination with 
the ability to apply it in particular practical situations, both in politics and ordinary life.  
Practical wisdom does not only refer to political wisdom.  For him, when man realizes 
his moral potential private and political life cannot be distinguished –whether man has 
this potential or not is a different ontological issue, which Aristotle left in ambiguity.  
Moral virtue is not therefore necessarily threatened by political virtue.  It is in tension 
with it, but without this tension there can exist neither of them.  The same goes for most 
‘value orders’ which constitute the essence of ‘ordinary’ morality.  Therefore, it is not 
entirely correct to argue that when we have to think and act politically we at the same 
time have to sacrifice our moral integrities.  This indicates that ‘dirty hands’ in politics 
as ‘immoral’ politics is a misconception of both the political and ethical discourses.  In 
reality, as mentioned previously, the ‘dirty hands’ concept is a way of describing the 
complex situation in which the moral character must compromise utilitarian and 
impartial demands with private ethical commitments.  This does not only happen within 
politics, but it happens there more often than not.  
 
When faced with choosing between the lesser of two evils, or forced to act so that a much 
cherished moral principle will be violated, moral persons find that they are stained of 
polluted by having so to act.  Even though they were moved by moral considerations or 
obligations to commit moral violations, the result is “dirty hands,” the loss of moral 
innocence and the knowledge that they have been a willing and active causal link in the 
furthering of evil projects.
498
  
   
The political question that naturally arises from all those considerations is then 
‘How can a government [or politicians in general] be satisfactorily ethical?’499  
According to Williams, Plato and Machiavelli’s political expositions can be conflated 
into ‘How can the good rule the world as it is?’ which is then followed by ‘How a 
political system should be?’500  However, a critical approach to both Plato and 
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Machiavelli’s political philosophies has certainly implied that this might be a deceiving 
question.  Also, Weber’s theory on moral pluralism consistently argued that the 
separation between ‘the good’ and ‘the world as it is’ is not entirely correct or realistic.  
Reality and value are relative things but still related to human judgment.  Thus, the good 
incorporates the world as it is because goodness is not the same as innocence; innocence 
is contradictory with active life, as it is moral absolutism.  Whether someone is good or 
not is to be judged in real life situations where efficiency and goodness are not clearly 
distinguished, resulting in impossibility for innocence.
501
  Innocence demands absence 
from action, whereas goodness demands engaging in moral conflict.  Integrity is the 
outcome of this conflict like ‘ordinary’ morality is the outcome of the fermentation of 
‘value orders’.  Goodness cannot be identified with one being morally impeccable; it is 
not equivalent to innocence.
502
  From a realistic perspective goodness can only be 
identified with one doing what is morally possible and best in certain circumstances.  In 
this sense, one does not have to avoid participating in politics in order to be good.    
Thus, we should answer the question about the nature of the political system 
under the auspices of a different understanding of ethics, i.e. the political system should 
be able to incorporate and prioritize values according to the suggestions of value 
pluralism.  The ‘dirty hands’ concept can help us do that, through the examination of the 
relationship between rules of conduct (which can be deontic, utilitarian or a mix of them 
in nature) and the moral character: 
 
The notion of dirty hands derives from an effort to refuse “absolutism” without denying the 
reality of the moral dilemma.  Though this may appear to utilitarian philosophers to pile 
confusion upon confusion, I propose to take it very seriously […]  Let me begin, then, with 
a piece of conventional wisdom to the effect that politicians are a good deal worse, morally 
worse, than the rest of us (it is the wisdom of the rest of us) […]  [This] suggests that the 
dilemma of dirty hands is a central feature of political life, that it arises not merely as an 
occasional crisis in the career of this or that unlucky politician but systematically and 
frequently.
503
 
 
  It is an ontological argument to say that human rationalism has certain limits 
which cannot be overcome.  Therefore, the view that despite our best efforts we have 
not succeeded in constructing a governmental system that is independent of the moral 
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qualities of its leaders
504
 is in accordance to a pluralist view of morality which accepts 
this ontological assumption (going back to Aristotle).  Therefore, the significance of the 
moral character in fulfilling a system of imperfect moral rules which frequently 
generates moral dilemmas becomes more and more obvious.  The significance of the 
moral character depends on how the essence of the rules of conduct is conceived.  
Political and public institutions are imperfect because those who designed them are 
imperfect.  Hence it lies within the abilities and the quality of the political agent to 
resolve those moral as well as practical conflicts, which derive from these 
imperfections.  This is where the usefulness of the ‘dirty hands’ concept lies. 
It is not entirely correct then to say, as Mendus states, that the ‘dirty hands’ 
argument revolves around the idea ‘that politics as a profession demands a willingness 
to depart from moral goodness.’505  A further consideration of the definitions of moral 
integrity and goodness indicates that this is a simplistic understanding of the character 
of politics.  This is because according to value pluralism, in some cases, there are no 
stable criteria according to which we can claim a departure from goodness or an 
assimilation of evil practices.  Monistic understandings of morality, on the other hand, 
would not accept that there can even be such a concept as ‘dirty hands’.  Because cases 
of ‘dirty hands’ emanate from the distinction between private and public or political 
morality; i.e. from clashes between equally valued and irreducible to each other moral 
principles.  A monistic explanation of moral and political conduct would reject that 
those clashes are an inherent feature of ethics and thus it would de facto reject the 
possibility of ‘dirty hands’.   
In the end, the ‘dirty hands’ concept is the natural political outcome of the 
irreducible value pluralism which characterizes ethics.  When there is a perfect moral 
system there can be no ‘dirty hands’ in the above sense because no one would have to 
violate an otherwise inviolable value in order to achieve a ‘higher’ moral end.  Prior 
prioritization of moral values or an overriding principle would resolve such an –
otherwise dilemmatic– situation ad initium.  In this instance, the ‘dirty hands’ problem 
would be reduced to cases of corruption.  Nonetheless, we have argued that the conflict 
between private and political morality cannot be reduced to cases wherein promoting 
self-interest is at odds with public interest; i.e. the ‘dirty hands’ concept is not related to 
cases of corruption.  In this sense De Wijze and Goodwin are right to define a ‘dirty 
hands analysis as one which is used in order to evaluate the normative aspects of 
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morally complex political situations.
506
  According to them, the concept of ‘dirty hands’ 
can help us demonstrate ‘that within ethical theory there is the conceptual or theoretical 
space to claim that it is possible (even laudatory) to do the right thing yet, nevertheless, 
at the same time also be guilty of serious wrongdoing’.507  
For the same reasons, ‘dirty hands’ situations are also impossible when morality 
and politics are considered to be unrelated.  The politician cannot act in a morally 
ambiguous manner when there are no general moral rules to be violated.  This argument 
reveals how thin is the line that separates moral absolutism from pure amoralism when 
one has to make practical decisions.  This is the argument that has been repeated in 
almost all versions of political ethics as illustrated in the preceding chapters: politics 
without symbolic references is a groundless, arbitrary and thus doomed to fail process.  
This is why Walzer begins his famous analysis of the problem of ‘dirty hands’ by 
asking whether there are real moral dilemmas or not.  Walzer’s argument makes a good 
case against utilitarianism which is the dominating moral feature in politics.  This 
criticism is based on the pluralist view that not only is the existence of a real moral 
dilemma possible, but also that whether frequently or very rarely any of us might one 
day face it.  ‘Indeed’ Walzer says ‘many men have faced it, or think they have, 
especially men involved in political activity or war […]  In modern times the dilemma 
appears most often as the problem of “dirty hands.” ’508   
According to him, philosophical monism, in the form of utilitarianism, would 
juxtapose against this view three extensive arguments
509
 –which have already been 
analyzed in their moral context, but they are now directly related to political conduct: 
first, that every political choice ought to be made solely in terms of its particular and 
immediate circumstances.  The good man will face difficult practical choices but he will 
never face a real moral dilemma, because the morality of his conduct will be judged by 
the overriding utility of his decision.  In this case, even when the politician lies and 
tortures his hands will be clean.  There will be no moral remainder because there was no 
immoral act in the first place.  This is, according to Walzer, an attractive description of 
moral decision-making, but it is also a very improbable one, because as we have argued 
so far the essence of morality lies in the interrelation between the private and the social.  
The quality of both the moral and political agency lies in the ability to reconcile the 
rules and values of those different spheres and also, as MacIntyre suggested, in the 
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ability to challenge and criticize them.  But ‘the experience of coming up against these 
rules, challenging their prohibitions […] is so obviously important that no account of 
moral decision-making can possibly come to grips with it.’510 
Hence the second utilitarian argument: ‘such rules do indeed exist, but they are 
not really prohibitions of wrongful actions […] They are moral guidelines, summaries 
of previous calculations.  They ease our choices in ordinary cases[.]’511  This argument 
refers to Hare’s criticism upon the function of intuitions as moral guidelines.  Politics, 
according to this utilitarian approach, constitutes a social section where exceptional 
moral situations happen more often than in ordinary life, but they do not really differ 
qualitatively.  Thus, as in ordinary life we have to use the utility principle in order to 
override our intuitional prohibitions, similarly in politics when a decision is based on 
sound calculative processes there cannot be a moral crime.  Ergo, the impossibility of 
both the ‘dirty hands’ argument and the feeling of guilt as a moral remainder lies in the 
superiority of utility in resolving conflicts.   
The opposite argument from a pluralist view is that utility cannot generally 
override all other moral claims; not only because this appears to be counter-intuitive, 
but also because we cannot philosophically establish the supremacy of one set of moral 
values over the others.  The corollary political argument, according to Walzer, is that 
when politicians must violate, in practice, a moral principle which is inviolable in 
theory, they do not simply explain their conduct in terms of justification, but they also 
ask for forgiveness or to be excused: ‘an excuse is typically an admission of fault; a 
justification is typically a denial of fault and an assertion of innocence.’512  Thus, when 
politicians are not ready to commit a morally faulty action they appear to be absolutists 
and irresponsible from a realist perspective.  On the other hand, when they are ready to 
offer justifications but never excuses for a morally condemnable action they are 
probably not taking seriously the morally formative importance of political conduct. 
However, the question remains: does feeling guilty mean that there really is a 
moral dilemma?  Walzer, like Williams, argues that it does so.  The feeling of guilt is 
the necessary ‘moral remainder’ which shows that when moral rules are practically 
violated, in extreme situations, they are not at the same time cancelled or annulled.  This 
is why this feeling is a crucial feature of our moral life according to Walzer.  ‘Hence the 
third utilitarian argument, which recognizes the usefulness of guilt and seeks to explain 
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it [...]  And so a good man will respect the rules rather than he would if he thought them 
merely guidelines, and he will feel guilty when he overrides them […]  Because of 
those feelings he will never be in a hurry to override them[.]’513  The problem with this 
final argument, Walzer says, is that it conceives the ‘moral remainder’ in utilitarian 
terms, reducing thus, again, the meaning of both the moral agent and morality itself to 
simple calculations: can then someone feel guilty, for good utilitarian reasons, when he 
has no reason for believing that he really is guilty?
514
  In other words, when the 
politician adopts the monistic approach of a utilitarian account of morality he or she will 
inevitably end up feeling guilty less and less as he or she engages in political agency.  
This brings us back to the amoral face of politics. 
 
 
C) Private life and public office: Some accounts of the ‘dirty hands’ problem 
Parrish summarizes the several aspects which attribute this special, morally obscure and 
problematic, character to politics as they have been analyzed so far: first is violence; the 
political state acts with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and coercive 
means.  ‘States must command, and must compel those who disobey their commands to 
comply, by force if necessary.’  Another quality of political life that, according to 
Parrish, makes moral action more difficult is ‘the frequent presence of ruthless and 
unscrupulous competition.’  Third, and mostly related to contemporary politics, is the 
special status held by the claims of universalism, neutrality, and the objective point of 
view; an inclination towards impartiality that tends to rule out the consideration of 
particularities.  Finally, and most importantly, in politics, claims of large-scale social 
benefits seem to possess a peculiar moral importance: ‘in no other scene of human life 
is it the case that the well-being of so many can be shaped so profoundly by the 
decisions of so few.’515  Weber and Nagel established where this difference between the 
moral importance of political or public institutions and private conduct lies.  This same 
difference, or the peculiar moral demands that separate private from collective action, is 
what distinguishes moral (as in ‘ordinary’ morality) from political responsibility.    
Generally speaking, the problem of ‘dirty hands’ arises more sharply in 
democratic political societies (but not only in there) due to the fact that, in a democracy, 
authority is formally wielded by the whole body politic but it is executed by its 
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representatives.  We must remember that when a body politic claims moral permission 
for its government to undertake morally ambiguous actions, it acknowledges that it 
shares responsibility for those actions.  In other words, when we claim moral permission 
for our governments to undertake on our behalf morally dubious deeds, as they will 
inevitably do, we do so at the cost of acknowledging ourselves as co-perpetrators of 
those deeds.
516
  In other words in a democracy we might transfer our right to make 
political decisions to our representatives, but this does not mean that we also fully 
transfer our moral responsibility for these decisions.  After all, the representatives do 
represent us.  Nevertheless, according to Richard Bellamy,
517
 we usually set higher 
moral standards for politicians than those we set for ourselves.  Do such double 
standards make not politicians but us ordinary citizens the hypocrites?  Or does politics 
require we hold politicians to a higher standard of moral judgment to that we apply to 
ourselves?  The question somewhat simplifies the moral problem, but the answer 
ultimately lies in how we understand the balance between our personal and impersonal 
standpoints and, consequently, in how we conceive the resulting discontinuity between 
private and public or political morality.   
 Hollis’ article on ‘dirty hands’ attempts to answer these questions and similarly 
starts from the argument about the interplay between private life and public office.  
Hollis upholds the view about responsibility in a democratic polity: politicians are our 
agents and their ‘dirty hands’ are ours, he claims.  However, he does not mean that the 
citizens are always to blame for all the sins of their uncivil servants, since, he assumes, 
offices can be abused or the state apparatus lose its claim to legitimacy.  ‘But even 
where the government truly represents the people, there may be dirty work for it to do; 
and then its dirty work is ours.  That is what groups a secretary of state, who orders a 
massacre, together with a soldier, who executes one, and sets both apart from a 
company chairman, who orders a lie, and salesman, who tells it.  Are there, then, 
officers of state who have a moral duty to do for us what we would be morally wrong to 
do for ourselves?’518  If the answer to this question is positive then we cannot at the 
same time claim that we should hold politicians to a higher standard of moral judgment 
to that we apply to ourselves.  
 However, we should not go so far as to consider that the ‘dirty hands’ concept 
only refers to a clash between public and private morality.  The conflict of values is 
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certainly more acute in politics for all the reasons analyzed already.  But ‘it is important 
not to slip into a commonly held error that simply because cases [of ‘dirty hands’] occur 
more frequently and dramatically in politics (and, more generally, in public life) this 
means that this clash between public and private values is the defining feature of the 
[‘dirty hands’] problem.’519  De Wijze and Goodwin emphasize here the need to 
understand the political expression of ‘dirty hands’ as a deeper philosophical problem, 
i.e. the necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘dirty hands’ cases are not embedded in 
the roles of political or public life, but lie elsewhere.  This is why, according to Walzer, 
even if one rightly follows the utilitarian reasoning in order to resolve a politically 
complex situation one will still feel guilty because of a moral wrong.
520
    
Walzer argues that we can distinguish ‘three ways of thinking about dirty hands, 
which derive in some very general fashion from neoclassical, Protestant, Catholic 
perspectives of politics and morality.’521  For Walzer’s own purposes the accuracy of 
this categorization is not very important.  What is important is the content of these 
roughly distinguished traditions.  Briefly, the first tradition derives from a positive 
answer to the question posed above by Hollis: ‘Are there, then, officers of state who 
have a moral duty to do for us what we would be morally wrong to do for ourselves?’  
The officers that would accept this ‘extra’ moral duty belong to the ‘Machiavellian’ 
tradition.  The republican interpretation of Machiavelli’s works –usually affiliated with 
political realism as analyzed in the previous chapters– argues that the heroic Prince 
must exercise his duty to act for the good of his people in a world full of ‘wolves’ and 
‘snares’.  ‘So he cannot practise the virtues of a good citizen without betraying the 
interests of his subjects [...]  The message is that there is dirty work to be done for the 
glory of the princedom and that a virtuous prince cannot discharge his duties without 
doing it.  He should get his hands dirty and wear clean gloves.’522   
This is the common view of the relationship between politics and morality 
nowadays.  It is a view that argues about the necessity of compromising in order to 
disregard the paradoxes that derive from this relationship, but without ever revealing or 
explaining the compromise.  This is why political realism is often met with doubt and 
suspicion.  Ordinary people should accept that the politicians will have to act immorally 
in order to promote good and the only solution for the paradox seems to be a morality of 
appearances; that is, we all know that politicians will have to do dirty work on our 
                                                 
519
 De Wijze & Goodwin, ‘Bellamy on Dirty Hands’, 531. 
520
 Ibid., 531. 
521
 Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, 174. 
522
 Hollis, ‘Dirty Hands’, 389. 
225 
 
behalf but because we cannot accept the moral cost we need them, at least, to appear 
clean; thus, the ‘dirty hands clean gloves’ perspective.523     
 This first tradition is characterized, according to Walzer, by the fact that the 
Machiavellian hero has no inwardness.  And for that he should be suspect; not because 
he tells political actors they must get their hands dirty, but because he does not specify 
the state of mind appropriate to a man with dirty hands.  We know he is dirty, we know 
he attempts to appear clean, but ‘What he thinks of himself we don’t know.’524  The 
moral character of the political agent remains thus hidden, only to be judged by 
practical outcomes.  This is obviously dangerous because it shows how easily political 
realism can degenerate into political amoralism.  The second tradition Walzer examines 
takes an opposite view.  It is one in which personal anguish sometimes seems the only 
acceptable excuse for political crimes.  This is, according to him, the Weberian tradition 
as we examined it previously.  In Politics as a Vocation, according to Walzer, Weber 
essentially argues that the good man with dirty hands is a hero still, but he is a tragic 
hero: ‘With full consciousness of what he is doing, he does bad in order to do good, and 
surrenders his soul... His choices are hard and painful, and he pays the price not only 
while making them but forever after.’  Walzer claims that the trouble with this view is 
that Weber attempts to resolve the problem of ‘dirty hands’ entirely within the confines 
of the individual conscience; but sometimes the hero’s suffering needs to be socially 
expressed and sometimes socially limited.
525
   
For Walzer, a politician with ‘dirty hands’ is an ethical concept that cannot be 
separated from the social norms of morality.  The best way to assure this is a 
punishment for his or her immoral acts; a punishment according to the precepts of 
‘ordinary morality’.  In that way, personal integrity or private ethical considerations are 
being connected with the social and both the perpetrator of the immoral action and the 
collective recipients of it acquire a better understanding of this action.  When the 
politician pays the penalty his or her hands will be clean again, or as clean as human 
hands can ever be.  Thus, the ‘dirty hands’ concept does not try to wash away the 
immorality of a contestable action under the guise of utilitarian calculation (as is the 
case in politics more often than not).  Rather, ‘it faces head on the paradoxical situation 
where politicians are sometimes required to do wrong in order to do right.  And in so 
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doing, they become morally polluted and “tragic heroes”. ’526  The punishment is not to 
be decided according to the rules of politics itself; it must be the connective link 
between the ‘political order’ and the rest of the social spheres.   
So the Catholic Church has always taught, and this teaching is central to the 
third tradition of political ethics according to Walzer.  The thinker who can best 
represent this tradition is, for Walzer, Albert Camus and his political extremism as 
illustrated in his play The Just Assassins.  Here we have the problem of ‘dirty hands’ in 
a new form.  The heroes are innocent criminals, just assassins, because having killed, 
they are prepared to die –and will die: they are tragic figures because they faced a tragic 
dilemma.  ‘Only their execution, by the same despotic authorities they are attacking, 
will complete the action in which they are engaged: dying, they need make no excuses.  
That is the end of their guilt and pain.  The execution is not so much punishment as self-
punishment and expiation.  On the scaffold they wash their hands clean and, unlike the 
[Weberian] suffering servant, they die happy.’527  Walzer admits that he finds this third 
view more attractive than the other two and his inclination toward Camus’ perspective 
constitutes his famous argument about ‘dirty hands’.  This argument derives from the 
tradition that requires from us at least to imagine a punishment or a penance that fits the 
crime of the politician and so to examine closely the nature of the crime.  The other 
traditions, according to him, do not require that.  Thus, ‘We would honour him [the 
politician] for the good he has done, and we would punish him for the bad he has done.  
We would punish him, that is, for the same reasons we punish anyone else’.528     
Hollis offers a philosophically simpler, but no less tragic, explanation of the ‘dirty 
hands’ problem.  There are, he says, two general views of politicians that also depict 
different traditions of political thought.  First, he says, is the tradition that conceives the 
politician as the Machiavellian hero, a republican figure that must be ready to violate 
‘ordinary morality’ in favour of the state.  The most interesting view though, for Hollis, 
is the second opposite and more absolutist view of politicians which proposes that the 
political leaders should be ‘citizens squared’.529  By this account the statesman should 
bring only private virtues to public life: 
 
Machiavelli’s view of virtue in princes cannot be extended to people at large, because a 
princely fox can operate only if people at large are not like him.  But there is no such 
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difficulty about supposing that everyone, prince and citizen alike, should live out the 
virtues of private life.  The vision of a society governed by people whose integrity is that of 
private citizens and who shoulder the burdens of office as they would those of a home-
maker is an attractive one.  It has a simple and a subtle version.  The simple one equates the 
integrity of the individual with unswerving obedience to conscience or to curt moral 
imperatives in all situations.  If thou shalt not lie, then thou shalt not lie in office and thou 
shalt not order others to lie.  This is the stuff of martyrs, and it has its obvious appeal...  The 
subtler version has a more nuanced view of principle and of the nature of integrity in 
private life.  It endorses [the view] against drawing sharp contrasts between an ethics of 
duty and an ethics of expediency.  Integrity, therefore, is not a stark affair of flying the flag 
of principle, going down with the ship and damning the consequences...  The citizen 
squared must treat the demands of office as a legitimate claim on his private integrity; yet, 
in doing so, he concedes nothing to Machiavelli.
530
       
 
The simpler version of the citizen-squared view derives from an absolutist, 
monistic conception of morality and politics usually affiliated with Christian and 
deontic ethics.  This conception can be easily criticized and rejected with respect to 
political action for all the reasons mentioned in the previous chapters, especially in the 
Weberian analysis: ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord”– 
and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has 
to give an account of foreseeable results of one’s action... a man who believes in an 
ethic of responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies of people.’531  
Therefore, as Hollis continues Weber’s argument, the integrity of the martyr is saved at 
his own expense, whereas the statesman’s refusal to compromise is paid for by his 
people.  ‘The martyr goes to the stake himself and that we admire.  But, let loose with 
political power, he sends others to the stake with an equal will and, in shutting his eyes 
to the moral nuances of political life without thereby abolishing them, he licenses very 
foul play, provided that it is conducted outside the limits of his simple moral lexicon.’532     
 The second and subtler version of the citizen-squared view is an attempt to 
mitigate the results of absolute attitudes in politics.  The ‘citizen squared’ must treat the 
demands of office as a legitimate claim on his private integrity, and this might seem that 
will often result in Machiavellian advice.  However, there is still a difference and for 
Hollis this difference shows itself when we ask whose integrity is at stake; namely, who 
will bear responsibility for the potentially morally dubious claims of office.  The 
republican Machiavelli makes it that of the Prince, since there is no more final answer to 
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the questions ‘Who is the Prince?’  The ‘citizen squared’, by contrast, Hollis argues, is 
an individual first and a Prince (a politician or a public servant) afterwards.  The identity 
of an individual does not change with office and we are all individuals.  ‘On 
Machiavelli’s account, therefore, the Dirty Hands problem is ultimate, since the 
morality of princes has a different origin from the morality of citizens.  On the citizen-
squared view the units of moral accounting are always individuals, whatever special 
dilemmas face those individuals who hold office.’533  Here, it is made clear that the 
‘dirty hands’ problem is the political expression of a moral dilemma based upon the 
tension between private and political morality, between the self and the public or 
political roles that the self must fulfil. 
The problem of this subtler version of the ‘citizen-squared’ view, and 
accordingly the need to reject it, may be traced, according to Hollis, in the argument 
about the relation between private values and the demands of public or political roles.  
Here, the central paradox of politics in relation to morality derives from a conflict 
between the self and the role.  The ‘citizen-squared’ view would have it that integrity is 
not a matter of identifying with one role or the other but of remaining true to one’s own 
self.  This approach assumes that we can put moral constraints on individuals distinct 
from all normative constraints on holders of office.  However, Hollis suggests, this 
misconstrues the relation of self to role, the nature of moral choice and hence the ‘dirty 
hands’ problem,534 and he gives three reasons for this:  First, he says, the holding of 
office can change the basis of moral decision.  The difference between private and 
public persons could be expressed by saying that private individuals acquire new moral 
duties with office.   
Secondly, the attempt to place universal moral requirements on everyone, 
whether in office or not, fails to resolve the moral dilemmas of office.  According to 
Hollis, such requirements are too broad and if general principles are treated as elastic, so 
that they can be massaged into specific shape for specific situations, then office 
becomes a specific situation.  Thirdly, it is fallacious, Hollis claims, to argue that, where 
roles conflict, there must be a place to stand, which is prior to all roles, in order to 
umpire the conflict, exactly because there is no true human situation other than the web 
of social roles.
535
  Thus, Hollis essentially rejects the ‘citizen-squared’ view based on a 
theory of value pluralism.  Because of that pluralism we cannot assign priority to either 
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the self (personal standpoint) or the role (impersonal standpoint).  Attempting to find 
universal reasons in order to assign this priority is doomed to fail as an absolutist, and 
thus inappropriate approach to politics. 
Hence, schematically, Hollis’ and Walzer’s general question has been whether 
there are two sources of morality, one grounding the duties of persons in office, the 
other those of private individuals which could also be called ‘ordinary’ morality as it 
was explained in the preceding chapters.  However, it might be more appropriate to talk 
about two different systems within one pluralist moral world.  In both their arguments 
the ‘dirty hands’ concept has been used in order to enter the philosophical debate about 
the discontinuity between the private and public or political morality.  Walzer’s 
conclusion is that political action is so morally uncertain that politicians necessarily take 
moral as well as political risks, committing crimes that they only think ought to be 
committed.  In other words, politicians under the morally peculiar demands of politics 
are hard pressed to act in ways that they know they might be morally dubious.  ‘They 
override rules without ever being certain that they have found the best way to the results 
they hope to achieve, and we don’t want them to do that too quickly or too often.  So it 
is important that the moral stakes be very high –which is to say, that the rules be rightly 
valued.’536  That, Walzer argues, is the reason for Camus’ political extremism: because 
without his executioner there is no one to set the stakes or maintain the values except 
ourselves, and also, there is probably no way to do either except through philosophic 
reiteration and political activity.  For Walzer, the politician lies, manipulates, and kills, 
and we must make sure he pays the price.
537
   This must be done in order to make 
certain that morality and politics must check each other.  
The ‘citizen-squared view’, as explained and rejected by Hollis, suggests that 
there cannot be two sources of morality, but only the universal duties of individuals.  
This is essentially how moral absolutism conceives of politics.  In a refined form, this 
view allows that the demands of office do make a difference, or in other words that the 
apparent tension between private and public moral considerations is taken into account.  
Hollis understands the unrealistic nature of the ‘citizen-squared’ view because he cannot 
see how the self can offer overriding moral reasons against the political role it is 
supposed to fulfil.  Thus, for him, even a limited abstraction from social roles to pre-
social moral individuals cannot be acceptable.  Although Hollis does not specifically 
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develop his account in terms of value pluralism, his argument can be clearly explicated 
based on the irreducible variety of ‘value orders’.        
However, Hollis admits that ‘I may have made the Princely view sound as if a 
Prince were necessarily a social actor, whereas his subjects were individuals.  In that 
case it would be plausible to suggest that there are two moralities, one social and the 
other individual.  But there is no need to put it like that.  The Prince’s subjects are not 
individuals but citizens; and the difference in the moral demands of public and private 
life attaches to different social positions’.  In final analysis, ‘Moral questions are about 
how we should live out social relations with others and, I submit, answers involve 
nothing more private than a citizen.’538  Even though Hollis is explicitly saying that 
there are two sources of morality, he concludes that private morality is irrelevant in 
constituting, motivating and controlling political life: ‘the art of the morally permissible 
in an arena where there is no one more private than a citizen’.539  In the end, he says, he 
cannot find a better solution to the paradox of ‘dirty hands’ than a compromise of letting 
our agents act beyond our control.
540
   Nevertheless, this approach renders the 
relationship between politics and morality problematic, because when private morality 
is to be firmly separated from public and political morality we end up with political 
amoralist attitudes.  The solution should be to conceive moral integrity as the outcome 
in part of our engagement into social roles and in part of our ability critically to evaluate 
the morality of those roles according to our private ethical commitments, not to reject 
the significance of morality in political conduct altogether.  
 Hollis’ conclusion about the ‘citizen-squared’ view is that it differs from the 
Machiavellian in bidding the man in office do what he would do, were he not in office.  
According to him, this demand is incoherent, since the problem would not exist for him, 
were he not in office.
541
  Political roles are created in the first place in order to be 
different.  We have seen in the preceding chapter the example that intends to 
corroborate his claim: if I were a fireman sent to put out a fire in the school, then I 
should treat my children exactly like all others, because it is morally corrupt to use the 
powers of office to further personal relationships.  And from this logically follows that 
the attempt to place universal moral requirements on everyone, whether in office or not, 
fails to resolve the moral dilemmas of office; and that, secondly, it is fallacious to argue 
that, where roles conflict, there must be a place to stand, which is prior to all roles, in 
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order to umpire the conflict, exactly because there is no true human situation other than 
the web of social roles.
542
  In other words, morality is basically constituted by moral 
specificities as these are defined by different social roles.  Value pluralism reflects this 
variety of roles.  Therefore, this variety is unavoidable and moral conflicts are also 
unavoidable, unless we conceive the different moral spheres of our lives as totally 
unrelated with each other, or attempt, like Plato, to eradicate variety altogether.    
 
 
D) Politics and morality: The normative importance of the ‘dirty hands’ concept 
The argument from the value pluralism perspective is that in our lives there will always 
be situations where moral agents would be unable to assign priority and to decide the 
right way to act.  ‘Dirty hands’ is not an exclusively political phenomenon, but it is an 
appropriate explanation of the fact that the different structure of politics demands a 
different understanding and application of ‘ordinary’ moral values.  The difference 
derives from the strong claims of impartiality and utility in the public and political 
‘orders’ respectively.  How we would decide about this application depends on our 
understanding –habitual and critical– of the relationship between the personal and the 
impersonal standpoint.  It should not be determined merely by the significance that 
social or political roles have in themselves, because these are also externally 
determined.      
Nagel’s conclusion that public morality, that is, the impersonal imposition of 
rules, has a special character exactly because of its scale, its lack of individuality and its 
institutional structure, does not mean that it should be considered unrelated to private 
morality.  Thus when public officials accept special obligations in serving interests that 
their office is designed to advance, they correlatively reduce their right to consider other 
factors.  These factors include their personal interests in a sense that they are not related 
to the institution or their role in it.
543
  If public and political morality is, in final analysis, 
related with ‘ordinary’ morality, the basic moral constraints we should pose on public 
and political action derive partly from ‘ordinary’ moral values. It does not matter how 
these values have been constituted in the first place, i.e. with priority given either to our 
impersonal or personal standpoint. The important thing is that the utilitarian and 
impartial reasoning of the public and political ‘order’ is kept under check.  Hence the 
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expression ‘dirty hands’ when these limits have been violated, even if this violation was 
necessary in order to promote some other moral end.  
Thus, some of the above philosophical approaches are similar in recognizing 
that private and political principles belong to different –and sometimes conflicting– 
types of values.  This does not mean that they are not interrelated.  Therefore, we must 
apply additional constraints –as derived from ‘ordinary’ morality– on public and 
political action.  It has been acknowledged that public life may have a special character 
and weight due to the special features of public and political roles (acting for others, 
ruling over others, using violence against them etc.), but they propose that private 
morality should not be completely separated from political considerations.  Then again, 
it is in Walzer’s account that we see why the conflict of moral values is unavoidable and 
how we should face this inevitability: ‘We would punish [the politician], that is, for the 
same reasons we punish anyone else.’  Understanding the nature of moral character in 
relation to the political decisions that must be made offers the solution to political 
judgment: ‘it is by his hands that we know him.  If he were a moral man and nothing 
else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would 
pretend that they were clean.’544   
 The pluralistic argument of ‘dirty hands’ should be posed against the ‘dirty 
hands clean gloves’ concept, according to which we all know that politicians act or 
should act immorally, but as long as they are able to hide this we should be satisfied.  It 
is the logic of value pluralism that takes for granted, at least for a democratic society, 
that individuals as citizens share, and they should share, the moral burdens of the 
political deeds done by their politicians.  This is their unavoidable role as members of a 
political community.  This logic requires that there will be posed some limits to the ‘end 
justifies the means’.  In final analysis, since private morality is strongly interrelated to 
political morality it should pose some constraints upon public or political action.  Of 
course, public officials accept special obligations that come with their assigned 
positions and in doing so they correlatively reduce their right to consider other factors, 
not related to the institution or their role in it: this is the special character of public and 
political obligations.
545
  However, it is still a special character, not an autonomous one, 
and the basic moral constraints that set the limits and control political action and/or the 
abuse of public and political resources derive from this interrelation and this tension 
indeed.  The abuse and misuse of power and the corrupted use of collective resources is 
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a private moral behaviour and it should be criticized like one.  Thus the public and 
political wrong should be in principle conceived as a criminal act.
546
    
The approach suggested here is not only philosophically against the ‘dirty hands 
clean gloves’ compromise, but also, and maybe more importantly, politically.  The 
problem with the ‘dirty hands clean gloves’ argument is that politicians and public 
officials would (too) often use it in order to abuse the power that comes with the special 
character of their public role.  This is the Platonic argument against power for power’s 
sake as illustrated in the Myth of Gyges.  For Plato, reluctance to hold political power 
was the last safety valve against political amoralism.  Similarly, the ‘dirty hands’ 
argument, as constructed so far in relation to insoluble and tragic dilemmas, compels us 
to assign the appropriate importance towards feeling the moral cost of a moral violation 
for moral reasons.  This is because, essentially, the significance of reluctance depends 
on the recognition of the tragic nature of human condition and of the tragic remorse of 
the agents involved in dubious moral activities.
547
  Therefore, the concept of reluctance 
which can be traced back in the classical debate between politics and morality is in 
close relationship with the concept of the ‘moral remainder’.  The virtuous agent is 
indeed virtuous because he is reluctant to act in front of the moral and possible tragic 
dilemmas he might face, and also because when he does act he is burdened with the 
‘moral remainder’ of his resolute action.548  
Peter Digeser argues that Walzer’s solution to the problem may not be 
ultimately desirable because there can be no punishment for tragic choices, since this 
may render other actors less willing to make such difficult choices.
549
  However, having 
politicians entering politics because they know there will be no ‘ordinary’ moral 
constraints and criminal punishment for immoral acts, is certainly an even worse 
scenario.  Besides, Digeser agrees that this alternative, which is concentrated in Weber’s 
proposition that the ethic of responsibility for politicians should have a corresponding 
ethic of responsibility for citizens, is not desirable as well.  This view pronounces the 
empathy of citizens and their understanding of the perplexing moral claims of the 
political world: citizens should understand the predicament of their politicians and 
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forget, but not forgive, their moral misdeeds.  But, Digeser says, ‘The danger of citizens 
adopting an ethic of responsibility is that it is all too easy for politicians to portray the 
normal as extraordinary and claim that it is necessary to do evil in situations in which it 
is not true.’550   
In the case of ‘dirty hands’ the appeals to necessity generated by this problem 
are extraordinarily dangerous and have been frequently misused: ‘In light of the 
difficulties for citizens to discern whether a problem of dirty hands has actually arisen, 
and given the propensity of politicians to deploy this excuse, forgetting the remainder 
simply lets government evade responsibility...  Politicians may have to dirty their hands, 
but they should not expect political amnesia or forgiveness.  Wrongs that issue from 
appeals to necessity should be politically unforgivable and not forgotten.’551  If the ethic 
of responsibility is too passive for citizens and entails the danger of the misuse of 
power, Digeser argues, citizens should adopt an angle of repose or vigilance, an 
antagonistic resignation toward their government.  According to this view, doing evil to 
do good should diminish the reservoir of support for a regime and its leaders.  ‘It should 
cost enough so that politicians are careful with its use.  However, it should not be so 
costly (which may be the case if punishment were called for) that politicians refuse to 
act in face of tragic choices.’  This angle of repose should not be transformed into 
cynicism from citizens’ part because in a state with cynical citizenry the danger of 
general social corruption is unavoidable.
552
  In a strikingly opportune argument 
Bosanquet wrote, almost a century ago, that ‘The means adopted by [a] supreme power 
to discharge its responsibilities as a whole, are of course subject to criticism as respects 
of the conception of good which they imply and their appropriateness to the task of 
realising it.  But’, Bosanquet continues, ‘it is mere confusion to apply to them names 
borrowed from analogous acts of individuals within communities, to impute them, as it 
were, to individuals under dyslogistic predicates and to pass moral judgment upon them 
in the same sense as on private acts.’553 
In conclusion, the philosophical re-evaluation of the ‘dirty hands’ concept 
should offer or add something to our understanding regarding political decision-making 
and political judgment.  De Wijze and Goodwin argue that a proper ‘dirty hands’ 
analysis improves on the standard analyses by adding at least four separate but 
interrelated levels of assessment to situations of unavoidable moral conflict.  First, it 
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does that by stressing that, in situations where different but equally strong sets’ of 
values conflict, there is no morally cost-free course of action.  Second, a ‘dirty hands’ 
analysis warns against forcing an exclusively deontological or consequentialist, or any 
other moral template, on cases of intractable moral conflict. Third, a ‘dirty hands’ 
analysis influences judgment concerning how we ought to act by providing a further 
layer of considerations beyond the usual concerns of moral and pragmatic 
considerations.  Fourth, it enables the correct characterization of the moral 
phenomenology of getting ‘dirty hands’, that is, how we ought to feel about the 
necessary dirty actions undertaken.  ‘All in all, a [dirty hands] analysis better captures 
our moral reality in the face of intractable moral conflicts[.]’554 
Therefore, the solution to the problem of ‘dirty hands’ is political activity and 
strict moral judgment from the citizens’ part in combination with the endorsement of the 
necessity of moral character in politics.  The philosophical key for such an approach is 
to reject the dominant view of contemporary moral theories which try to avoid the 
paradox of politics and morality altogether.  A theory of value pluralism, as expressed 
in the accounts of Walzer, Hollis, Williams, Nagel, Coady and Mendus, is the starting 
point for such an approach because it helps us ‘appreciate the complexities of a moral 
politics so that we can properly judge politicians and so they can appropriately judge 
themselves.’555  In addition to this approach, however, we should use the concept of 
‘dirty hands’ as a normative account against moral naivety because, as we aimed to 
show in the course of this thesis, some moral conflicts are unavoidable, as their 
consequences are tragic.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
As it has been exposed through the various historical explorations and analytical 
arguments in this thesis, the inner connection between politics and morality is always at 
the centre of attention when classical questions about the meaning and purpose of 
human life are asked. Thus, I hope to have shown that amidst the ever-changing 
conditions of social life the need to insist on a better understanding of this connection 
has not diminished.  Thus, the explicit aim of this thesis has been a contribution to the 
discussion regarding the way political action is morally judged according to its internal 
moral standards and/or to external more ‘ordinary’ standards.  The purpose has been to 
make this distinction understandable and show how ‘ordinary’ or external, on the one 
hand, and specialised or internal to politics moral standards, on the other, are in tension 
but also interrelated.  The central conclusion of my argument has been that the 
continuous need for this kind of clarification is the result of the ongoing process of 
moral fragmentation in the modern world.  The more morality appears to be losing its 
coherent nature, the more politics becomes a disputed, but at the same time morally 
necessary, field of activity. 
Politics is an activity that derives from moral considerations and, at the same 
time, an activity that raises moral considerations by itself.  Thus, when we aim at a 
conception of moral politics it is not always sufficient to state the obvious, i.e. there are 
apparent contradictions, which cannot be resolved unless we are ready to make 
sacrifices or offer a more systematic moral guidance.  From the outset of this argument I 
have tried to make clear that the aim should be more humble, yet more complex.  That 
is, the aim should be a better understanding of our continuously changing moral 
universe in relation to political action and its moral justification.  Better understanding 
is not of course something radically original in itself, but it is necessary as an 
indispensable element for the improvement of the ‘human condition’ in its classical and 
Weberian meaning.  I hope to have shown, therefore, the methodological usefulness in 
re-approaching politics and morality through the spectacles of thinkers whose attempts 
to offer answers to our problem produced powerful political philosophies.  As Pitkin 
rightly argues, ‘[u]ntil we can answer such [problems], we are not ready to criticize or 
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reject, because we do not yet know what is being proposed.  Understanding must take 
precedence over criticism.’556 
Hence, what we have learnt from this philosophical retrospective is that, 
although politics seems to be in perpetual tension with morality, politics can rarely be 
considered as an amoral field of practical conduct.  In contemporary political 
philosophy there has also been some serious attention directed to problems which are 
related to social organization and ethical objectives.  Political morality is therefore a 
recurrent theme, since its complexity and its ambiguities are very intriguing.  This is 
because they make us realize the incompleteness of our political and ethical thought.  
Thus, in attempting to explicate why politics seems an indispensable feature of 
morality, despite the challenges that it continually poses to it, it is possible to approach 
the subject from three different but related perspectives.  First, from the perspective of 
historical reconstructions of major philosophical works, which focus on the tension 
between politics and morality.  Second from the perspective of philosophical arguments, 
which focus on the discussion about the nature of morality in relation to practical 
choices.  And finally from a political perspective, which focuses on the practical 
consequences of the tension between politics and morality and on the special moral 
character of politics itself.  However, only rarely do we find accounts that explain the 
relationship between politics and morality within a comprehensive account that 
combines these three approaches.   My aspiration has been, therefore, to introduce the 
possibility and usefulness for such an account, which would begin from an 
understanding of the problem itself through its history; continue with a philosophical 
analysis of all the variables that constitute the problem in the present circumstances; and 
conclude with the practical claim that we should rely on politics as the only viable 
solution to the problem of morality.  In other words, I wish to suggest that politics is not 
the problem for moral action, but the solution of moral action. 
Hampshire argues that ‘Plato and Aristotle were surely right to think that virtues 
and vices in government, and in the uses of power, always constitute the greater part of 
morality, or at least one half of morality, when we come to reflect on our life and 
times’557  This is the starting point and the general argument that underlies this thesis 
and explains the need for the historical reconstruction.  Plato sets the background and 
terminology of the problem: the fundamental distinction between the moral code of 
private action and the moral code of political action.  He argues that the solution to this 
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problem requires a holistic approach which does not separate political theory from a 
theory of knowledge and ethical theory.  The holistic and permanent solution is 
indicative of Plato’s desperation about the most important philosophical problem: the 
relation between morality, politics and being.  He essentially asks ‘how can humans live 
a happy (virtuous) life, without having first resolved the difficulties in organising their 
collective existence?’  His answer is that this organisation must first and foremost aim 
at preserving one’s moral self-integrity, and this can only be achieved if we stop posing 
contradictory demands to it.  This is, at the end of the day, what we are struggling with 
even nowadays; the fundamental philosophical problem that underpins, without 
exception, all political philosophies. 
Resolving this problem without having recourse to metaphysical accounts of 
morality was Aristotle’s response to Plato.  For Aristotle, the problem is a practical-one 
because morality is about practical choices; it is about what one ought to do given some 
set of known and unknown factors or conditions.  Thus, from the classical beginnings of 
the debate there is a variety of political dimensions in pondering about morality, 
considering that practical choices within the sphere of politics seem to bear the greatest 
moral importance for our collective existence.  Therefore, Aristotle’s political 
philosophy is particularly significant in the historical reconstruction of the problem 
because, as argued previously, his analysis of theoretical and practical reason and the 
transition from the former to the latter constitutes the basis for every succeeding 
philosophical account regarding the relationship between politics and morality.  The 
Aristotelian tradition (often identified with classical republicanism) is still very strong 
nowadays exactly because it develops a complete and realistic frame within which we 
can reconcile our naturally political aims with a universally accepted conception of the 
good life.   
It is not by luck, therefore, that the structure of this thesis resembles one of the 
central parts of Aristotle’s political and ethical philosophy: the transition from the 
philosophical understanding of the problem of politics and moral pluralism to the claim 
that politics has been, and still remains, the most important practical activity is like the 
transition from Aristotle’s contemplation to practical thinking.  While making this 
transition one has to think, necessarily, whether it is political activity or moral theory 
that must take priority in ordering ethical practices and, consequently, which one 
develops first.  In the same manner Aristotle struggled with the prioritization between 
intellectual and moral virtue.  Thus, in reconstructing the problem through the modern 
perspective, one is surely about to recognize Aristotle’s insoluble puzzle of political 
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pluralism (as derived from the variety of instantiations of practical reason) and ethical 
objectivism (as derived from the completeness and self-sufficiency of theory).  For 
Aristotle and all succeeding philosophers this puzzle poses an existential problem that 
concerns and will concern all of us for the foreseeable future. 
Of course, it is Machiavelli who re-introduces the problem in modernity after a 
long period of reliance on the Christian apolitical conception of the good and the 
precepts of salvation (eternal happiness) in another world.  However, we must go 
through a variety of interpretations of Machiavelli’s works in order to show that he does 
not merely reinstate the problem but he expands it into horizons that were not 
conceivable before.  Thus, I hope to have made clear that irrespective of Machiavelli’s 
true intentions, his works forced to the surface a historical lesson that we must take into 
consideration when examining the nature of morality and its relation to politics.  
Hampshire articulates this lesson succinctly when he argues that, ‘[w]e will perplex 
ourselves unnecessarily if we assume that all human beings have willy-nilly been 
entered as competitors in a single moral steeplechase, and that we need criteria for 
allotting them points on their performance’,558 because ‘the problem that Machiavelli 
posed in unphilosophical terms, and in terms appropriate to his time, is the specification 
of a more general issue in moral philosophy, and, further, that this general issue, 
philosophical though it is, often does cause confusion, and does in fact lead to despair in 
day-to-day politics.  The general issue is the incompatibility of different conceptions of 
the good life which are attached to different social roles and to the individual natures of 
very different human beings.’559  With Machiavelli therefore, we can for the first time 
reconstruct the problem of moral integrity, the plurality of social roles and the plurality 
of conceptions of the good by using our own vocabulary (deontology vs. utilitarianism; 
the ends and the means; Christianity and politics; republicanism and universalism etc.).  
In this sense, this is a crucial chapter in understanding the problem itself and its history.  
This is because it poses the problem in a manner that could not have been accessible to 
the ancient classical authors.  That is, politics and morality are not in tension just 
because there is a discontinuity between private and political virtue, but also, and maybe 
more significantly, because politics can only realize one conception of the good at any 
given time.  Hence, political roles represent specific conceptions of the good, when in 
the human moral universe there is an incompatible variety of such conceptions.   
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Thus, last but not least, it is Weber who decidedly pronounces the problem as 
permanently present and insoluble, considering the analytical tools at our disposal.  This 
is where the essential argument of moral pluralism in relation to politics and morality is 
finally revealed.  With Weber we can clearly see the origins of the differentiation 
between the ancients and the more modern political philosophers in relation to the roots 
of value pluralism.  If for the ancients the main distinction or conflict was between 
private and political virtue, in contemporary times there is also the element of public 
impartiality as a result of the dichotomy between the nation and the state.  This is an 
essential feature of moral pluralism which explains the intensification of the complexity 
of the connection between politics and morality in modernity.  But Weber is a key 
figure in this reconstruction also because he claims that despite the fact that the 
insoluble conflict between morality and politics is part of the irreducible moral 
pluralism, politics should remain the predominant moral activity.  Virtue within an 
endless variety of ‘conditions of existence’ remains the ultimate aim of moral and 
political philosophy, notwithstanding the fact that we now know that a universal and 
unitary account of virtues is maybe impossible.  Politics has a particular characteristic 
which assigns to it a universal dimension, exactly because it sets the frame within which 
we pursue this aim.  The question of whether this frame is based on an arbitrary 
conception of the good is irrelevant insofar as the resultant form of social organization 
is morally meaningful and allows a fulfilling ethical self-evaluation of its members. 
In the classical accounts, the relationship between politics and morality is 
problematic because of the basic dichotomy between the polis and the individual.  The 
focus of this classical division changes when we move to modernity.  Now, in place of 
the polis we find two quite distinct concepts that constitute political society; the nation 
and the state.  The moral significance of the community for its members becomes 
something obscure and complicated, maybe lost amidst the variety of moral claims 
coming from different spheres of social life.  Hence, it has become obvious from the 
Weberian conclusion of the historical reconstruction that the two features which signify 
the transition from antiquity to modernity are the fragmentation of morality and, as part 
of this fragmentation, the distinction between the public and the political, in addition to 
the distinction between the private and the political. 
The acceptance of moral pluralism, as the penultimate obstacle for the unity to 
which politics aspires, signifies the end of the genealogy of the problem and the –final– 
transition to our contemporary understanding of the inner connection between politics 
and morality.  Thus, it has been the contention of this thesis that the concept of moral 
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dilemmas is an essential feature for the philosophical understanding of our problem.  It 
is the necessary tool for analysing the debate between monistic and pluralistic theories 
of moral and political conduct.  Their basic difference lies in their acceptance or 
rejection of the existence of moral dilemmas and conflicts.  As a consequence of this 
difference, we also have different conceptions of moral and political agency.  The 
ambition of the dominant monistic moral theories of modernity is that of a faultless 
moral theory (i.e. wherein no moral conflicts are really possible) which would 
necessarily entail faultless political action.  On the other hand, according to pluralistic 
explanations of morality, if there are moral conflicts, then we should have to grapple 
with Weber’s existential problem, although now posed in a slightly different manner: 
that is, we should understand whether moral dilemmas arising in the political arena are 
any different from more ordinary moral dilemmas that may arise in everyday life, that 
is, outside politics; and then in what sense they are different.  In a few words, this is 
how we eventually arrive at one of the definitive questions of political morality.  The 
question is whether moral pluralism should entail disordered political action.   
This question is also related to the distinction between moral pluralism and 
moral relativism, because pluralistic understandings of morality do not deny the 
existence of fundamental and maybe universal moral principles; they merely accept the 
possibility that these principles may be conflicting and irreconcilable.  On the other 
hand, in moral relativism, where ‘anything goes’ in terms of moral reasoning, 
disordered political action may be more possible or even inevitable; and as Plato was 
the first to argue, in such cases moral reasoning necessarily degenerates into power 
relations.  But throughout the centuries, we have been assigning to politics, a special 
moral importance precisely because human beings envisage collective existence as 
something more meaningful than merely a web of power relations.  If, because of the 
fragmentation of morality, we denied the possibility of a moral politics in the first place, 
there would be no need to call some political situations ‘dirty’.  The explanation of 
‘dirty hands’ as the political expression of insoluble moral conflicts has reinforced the 
claim of this thesis that politics cannot but be moral, even in a world of conflicting 
moral values.  In contrast, if we understood politics as the power struggle that 
necessarily follows a relativistic account of morality, then to call politics a ‘dirty’ 
business would be redundant and pointless.    
What we learn from the historical explorations about the problem of politics and 
morality is that despite the acceptance that moral unity is not possible, we still find 
refuge to politics as the only way to resolving existential problems related to our moral 
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purposes.  Nowadays, we take it for granted that politics requires a plurality of moral 
viewpoints from which to begin; ‘and the interaction of these varied perspectives, their 
reconciliation into a single public policy, though that reconciliation will always be 
temporary, partial and provisional.’560  Thus, despite our newly founded certainty that 
there may not be a universally accepted coherent account of morality for political 
societies, we still ponder about politics in the classical ‘existential’ sense.  In other 
words, in contemporary political philosophy we still attribute a special moral character 
to politics, although we have outdated its ancient perfectionist and teleological 
conceptions.  A moral relativist could not agree, by principle, with this classical or 
‘existential’ approach to our problem, because for him, if all moral meaning is relative, 
and thus pointless, then moral politics is also meaningless and pointless.  
So, if we are ready to analyze the relation between politics and moral pluralism 
and, as I have attempted to show, accept that politics is part of the conflicting moral 
values and part of the solution to this conflict, we need to ask the question ‘in what way 
is this so?’  In one of the central passages of this thesis I hope to have demonstrated 
how the moral code of politics is, on the one hand, part of moral fragmentation and, on 
the other, an essential factor for its reconciliation.  Several points, which perhaps are not 
fully developed by some of the literature, have been discussed here, especially the 
conflict between the private, the public and the political spheres of action.  Private 
ethical considerations are based on a variety of moral values, whereas impartiality is the 
dominant value of the public sphere, and utility is the guiding principle of politics.  
Different spheres of individual and social activity are permeated by different sets of 
moral values, which are of equal importance for the agents involved and irreducible to 
each other.  That is how moral pluralism is depicted within the universe of social 
organization and action, and this is why the connection between politics and morality 
sometimes seems like a puzzling subject for philosophers who pursue morally unifying 
answers.  
Of course, the correlation of the private sphere of action with principles of the 
‘agent-centred’ standpoint and of the public and political spheres with principles of the 
‘outcome-centred’ standpoint repositions us within the ancient dichotomy between 
private and political virtue, which was then substituted in modernity by the conflict 
between principle and utility.  I have claimed, however, that although this fundamental 
dichotomy is the starting and definitive point for the relationship between politics and 
morality, we need to conceive the importance of moral agency in the social through the 
                                                 
560
 Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, 217. 
243 
 
tension between the three types of moral values as analyzed above.  Only then shall we 
understand the intricacies of the problematic relationship and be able to see what 
politics is and can be for morality and vice versa. 
The analysis of the inner connection between politics and morality is exposed 
therefore in this complexity of the variety of types of moral values that are in interplay.  
Monistic explanations of morality simplify this complexity and in practice exacerbate 
the confusion regarding our problem.  The modern threefold categorization of moral 
spheres signifies a progressive fragmentation of moral values that redefines the 
relationship between politics and morality in the course of time.  I have argued that this 
categorization is an essential feature for a better philosophical understanding of politics 
and morality within the pluralist tradition.  Moral fragmentation is depicted in the 
conflict between private moral integrity, which is constituted by general personal ethical 
considerations; political virtue, or sometimes called the political ethic, which gives 
priority to the utility and consequences of political action; and public morality which is 
particularly related to the public official’s virtues of impartiality.  Thus, fulfilling 
private, public and political roles requires a difficult prioritization of the demands of the 
role against the requirements of private ethical considerations.  Once again, we return to 
the problem that Plato first posed: how is moral integrity possible, if the ethical 
requirements of social (public and political) roles are not compatible with the demands 
of private virtue?  And then, what should one do in order to resolve this problem?  
Should one change the structure of the social roles so that they will conform to private 
ethical considerations (like Plato suggested)?  Or should one claim that private ethical 
considerations are the outcome of the function of social roles and thus the latter have 
priority?   
What we examined as the derivability problem in this thesis, is essentially a 
reconstruction of this perennial issue of how to assign priority between the two basic 
moral standpoints that define our daily moral life.  The pluralistic argument has been 
that if one accepts the existence of moral conflicts and thus, in consequence, the 
pluralistic nature of morality, the two standpoints are irreducible to each other and it is 
impossible to assign priority to either of them.  They represent the dualist manner in 
which human beings conceive the moral world: the ‘agent-centred’ against the 
‘outcome-centred’ standpoints.  The morality of social roles is a projection of the 
‘outcome-centred’ standpoint, whereas private ethical considerations are a projection of 
the ‘agent-centred’ standpoint.  The conflict within the self is projected into the conflict 
between the self and the social roles (public and political) that the self must fulfil.  
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Hence, when considering the general issue of this thesis, that is, the inner connection 
between politics and morality, we see that private or personal ethical considerations are 
related to moral values which mainly derive from the ‘agent-centred’ standpoint, 
whereas public and political morality is mainly constituted upon the values which 
derive from the ‘outcome-centred’ standpoint.  We say mainly, because there is always 
some degree of overlapping between values and principles deriving from the three 
different sets of moral values.  Thus, one of the main contributions of this thesis has 
been the clarification of these distinctions and the analysis of political morality through 
an understanding of how and when there is an overlapping of the otherwise conflicting 
moral codes.   
My claim is that the root of the philosophical confusion lies exactly within this 
fundamental dichotomy between the two standpoints, which is further exacerbated in 
politics because of the further distinction between the public and the political.  
However, I hope to have successfully argued, we should not simply accept the 
distinctions and the conflicting nature of the moral codes that are in interplay.  Instead, 
my argument is in favour of the view that personal (private ethical commitments) are 
indispensable for the function of public and political morality.  Therefore, it can be 
understood how the agents, individually and collectively, morally evaluate this interplay 
and set the boundaries between the different spheres of moral activity. 
Finally, the last point of this thesis to the political aspect of the complex 
philosophical problem of politics and morality is related to the practical consequences 
of such a conception of their inner connection as described above.  Because the purpose 
of any inquiry of this kind, as Aristotle posed it since the beginning, is to find out what 
ought to be done; what the moral agents ought to do.  If we conceive moral integrity as 
the outcome in part of our engagement into social (public and political) roles and in part 
of our ability critically to evaluate the morality of those roles according to our private 
ethical commitments, then the practical question is ‘how do we set constraints on 
political and public action within a pluralistic approach?’  Of course, it has been argued 
throughout the thesis, political and public roles inevitably carry with them certain duties 
to be fulfilled, and these roles have some special character because of the special 
character of politics in moulding the moral purposes of the collectivity.  Therefore, the 
conflicting nature of moral values in different spheres of life requires political agents 
who have a certain ability to reconcile, with the least possible moral cost, the conflicting 
values.  Essentially, then, what we call political and public virtue is the ability of the 
agents who act within those spheres to comprehend the special moral importance of 
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politics in a morally fragmented world.  Once again, Aristotle’s ethics should be here 
our guide: practical wisdom is the ultimate virtue because it relies on the philosophical 
understanding of the complexity of morality, before proceeding to commanding 
practical choices.  Nowadays, we need to re-introduce this conception of political virtue 
against the conception of political virtue purely as successful calculation.   
The case of ‘dirty hands’ has been used as an example to reveal the practical 
consequences of moral fragmentation for the political agents who, more often than not, 
face insoluble moral dilemmas.  My argument, however, has been that in reality, if one 
accepts the analysis from the philosophical perspective of this thesis, ‘dirty hands’ may 
not express fully the complexity of the relationship between politics and morality and 
the predicament of the political agents involved in such cases.  A politically active 
moral agent must learn how to recognize the special responsibility of carrying the 
burden of making political decisions, and he must be able to discern and be prepared for 
those inevitable situations that will require resolution of insoluble conflicts.  Therefore, 
I hope to have successfully shown that the main foci for the philosophical treatment of 
the problem of political morality should be: first the central theme of moral 
fragmentation; and second the conception of politics as part of this fragmentation and at 
the same time as the only practical activity that may help reconcile the opposing moral 
values and the conflicting conceptions of the good.  Politics may constitute its own 
autonomous moral code amongst many others, but in the end politics is the only 
practical activity that cannot be separated from the other spheres of human action.  Only 
through politics do societies find the unity of moral purpose that they constantly seek, 
even if only temporarily and partially.  This existential need to achieve some sense of 
moral unity through politics is the connecting thread of the genealogy from Plato to 
Weber, despite the break of modernity from ancient conceptions of the good life.  The 
philosophical understanding of the problem is a precondition for political virtue, in the 
Aristotelian sense. 
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